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H264 Video Decoding Support #3
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Hi SetV, |
That is too bad. Any idea if this will speed up when v4l2 is rolling out? |
I have no idea, I'm not working actively on it anymore.
Le 22 mars 2017 2:08 AM, "Invictaz" <[email protected]> a écrit :
… That is too bad. Any idea if this will speed up when v4l2 is rolling out?
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Ilya reported following lockdep splat: kernel: ========================= kernel: [ BUG: held lock freed! ] kernel: 4.5.0-rc1-ceph-00026-g5e0a311 #1 Not tainted kernel: ------------------------- kernel: swapper/5/0 is freeing memory ffff880035c9d200-ffff880035c9dbff, with a lock still held there! kernel: (&(&queue->rskq_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff816f6a88>] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x28/0xa0 kernel: 4 locks held by swapper/5/0: kernel: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8169ef6b>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x4b/0x1f0 kernel: #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff816e977f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3f/0x380 kernel: #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81685ffb>] sk_clone_lock+0x19b/0x440 kernel: #3: (&(&queue->rskq_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff816f6a88>] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x28/0xa0 To properly fix this issue, inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() needs to return to its callers if the child as been queued into accept queue. We also need to make sure listener is still there before calling sk->sk_data_ready(), by holding a reference on it, since the reference carried by the child can disappear as soon as the child is put on accept queue. Reported-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Fixes: ebb516a ("tcp/dccp: fix race at listener dismantle phase") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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If we use USB ID pin as wakeup source, and there is a USB block device on this USB OTG (ID) cable, the system will be deadlock after system resume. The root cause for this problem is: the workqueue ci_otg may try to remove hcd before the driver resume has finished, and hcd will disconnect the device on it, then, it will call device_release_driver, and holds the device lock "dev->mutex", but it is never unlocked since it waits workqueue writeback to run to flush the block information, but the workqueue writeback is freezable, it is not thawed before driver resume has finished. When the driver (device: sd 0:0:0:0:) resume goes to dpm_complete, it tries to get its device lock "dev->mutex", but it can't get it forever, then the deadlock occurs. Below call stacks show the situation. So, in order to fix this problem, we need to change workqueue ci_otg as freezable, then the work item in this workqueue will be run after driver's resume, this workqueue will not be blocked forever like above case since the workqueue writeback has been thawed too. Tested at: i.mx6qdl-sabresd and i.mx6sx-sdb. [ 555.178869] kworker/u2:13 D c07de74c 0 826 2 0x00000000 [ 555.185310] Workqueue: ci_otg ci_otg_work [ 555.189353] Backtrace: [ 555.191849] [<c07de4fc>] (__schedule) from [<c07dec6c>] (schedule+0x48/0xa0) [ 555.198912] r10:ee471ba0 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000002 r6:ee470000 r5:ee471ba4 [ 555.206867] r4:ee470000 [ 555.209453] [<c07dec24>] (schedule) from [<c07e2fc4>] (schedule_timeout+0x15c/0x1e0) [ 555.217212] r4:7fffffff r3:edc2b000 [ 555.220862] [<c07e2e68>] (schedule_timeout) from [<c07df6c8>] (wait_for_common+0x94/0x144) [ 555.229140] r8:00000000 r7:00000002 r6:ee470000 r5:ee471ba4 r4:7fffffff [ 555.235980] [<c07df634>] (wait_for_common) from [<c07df790>] (wait_for_completion+0x18/0x1c) [ 555.244430] r10:00000001 r9:c0b5563c r8:c0042e48 r7:ef086000 r6:eea4372c r5:ef131b00 [ 555.252383] r4:00000000 [ 555.254970] [<c07df778>] (wait_for_completion) from [<c0043cb8>] (flush_work+0x19c/0x234) [ 555.263177] [<c0043b1c>] (flush_work) from [<c0043fac>] (flush_delayed_work+0x48/0x4c) [ 555.271106] r8:ed5b5000 r7:c0b38a3c r6:eea439cc r5:eea4372c r4:eea4372c [ 555.277958] [<c0043f64>] (flush_delayed_work) from [<c00eae18>] (bdi_unregister+0x84/0xec) [ 555.286236] r4:eea43520 r3:20000153 [ 555.289885] [<c00ead94>] (bdi_unregister) from [<c02c2154>] (blk_cleanup_queue+0x180/0x29c) [ 555.298250] r5:eea43808 r4:eea43400 [ 555.301909] [<c02c1fd4>] (blk_cleanup_queue) from [<c0417914>] (__scsi_remove_device+0x48/0xb8) [ 555.310623] r7:00000000 r6:20000153 r5:ededa950 r4:ededa800 [ 555.316403] [<c04178cc>] (__scsi_remove_device) from [<c0415e90>] (scsi_forget_host+0x64/0x68) [ 555.325028] r5:ededa800 r4:ed5b5000 [ 555.328689] [<c0415e2c>] (scsi_forget_host) from [<c0409828>] (scsi_remove_host+0x78/0x104) [ 555.337054] r5:ed5b5068 r4:ed5b5000 [ 555.340709] [<c04097b0>] (scsi_remove_host) from [<c04cdfcc>] (usb_stor_disconnect+0x50/0xb4) [ 555.349247] r6:ed5b56e4 r5:ed5b5818 r4:ed5b5690 r3:00000008 [ 555.355025] [<c04cdf7c>] (usb_stor_disconnect) from [<c04b3bc8>] (usb_unbind_interface+0x78/0x25c) [ 555.363997] r8:c13919b4 r7:edd3c000 r6:edd3c020 r5:ee551c68 r4:ee551c00 r3:c04cdf7c [ 555.371892] [<c04b3b50>] (usb_unbind_interface) from [<c03dc248>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0x118) [ 555.381213] r10:00000001 r9:edd90c00 r8:c13919b4 r7:ee551c68 r6:c0b546e0 r5:c0b5563c [ 555.389167] r4:edd3c020 [ 555.391752] [<c03dc1bc>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c03dc2fc>] (device_release_driver+0x28/0x34) [ 555.401071] r5:edd3c020 r4:edd3c054 [ 555.404721] [<c03dc2d4>] (device_release_driver) from [<c03db304>] (bus_remove_device+0xe0/0x110) [ 555.413607] r5:edd3c020 r4:ef17f04c [ 555.417253] [<c03db224>] (bus_remove_device) from [<c03d8128>] (device_del+0x114/0x21c) [ 555.425270] r6:edd3c028 r5:edd3c020 r4:ee551c00 r3:00000000 [ 555.431045] [<c03d8014>] (device_del) from [<c04b1560>] (usb_disable_device+0xa4/0x1e8) [ 555.439061] r8:edd3c000 