Paul A. Grassi
Elaine M. Newton
Ray A. Perlner
William E. Burr
James L. Fenton
Justin P. Richer
This publication is available free of charge from:
(to be added at publication)
Paul A. Grassi
Applied Cybersecurity Division
Information Technology Laboratory
Elaine M. Newton
Office of the Director
Information Technology Laboratory
Ray A. Perlner
Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory
William E. Burr
Dakota Consulting, Inc.
Silver Spring, MD
James L. Fenton
Altmode Networks
Los Altos, CA
Justin P. Richer
Bespoke Engineering
Billerica, MA
This publication is available free of charge from: (to be added at publication)
Month TBD 2016
U.S. Department of Commerce
Penny Pritzker, Secretary
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Willie E. May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and
Technology and Director
This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.
Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other Federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-63B
Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-63B, xxx pages (MonthTBD 2016)
CODEN: NSPUE2
This publication is available free of charge from: (to be added at publication)
Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.
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Comments on this publication may be submitted to [email protected]
Public comment period: Month Day, YYYY through Month Day, YYYY
All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
Email: [email protected]
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The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in Federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.
This document and its companion documents, SP 800-63-3, SP 800-63A, and SP 800-63C, provide technical and procedural guidelines to agencies implementing electronic authentication to choose and implement effective authentication processes based on risk. The recommendation covers remote authentication of users (such as employees, contractors, or private individuals) interacting with government IT systems over open networks. It defines technical requirements for each of the three authenticator assurance levels. This publication supersedes corresponding sections of NIST SP 800-63-1 and SP 800-63-2.
authentication; credential service provider; digital authentication; digital credentials; electronic authentication; electronic credentials.
The authors would like to acknowledge the thought leadership and innovation of the original authors: Donna F. Dodson, W. Timothy Polk, Sarbari Gupta, and Emad A. Nabbus. Without their tireless efforts, we would not have had the incredible baseline from which to evolve 800-63 to the document it is today.
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The terms “SHALL” and “SHALL NOT” indicate requirements to be followed strictly in order to conform to the publication and from which no deviation is permitted.
The terms “SHOULD” and “SHOULD NOT” indicate that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in the negative form) a certain possibility or course of action is discouraged but not prohibited.
The terms “MAY” and “NEED NOT” indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the publication.
The terms “CAN” and “CANNOT” indicate a possibility and capability, whether material, physical or causal.
Digital authentication is the process of establishing confidence that a given claimant is the same as a subscriber that has previously authenticated. The robustness of this confidence is described by categorization known as the Authenticator Assurance Level (AAL). The separation of AAL from Identity Assurance Level (IAL), described in SP 800-63A, better supports applications requiring strong authentication that may be pseudonomymous. The separation of authenticator issuance from the establishment of credentials binding those authenticators to individuals provides additional flexibility in the enrollment and identity proofing process.
This guideline addresses how an individual, known as a claimant, can securely authenticate to a Credential Service Provider to establish the context for a remote digital interaction.
The three AALs reflect the options agencies will select based on their risk profile and the potential harm caused by an invalid or fraudulent user accessing their systems. The AALs are as follows:
AAL 1: AAL 1 requires single factor authentication, giving some assurance that the same claimant who participated in previous transactions is accessing the protected transaction or data.
AAL 2: AAL 2 requires two different authentication factors, providing higher assurance that the same claimaint who participated in previous transactions is accessing the protected transaction or data.
AAL 3: AAL 3 provides the highest practical remote digital authentication assurance. It requires proof of possession of a key in a physical multifactor authenticator through a cryptographic protocol.
The three AALs correspond to the existing Levels of Assurance, specified in OMB Memorandum M-04-04, as follows:
| Level of Assurance | Authenticator Assurance Level |
|---|---|
| 1 | 1 |
| 2 (pseudonymous) | 1 |
| 2 (non-pseudonymous) | 1 |
| 3 | 2 |
| 4 | 3 |
3. Definitions and Abbreviations
4. Authenticator Assurance Levels
5. Authenticator and Verifier Requirements
6. Authenticator Lifecycle Requirements