r7:eded8000 r6:00000000 r5:00000001 r4:ee551c00 [ 555.445906] [<c04b14bc>] (usb_disable_device) from [<c04a8e54>] (usb_disconnect+0x74/0x224) [ 555.454271] r9:edd90c00 r8:ee551000 r7:ee551c68 r6:ee551c9c r5:ee551c00 r4:00000001 [ 555.462156] [<c04a8de0>] (usb_disconnect) from [<c04a8fb8>] (usb_disconnect+0x1d8/0x224) [ 555.470259] r10:00000001 r9:edd90000 r8:ee471e2c r7:ee551468 r6:ee55149c r5:ee551400 [ 555.478213] r4:00000001 [ 555.480797] [<c04a8de0>] (usb_disconnect) from [<c04ae5ec>] (usb_remove_hcd+0xa0/0x1ac) [ 555.488813] r10:00000001 r9:ee471eb0 r8:00000000 r7:ef3d9500 r6:eded810c r5:eded80b0 [ 555.496765] r4:eded8000 [ 555.499351] [<c04ae54c>] (usb_remove_hcd) from [<c04d4158>] (host_stop+0x28/0x64) [ 555.506847] r6:eeb50010 r5:eded8000 r4:eeb51010 [ 555.511563] [<c04d4130>] (host_stop) from [<c04d09b8>] (ci_otg_work+0xc4/0x124) [ 555.518885] r6:00000001 r5:eeb50010 r4:eeb502a0 r3:c04d4130 [ 555.524665] [<c04d08f4>] (ci_otg_work) from [<c00454f0>] (process_one_work+0x194/0x420) [ 555.532682] r6:ef086000 r5:eeb502a0 r4:edc44480 [ 555.537393] [<c004535c>] (process_one_work) from [<c00457b0>] (worker_thread+0x34/0x514) [ 555.545496] r10:edc44480 r9:ef086000 r8:c0b1a100 r7:ef086034 r6:00000088 r5:edc44498 [ 555.553450] r4:ef086000 [ 555.556032] [<c004577c>] (worker_thread) from [<c004bab4>] (kthread+0xdc/0xf8) [ 555.563268] r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:c004577c r6:edc44480 r5:eddc15c0 [ 555.571221] r4:00000000 [ 555.573804] [<c004b9d8>] (kthread) from [<c000fef0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) [ 555.581040] r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c004b9d8 r4:eddc15c0 [ 553.429383] sh D c07de74c 0 694 691 0x00000000 [ 553.435801] Backtrace: [ 553.438295] [<c07de4fc>] (__schedule) from [<c07dec6c>] (schedule+0x48/0xa0) [ 553.445358] r10:edd3c054 r9:edd3c078 r8:edddbd50 r7:edcbbc00 r6:c1377c34 r5:60000153 [ 553.453313] r4:eddda000 [ 553.455896] [<c07dec24>] (schedule) from [<c07deff8>] (schedule_preempt_disabled+0x10/0x14) [ 553.464261] r4:edd3c058 r3:0000000a [ 553.467910] [<c07defe8>] (schedule_preempt_disabled) from [<c07e0bbc>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x1a0/0x3e8) [ 553.477254] [<c07e0a1c>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e927c>] (dpm_complete+0xc0/0x1b0) [ 553.485358] r10:00561408 r9:edd3c054 r8:c0b4863c r7:edddbd90 r6:c0b485d8 r5:edd3c020 [ 553.493313] r4:edd3c0d0 [ 553.495896] [<c03e91bc>] (dpm_complete) from [<c03e9388>] (dpm_resume_end+0x1c/0x20) [ 553.503652] r9:00000000 r8:c0b1a9d0 r7:c1334ec0 r6:c1334edc r5:00000003 r4:00000010 [ 553.511544] [<c03e936c>] (dpm_resume_end) from [<c0079894>] (suspend_devices_and_enter+0x158/0x504) [ 553.520604] r4:00000000 r3:c1334efc [ 553.524250] [<c007973c>] (suspend_devices_and_enter) from [<c0079e74>] (pm_suspend+0x234/0x2cc) [ 553.532961] r10:00561408 r9:ed6b7300 r8:00000004 r7:c1334eec r6:00000000 r5:c1334ee8 [ 553.540914] r4:00000003 [ 553.543493] [<c0079c40>] (pm_suspend) from [<c0078a6c>] (state_store+0x6c/0xc0) [ 555.703684] 7 locks held by kworker/u2:13/826: [ 555.708140] #0: ("%s""ci_otg"){++++.+}, at: [<c0045484>] process_one_work+0x128/0x420 [ 555.716277] #1: ((&ci->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0045484>] process_one_work+0x128/0x420 [ 555.724317] #2: (usb_bus_list_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04ae5e4>] usb_remove_hcd+0x98/0x1ac [ 555.732626] #3: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04a8e28>] usb_disconnect+0x48/0x224 [ 555.740403] #4: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04a8e28>] usb_disconnect+0x48/0x224 [ 555.748179] #5: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c03dc2f4>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x34 [ 555.756487] #6: (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04097d0>] scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x104 Cc: <[email protected]> #v3.14+ Cc: Jun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>
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Aaron Young says: ==================== ldmvsw: Add ldmvsw driver This series adds a new Logical Domains vSwitch (ldmvsw) driver. The ldmvsw driver code will live in the drivers/net/ethernet/sun/ directory and will operate on Oracle systems running SPARC Linux in a Logical Domains environment (typically in the control domain). The ldmvsw driver is very similar in function to the existing sunvnet driver. Ldmvsw creates a network interface for each "vsw-port" node found in the Machine Description (MD) of a service domain. These nodes correspond to ports on a vswitch created by the logical domains manager. The created network interface(s) can be used by bridge/vswitch software (such as the Linux bridge or Open vSwitch) to provide guest domain(s) with network interconnectivity or connectivity to a physical network. Here is a example diagram of ldmvsw driver usage in a logical domain environment to provide a guest domain with network connectivity to a physical NIC on the service domain: +----------------+ +----------------- | Service Domain | | Guest domain | | | | | | LinuxBridge | | | | | | | | | | NIC Ldmvsw | | Sunvnet | +----------------+ +----------------+ | | LDC | LAN ------------------------------ As stated, the sunvnet and ldmvsw drivers are _very_ similar in function. They both create network interface(s) to receive/transmit network traffic across LDC network channel(s). Since the driver is so similar in function to sunvnet, the approach will be as follows to integrate the driver and take advantage of common code: Patch #1: Split sunvnet.c driver into sunvnet.c and sunvnet_common.c Patch #2: Modify the sunvnet_common code and data structures to be compatible with both the sunvnet and ldmvsw drivers. Patch #3: Add the new ldmvsw.c driver code Patch #4: Checkpatch cleanup of the sunvnet/sunvnet_common code. NOTE - Patch#1 renames a file (sunvnet.h -> sunvnet_common.h). When generating the patches (using git format-patch), I had to use the --no-renames option otherwise patch#1 would NOT apply using 'patch -p1' - which as I understand is a requirement for patch acceptance. I wasn't sure if this is proper thing to do. Please advise if not. Thanks. v2 changes: * change all EXPORT_SYMBOL declarations to EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL * remove inline attribute for external function port_is_up_common() * Give all exported/global funcs in sunvnet_common.c a 'sunvnet_' prefix to avoid kernel global namespace pollution/collisions * ldmvsw.c: Order local variable declarations from longest to shortest line * ldmvsw.c: register the netdevice after all supporting state is ready/setup. NOTE: The consensus at Oracle is that the following functions must be done AFTER register_netdev() - this is the same ordering currently used in the sunvnet driver: 1. sunvnet_port_add_txq_common() - needs registered netdev 2. napi_enable() - requires registered netdev 3. vio_port_up() - as soon as this function is called LDC handshake messages will come in which must be handled by the napi code. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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In some cases, platform thermal driver may report invalid trip points, thermal core should not take any action for these trip points. This fixed a regression that bogus trip point starts to screw up thermal control on some Lenovo laptops, after commit bb431ba Author: Zhang Rui <[email protected]> Date: Fri Oct 30 16:31:47 2015 +0800 Thermal: initialize thermal zone device correctly After thermal zone device registered, as we have not read any temperature before, thus tz->temperature should not be 0, which actually means 0C, and thermal trend is not available. In this case, we need specially handling for the first thermal_zone_device_update(). Both thermal core framework and step_wise governor is enhanced to handle this. And since the step_wise governor is the only one that uses trends, so it's the only thermal governor that needs to be updated. Tested-by: Manuel Krause <[email protected]> Tested-by: szegad <[email protected]> Tested-by: prash <[email protected]> Tested-by: amish <[email protected]> Tested-by: Matthias <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Javi Merino <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> #3.18+ Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1317190 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114551 Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
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…pt() Since 4.4, I've been able to trigger this occasionally: =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.5.0-rc7-think+ #3 Not tainted Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> ------------------------------- ./arch/x86/include/asm/msr-trace.h:47 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from idle CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! no locks held by swapper/3/0. stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7-think+ #3 ffffffff92f821e0 1f3e5c340597d7fc ffff880468e07f10 ffffffff92560c2a ffff880462145280 0000000000000001 ffff880468e07f40 ffffffff921376a6 ffffffff93665ea0 0000cc7c876d28da 0000000000000005 ffffffff9383dd60 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff92560c2a>] dump_stack+0x67/0x9d [<ffffffff921376a6>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe6/0x100 [<ffffffff925ae7a7>] do_trace_write_msr+0x127/0x1a0 [<ffffffff92061c83>] native_apic_msr_eoi_write+0x23/0x30 [<ffffffff92054408>] smp_trace_call_function_interrupt+0x38/0x360 [<ffffffff92d1ca60>] trace_call_function_interrupt+0x90/0xa0 <EOI> [<ffffffff92ac5124>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x1b4/0x520 Move the entering_irq() call before ack_APIC_irq(), because entering_irq() tells the RCU susbstems to end the extended quiescent state, so that the following trace call in ack_APIC_irq() works correctly. Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Fixes: 4787c36 "x86/tracing: Add irq_enter/exit() in smp_trace_reschedule_interrupt()" Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]
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commit e2c8b87 moved modeset locking inside resume/suspend functions, but missed a code path only executed on lid close/open on older hardware. The result was a deadlock when closing and opening the lid without suspending on such hardware: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.6.0-rc1 #385 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- kworker/0:3/88 is trying to acquire lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] but task is already holding lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d4f>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3e/0xa6 [drm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by kworker/0:3/88: #0: ("kacpi_notify"){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff81068dfc>] process_one_work+0x14a/0x50b #1: ((&dpc->work)#2){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81068dfc>] process_one_work+0x14a/0x50b #2: ((acpi_lid_notifier).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff8106f874>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x65 #3: (&dev_priv->modeset_restore_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0664cf6>] intel_lid_notify+0x3c/0xd9 [i915] #4: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d4f>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3e/0xa6 [drm] #5: (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d59>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x48/0xa6 [drm] #6: (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.6.0-rc1 #385 Hardware name: LENOVO 2776LEG/2776LEG, BIOS 6EET55WW (3.15 ) 12/19/2011 Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred 0000000000000000 ffff88022fd5f990 ffffffff8124af06 ffffffff825b39c0 ffffffff825b39c0 ffff88022fd5fa60 ffffffff8108f547 ffff88022fd5fa70 000000008108e817 ffff880230236cc0 0000000000000000 ffffffff825b39c0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8124af06>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [<ffffffff8108f547>] __lock_acquire+0xdb5/0xf71 [<ffffffff8108bd2c>] ? look_up_lock_class+0xbe/0x10a [<ffffffff8108fae2>] lock_acquire+0x137/0x1cb [<ffffffff8108fae2>] ? lock_acquire+0x137/0x1cb [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffff8148202f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x7e/0x3a4 [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0bf7>] ? drm_modeset_lock+0x17/0x24 [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0c8b>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all_ctx+0x87/0xa1 [drm] [<ffffffffa0664d6a>] intel_lid_notify+0xb0/0xd9 [i915] [<ffffffff8106f4c6>] notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x6c [<ffffffff8106f88d>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x65 [<ffffffff8106f8b9>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x16 [<ffffffffa0011215>] acpi_lid_send_state+0x83/0xad [button] [<ffffffffa00112a6>] acpi_button_notify+0x41/0x132 [button] [<ffffffff812b07df>] acpi_device_notify+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff812c8570>] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x49/0x64 [<ffffffff812ab9fb>] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff81068f17>] process_one_work+0x265/0x50b [<ffffffff810696f5>] worker_thread+0x1fc/0x2dd [<ffffffff810694f9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x309/0x309 [<ffffffff810694f9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x309/0x309 [<ffffffff8106e2d6>] kthread+0xe0/0xe8 [<ffffffff8107bc47>] ? local_clock+0x19/0x22 [<ffffffff81484f42>] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 [<ffffffff8106e1f6>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1b5/0x1b5 Fixes: e2c8b87 ("drm/i915: Use atomic helpers for suspend, v2.") Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 9f54d4b) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
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The driver never calls platform_set_drvdata() , so platform_get_drvdata() in .remove returns NULL and thus $indio_dev variable in .remove is NULL. Then it's only a matter of dereferencing the indio_dev variable to make the kernel blow as seen below. This patch adds the platform_set_drvdata() call to fix the problem. root@armhf:~# rmmod at91-sama5d2_adc Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000001d4 pgd = dd57c000 [000001d4] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: at91_sama5d2_adc(-) CPU: 0 PID: 1334 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 4.6.0-rc3-next-20160418+ #3 Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5 task: dd4fcc40 ti: de910000 task.ti: de910000 PC is at mutex_lock+0x4/0x24 LR is at iio_device_unregister+0x14/0x6c pc : [<c05f4624>] lr : [<c0471f74>] psr: a00d0013 sp : de911f00 ip : 00000000 fp : be898bd8 r10: 00000000 r9 : de910000 r8 : c0107724 r7 : 00000081 r6 : bf001048 r5 : 000001d4 r4 : 00000000 r3 : bf000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000004 r0 : 000001d4 Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c53c7d Table: 3d57c059 DAC: 00000051 Process rmmod (pid: 1334, stack limit = 0xde910208) Stack: (0xde911f00 to 0xde912000) 1f00: bf000000 00000000 df5c7e10 bf000010 bf000000 df5c7e10 df5c7e10 c0351ca8 1f20: c0351c84 df5c7e10 bf001048 c0350734 bf001048 df5c7e10 df5c7e44 c035087c 1f40: bf001048 7f62dd4c 00000800 c034fb30 bf0010c0 c0158ee8 de910000 31397461 1f60: 6d61735f 32643561 6364615f 00000000 de911f90 de910000 de910000 00000000 1f80: de911fb0 10c53c7d de911f9c c05f33d8 de911fa0 00910000 be898ecb 7f62dd10 1fa0: 00000000 c0107560 be898ecb 7f62dd10 7f62dd4c 00000800 6f844800 6f844800 1fc0: be898ecb 7f62dd10 00000000 00000081 00000000 7f62dd10 be898bd8 be898bd8 1fe0: b6eedab1 be898b6c 7f61056b b6eedab6 000d0030 7f62dd4c 00000000 00000000 [<c05f4624>] (mutex_lock) from [<c0471f74>] (iio_device_unregister+0x14/0x6c) [<c0471f74>] (iio_device_unregister) from [<bf000010>] (at91_adc_remove+0x10/0x3c [at91_sama5d2_adc]) [<bf000010>] (at91_adc_remove [at91_sama5d2_adc]) from [<c0351ca8>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x3c) [<c0351ca8>] (platform_drv_remove) from [<c0350734>] (__device_release_driver+0x84/0x110) [<c0350734>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c035087c>] (driver_detach+0x8c/0x90) [<c035087c>] (driver_detach) from [<c034fb30>] (bus_remove_driver+0x4c/0xa0) [<c034fb30>] (bus_remove_driver) from [<c0158ee8>] (SyS_delete_module+0x110/0x1d0) [<c0158ee8>] (SyS_delete_module) from [<c0107560>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c) Code: e3520001 1affffd5 eafffff4 f5d0f000 (e1902f9f) ---[ end trace 86914d7ad3696fca ]--- Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <[email protected]> Cc: Ludovic Desroches <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
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…ing" This patch causes a Kernel panic when called on a DVB driver. This was also reported by David R <[email protected]>: May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.247123] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.247239] IP: [<ffffffffa0222c71>] __verify_planes_array.isra.3+0x1/0x80 [videobuf2_v4l2] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.247354] PGD cae6f067 PUD ca99c067 PMD 0 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.247426] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.247482] Modules linked in: xfs tun xt_connmark xt_TCPMSS xt_tcpmss xt_owner xt_REDIRECT nf_nat_redirect xt_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 ts_kmp ts_bm xt_string ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_recent xt_conntrack xt_multiport xt_pkttype xt_tcpudp xt_mark nf_log_ipv4 nf_log_common xt_LOG xt_limit iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables ip6table_filter ip6_tables x_tables pppoe pppox dm_crypt ts2020 regmap_i2c ds3000 cx88_dvb dvb_pll cx88_vp3054_i2c mt352 videobuf2_dvb cx8800 cx8802 cx88xx pl2303 tveeprom videobuf2_dma_sg ppdev videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_core dvb_usb_digitv snd_hda_codec_via snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_generic radeon dvb_usb snd_hda_intel amd64_edac_mod serio_raw snd_hda_codec edac_core fbcon k10temp bitblit softcursor snd_hda_core font snd_pcm_oss i2c_piix4 snd_mixer_oss tileblit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea snd_pcm snd_seq_dummy sysfillrect snd_seq_oss sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm snd_seq_midi r8169 snd_rawmidi drm snd_seq_midi_event e1000e snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer snd ptp pps_core i2c_algo_bit soundcore parport_pc ohci_pci shpchp tpm_tis tpm nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry hwmon_vid exportfs nfs_acl mii nfs bonding lockd grace lp sunrpc parport May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.249564] CPU: 1 PID: 6889 Comm: vb2-cx88[0] Not tainted 4.5.3 #3 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.249644] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/M4A785TD-V EVO, BIOS 0211 07/08/2009 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.249767] task: ffff8800aebf3600 ti: ffff8801e07a0000 task.ti: ffff8801e07a0000 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.249861] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0222c71>] [<ffffffffa0222c71>] __verify_planes_array.isra.3+0x1/0x80 [videobuf2_v4l2] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250002] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e07a3de8 EFLAGS: 00010086 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250071] RAX: 0000000000000283 RBX: ffff880210dc5000 RCX: 0000000000000283 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250161] RDX: ffffffffa0222cf0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff880210dc5014 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250251] RBP: ffff8801e07a3df8 R08: ffff8801e07a0000 R09: 0000000000000000 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250348] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800cda2a9d8 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250438] R13: ffff880210dc51b8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800cda2a828 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250528] FS: 00007f5b77fff700(0000) GS:ffff88021fc40000(0000) knlGS:00000000adaffb40 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250631] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250704] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000000ca19d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250794] Stack: May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250822] ffff8801e07a3df8 ffffffffa0222cfd ffff8801e07a3e70 ffffffffa0236beb May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.250937] 0000000000000283 ffff8801e07a3e94 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251051] ffff8800aebf3600 ffffffff8108d8e0 ffff8801e07a3e38 ffff8801e07a3e38 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251165] Call Trace: May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251200] [<ffffffffa0222cfd>] ? __verify_planes_array_core+0xd/0x10 [videobuf2_v4l2] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251306] [<ffffffffa0236beb>] vb2_core_dqbuf+0x2eb/0x4c0 [videobuf2_core] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251398] [<ffffffff8108d8e0>] ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x100/0x100 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251482] [<ffffffffa023855b>] vb2_thread+0x1cb/0x220 [videobuf2_core] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251569] [<ffffffffa0238390>] ? vb2_core_qbuf+0x230/0x230 [videobuf2_core] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.251662] [<ffffffffa0238390>] ? vb2_core_qbuf+0x230/0x230 [videobuf2_core] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.255982] [<ffffffff8106f984>] kthread+0xc4/0xe0 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.260292] [<ffffffff8106f8c0>] ? kthread_park+0x50/0x50 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.264615] [<ffffffff81697a5f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.268962] [<ffffffff8106f8c0>] ? kthread_park+0x50/0x50 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.273216] Code: 0d 01 74 16 48 8b 46 28 48 8b 56 30 48 89 87 d0 01 00 00 48 89 97 d8 01 00 00 5d c3 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 <8b> 46 04 48 89 e5 8d 50 f7 31 c0 83 fa 01 76 02 5d c3 48 83 7e May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.282146] RIP [<ffffffffa0222c71>] __verify_planes_array.isra.3+0x1/0x80 [videobuf2_v4l2] May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.286391] RSP <ffff8801e07a3de8> May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.290619] CR2: 0000000000000004 May 7 14:47:35 server kernel: [ 501.294786] ---[ end trace b2b354153ccad110 ]--- This reverts commit 2c1f695. Cc: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]> Cc: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 2c1f695 ("[media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing") Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
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Paul Durrant says: ==================== xen-netback: support for control ring My recent patch to import an up-to-date include/xen/interface/io/netif.h from the Xen Project brought in the necessary definitions to support the new control shared ring and protocol. This patch series updates xen-netback to support the new ring. Patch #1 adds the necessary boilerplate to map the control ring and handle messages. No implementation of the new protocol is included in this patch so that it can be kept to a reasonable size. Patch #2 adds the protocol implementation. Patch #3 adds support for passing has values calculated by xen-netback to capable frontends. Patch #4 adds support for accepting hash values calculated by capable frontends and using them the set the socket buffer hash. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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…offline_kmem() memcg_offline_kmem() may be called from memcg_free_kmem() after a css init failure. memcg_free_kmem() is a ->css_free callback which is called without cgroup_mutex and memcg_offline_kmem() ends up using css_for_each_descendant_pre() without any locking. Fix it by adding rcu read locking around it. mkdir: cannot create directory `65530': No space left on device =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.6.0-work+ #321 Not tainted ------------------------------- kernel/cgroup.c:4008 cgroup_mutex or RCU read lock required! [ 527.243970] other info that might help us debug this: [ 527.244715] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by kworker/0:5/1664: #0: ("cgroup_destroy"){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff81060ab5>] process_one_work+0x165/0x4a0 #1: ((&css->destroy_work)#3){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81060ab5>] process_one_work+0x165/0x4a0 [ 527.248098] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1664 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 4.6.0-work+ #321 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.1-1.fc24 04/01/2014 Workqueue: cgroup_destroy css_free_work_fn Call Trace: dump_stack+0x68/0xa1 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xd7/0x110 css_next_descendant_pre+0x7d/0xb0 memcg_offline_kmem.part.44+0x4a/0xc0 mem_cgroup_css_free+0x1ec/0x200 css_free_work_fn+0x49/0x5e0 process_one_work+0x1c5/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x49/0x490 kthread+0xea/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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In commit f9476a6 ("drm/i915: Refactor platform specifics out of intel_get_shared_dpll()"), the ibx_get_dpll() function lacked an error check, that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to enable three pipes. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000068 IP: [<ffffffffa0482275>] intel_reference_shared_dpll+0x15/0x100 [i915] PGD cec87067 PUD d30ce067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel i915 drm_kms_helper drm intel_gtt sch_fq_codel cfg80211 binfmt_misc i2c_algo_bit cfbfillrect syscopyarea cfbimgblt sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cfbcopyarea intel_rapl iosf_mbi x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp agpgart kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm iTCO_wdt snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic irqbypass aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd psmouse pcspkr snd_hda_codec i2c_i801 snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer lpc_ich mfd_core snd soundcore wmi evdev tpm_tis tpm [last unloaded: drm] CPU: 3 PID: 5810 Comm: kms_flip Tainted: G U W 4.6.0-test+ #3 Hardware name: /DZ77BH-55K, BIOS BHZ7710H.86A.0100.2013.0517.0942 05/17/2013 task: ffff8800d3908040 ti: ffff8801166c8000 task.ti: ffff8801166c8000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0482275>] [<ffffffffa0482275>] intel_reference_shared_dpll+0x15/0x100 [i915] RSP: 0018:ffff8801166cba60 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8800d07f1bf8 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8801166cba88 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffff8800d32e5698 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff8800cc89ac88 R12: ffff8800d07f1bf8 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4c3fc8d8c0(0000) GS:ffff88011bcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000068 CR3: 00000000d3b4c000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffff8800d07f1bf8 0000000000000000 ffff8800d04c0000 0000000000000000 ffff8801166cbaa8 ffffffffa04823a7 ffff8800d07f1bf8 ffff8800d32e5698 ffff8801166cbab8 ffffffffa04840cf ffff8801166cbaf0 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa04823a7>] ibx_get_dpll+0x47/0xa0 [i915] [<ffffffffa04840cf>] intel_get_shared_dpll+0x1f/0x50 [i915] [<ffffffffa046d080>] ironlake_crtc_compute_clock+0x280/0x430 [i915] [<ffffffffa0472ac0>] intel_crtc_atomic_check+0x240/0x320 [i915] [<ffffffffa03da18e>] drm_atomic_helper_check_planes+0x14e/0x1d0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa0474a0c>] intel_atomic_check+0x5dc/0x1110 [i915] [<ffffffffa029d3aa>] drm_atomic_check_only+0x14a/0x660 [drm] [<ffffffffa029d086>] ? drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector+0x96/0x100 [drm] [<ffffffffa029d8d7>] drm_atomic_commit+0x17/0x60 [drm] [<ffffffffa03dc3b7>] restore_fbdev_mode+0x237/0x260 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa029c65a>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all_ctx+0x9a/0xb0 [drm] [<ffffffffa03de9b3>] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x33/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03dea2d>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03de93a>] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event+0xaa/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03de9d6>] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x56/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa0490f72>] intel_fbdev_restore_mode+0x22/0x80 [i915] [<ffffffffa04ba45e>] i915_driver_lastclose+0xe/0x20 [i915] [<ffffffffa02810de>] drm_lastclose+0x2e/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa028148c>] drm_release+0x2ac/0x4b0 [drm] [<ffffffff811a6b2d>] __fput+0xed/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811a6c6e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81079156>] task_work_run+0x76/0xb0 [<ffffffff8105aaab>] do_exit+0x3ab/0xc60 [<ffffffff810a145f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x12f/0x1c0 [<ffffffff8105c67e>] do_group_exit+0x4e/0xc0 [<ffffffff8105c704>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff8158bb25>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xa8 Code: 14 80 48 8d 34 90 b8 01 00 00 00 d3 e0 09 04 b3 5b 41 5c 5d c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 55 41 54 53 <44> 8b 67 68 48 89 f3 48 8b be 08 02 00 00 4c 8b 2e e8 15 9d fd RIP [<ffffffffa0482275>] intel_reference_shared_dpll+0x15/0x100 [i915] RSP <ffff8801166cba60> CR2: 0000000000000068 Cc: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Fixes: f9476a6 ("drm/i915: Refactor platform specifics out of intel_get_shared_dpll()") Signed-off-by: Ander Conselvan de Oliveira <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1463748426-5956-1-git-send-email-ander.conselvan.de.oliveira@intel.com (cherry picked from commit bb14316) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
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We must not attempt to send WMI packets while holding the data-lock, as it may deadlock: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c:1824 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 2878, name: wpa_supplicant ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.4.6+ #21 Tainted: G W O --------------------------------------------- wpa_supplicant/2878 is trying to acquire lock: (&(&ar->data_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0721511>] ath10k_wmi_tx_beacons_iter+0x26/0x11a [ath10k_core] but task is already holding lock: (&(&ar->data_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa070251b>] ath10k_peer_create+0x122/0x1ae [ath10k_core] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&ar->data_lock)->rlock); lock(&(&ar->data_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by wpa_supplicant/2878: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff816493ca>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x14 #1: (&ar->conf_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0706932>] ath10k_add_interface+0x3b/0xbda [ath10k_core] #2: (&(&ar->data_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa070251b>] ath10k_peer_create+0x122/0x1ae [ath10k_core] #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffffa062f304>] rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x66 [mac80211] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 2878 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G W O 4.4.6+ #21 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./ChiefRiver, BIOS 4.6.5 06/07/2013 0000000000000000 ffff8801fcadf8f0 ffffffff8137086d ffffffff82681720 ffffffff82681720 ffff8801fcadf9b0 ffffffff8112e3be ffff8801fcadf920 0000000100000000 ffffffff82681720 ffffffffa0721500 ffff8801fcb8d348 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137086d>] dump_stack+0x81/0xb6 [<ffffffff8112e3be>] __lock_acquire+0xc5b/0xde7 [<ffffffffa0721500>] ? ath10k_wmi_tx_beacons_iter+0x15/0x11a [ath10k_core] [<ffffffff8112d0d0>] ? mark_lock+0x24/0x201 [<ffffffff8112e908>] lock_acquire+0x132/0x1cb [<ffffffff8112e908>] ? lock_acquire+0x132/0x1cb [<ffffffffa0721511>] ? ath10k_wmi_tx_beacons_iter+0x26/0x11a [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa07214eb>] ? ath10k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x1ce/0x1ce [ath10k_core] [<ffffffff816f9e2b>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 [<ffffffffa0721511>] ? ath10k_wmi_tx_beacons_iter+0x26/0x11a [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa0721511>] ath10k_wmi_tx_beacons_iter+0x26/0x11a [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa07214eb>] ? ath10k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x1ce/0x1ce [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa062eb18>] __iterate_interfaces+0x9d/0x13d [mac80211] [<ffffffffa062f609>] ieee80211_iterate_active_interfaces_atomic+0x32/0x3e [mac80211] [<ffffffffa07214eb>] ? ath10k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x1ce/0x1ce [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa071fa9f>] ath10k_wmi_tx_beacons_nowait.isra.13+0x14/0x16 [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa0721676>] ath10k_wmi_cmd_send+0x71/0x242 [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa07023f6>] ath10k_wmi_peer_delete+0x3f/0x42 [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa0702557>] ath10k_peer_create+0x15e/0x1ae [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa0707004>] ath10k_add_interface+0x70d/0xbda [ath10k_core] [<ffffffffa05fffcc>] drv_add_interface+0x123/0x1a5 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa061554b>] ieee80211_do_open+0x351/0x667 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa06158aa>] ieee80211_open+0x49/0x4c [mac80211] [<ffffffff8163ecf9>] __dev_open+0x88/0xde [<ffffffff8163ef6e>] __dev_change_flags+0xa4/0x13a [<ffffffff8163f023>] dev_change_flags+0x1f/0x54 [<ffffffff816a5532>] devinet_ioctl+0x2b9/0x5c9 [<ffffffff816514dd>] ? copy_to_user+0x32/0x38 [<ffffffff816a6115>] inet_ioctl+0x81/0x9d [<ffffffff816a6115>] ? inet_ioctl+0x81/0x9d [<ffffffff81621cf8>] sock_do_ioctl+0x20/0x3d [<ffffffff816223c4>] sock_ioctl+0x222/0x22e [<ffffffff8121cf95>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x453/0x4d7 [<ffffffff81625603>] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x4c/0x5b [<ffffffff81225af1>] ? __fget_light+0x48/0x6c [<ffffffff8121d06b>] SyS_ioctl+0x52/0x74 [<ffffffff816fa736>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter/IPVS updates for net-next The following patchset contains Netfilter/IPVS updates for net-next, they are: 1) Count pre-established connections as active in "least connection" schedulers such that pre-established connections to avoid overloading backend servers on peak demands, from Michal Kubecek via Simon Horman. 2) Address a race condition when resizing the conntrack table by caching the bucket size when fulling iterating over the hashtable in these three possible scenarios: 1) dump via /proc/net/nf_conntrack, 2) unlinking userspace helper and 3) unlinking custom conntrack timeout. From Liping Zhang. 3) Revisit early_drop() path to perform lockless traversal on conntrack eviction under stress, use del_timer() as synchronization point to avoid two CPUs evicting the same entry, from Florian Westphal. 4) Move NAT hlist_head to nf_conn object, this simplifies the existing NAT extension and it doesn't increase size since recent patches to align nf_conn, from Florian. 5) Use rhashtable for the by-source NAT hashtable, also from Florian. 6) Don't allow --physdev-is-out from OUTPUT chain, just like --physdev-out is not either, from Hangbin Liu. 7) Automagically set on nf_conntrack counters if the user tries to match ct bytes/packets from nftables, from Liping Zhang. 8) Remove possible_net_t fields in nf_tables set objects since we just simply pass the net pointer to the backend set type implementations. 9) Fix possible off-by-one in h323, from Toby DiPasquale. 10) early_drop() may be called from ctnetlink patch, so we must hold rcu read size lock from them too, this amends Florian's patch #3 coming in this batch, from Liping Zhang. 11) Use binary search to validate jump offset in x_tables, this addresses the O(n!) validation that was introduced recently resolve security issues with unpriviledge namespaces, from Florian. 12) Fix reference leak to connlabel in error path of nft_ct, from Zhang. 13) Three updates for nft_log: Fix log prefix leak in error path. Bail out on loglevel larger than debug in nft_log and set on the new NF_LOG_F_COPY_LEN flag when snaplen is specified. Again from Zhang. 14) Allow to filter rule dumps in nf_tables based on table and chain names. 15) Simplify connlabel to always use 128 bits to store labels and get rid of unused function in xt_connlabel, from Florian. 16) Replace set_expect_timeout() by mod_timer() from the h323 conntrack helper, by Gao Feng. 17) Put back x_tables module reference in nft_compat on error, from Liping Zhang. 18) Add a reference count to the x_tables extensions cache in nft_compat, so we can remove them when unused and avoid a crash if the extensions are rmmod, again from Zhang. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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drm_connector_register_all requires a few too many locks because our connector_list locking is busted. Add another FIXME+hack to work around this. This should address the below lockdep splat: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.7.0-rc5+ #524 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:0/6 is trying to acquire lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815afde0>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x120 but task is already holding lock: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff810ac195>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x35/0x70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}: [<ffffffff810df611>] lock_acquire+0xb1/0x200 [<ffffffff819a55b4>] down_write+0x44/0x80 [<ffffffff810abf91>] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x21/0xb0 [<ffffffff814c7448>] fb_register_client+0x18/0x20 [<ffffffff814c6c86>] backlight_device_register+0x136/0x260 [<ffffffffa0127eb2>] intel_backlight_device_register+0xa2/0x160 [i915] [<ffffffffa00f46be>] intel_connector_register+0xe/0x10 [i915] [<ffffffffa0112bfb>] intel_dp_connector_register+0x1b/0x80 [i915] [<ffffffff8159dfea>] drm_connector_register+0x4a/0x80 [<ffffffff8159fe44>] drm_connector_register_all+0x64/0xf0 [<ffffffff815a2a64>] drm_modeset_register_all+0x174/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81599b72>] drm_dev_register+0xc2/0xd0 [<ffffffffa00621d7>] i915_driver_load+0x1547/0x2200 [i915] [<ffffffffa006d80f>] i915_pci_probe+0x4f/0x70 [i915] [<ffffffff814a2135>] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0 [<ffffffff814a349b>] pci_device_probe+0xdb/0x130 [<ffffffff815c07e3>] driver_probe_device+0x223/0x440 [<ffffffff815c0ad5>] __driver_attach+0xd5/0x100 [<ffffffff815be386>] bus_for_each_dev+0x66/0xa0 [<ffffffff815c002e>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff815bf9be>] bus_add_driver+0x1ee/0x280 [<ffffffff815c1810>] driver_register+0x60/0xe0 [<ffffffff814a1a10>] __pci_register_driver+0x60/0x70 [<ffffffffa01a905b>] i915_init+0x5b/0x62 [i915] [<ffffffff8100042d>] do_one_initcall+0x3d/0x150 [<ffffffff811a935b>] do_init_module+0x5f/0x1d9 [<ffffffff81124416>] load_module+0x20e6/0x27e0 [<ffffffff81124d63>] SYSC_finit_module+0xc3/0xf0 [<ffffffff81124dae>] SyS_finit_module+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff819a83a9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1c/0xac -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff810df0ac>] __lock_acquire+0x10fc/0x1260 [<ffffffff810df611>] lock_acquire+0xb1/0x200 [<ffffffff819a3097>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x3c0 [<ffffffff815afde0>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x120 [<ffffffff8158f79b>] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x2b/0x80 [<ffffffff8158f81d>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [<ffffffffa0105f7a>] intel_fbdev_set_par+0x1a/0x60 [i915] [<ffffffff814c13c6>] fbcon_init+0x586/0x610 [<ffffffff8154d16a>] visual_init+0xca/0x130 [<ffffffff8154e611>] do_bind_con_driver+0x1c1/0x3a0 [<ffffffff8154eaf6>] do_take_over_console+0x116/0x180 [<ffffffff814bd3a7>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff814c1e48>] fbcon_event_notify+0x658/0x750 [<ffffffff810abcae>] notifier_call_chain+0x3e/0xb0 [<ffffffff810ac1ad>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [<ffffffff810ac1e6>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff814c748b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff814c86b1>] register_framebuffer+0x251/0x330 [<ffffffff8158fa9f>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x25f/0x3f0 [<ffffffffa0106b48>] intel_fbdev_initial_config+0x18/0x30 [i915] [<ffffffff810adfd8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x48/0x150 [<ffffffff810a3947>] process_one_work+0x1e7/0x750 [<ffffffff810a3efb>] worker_thread+0x4b/0x4f0 [<ffffffff810aad4f>] kthread+0xef/0x110 [<ffffffff819a85ef>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by kworker/u8:0/6: #0: ("events_unbound"){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff810a38c9>] process_one_work+0x169/0x750 #1: ((&entry->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810a38c9>] process_one_work+0x169/0x750 #2: (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff814c8487>] register_framebuffer+0x27/0x330 #3: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff814c86ce>] register_framebuffer+0x26e/0x330 #4: (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff814c78dd>] lock_fb_info+0x1d/0x40 #5: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff810ac195>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x35/0x70 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Tainted: G O 4.7.0-rc5+ #524 Hardware name: Intel Corp. Broxton P/NOTEBOOK, BIOS APLKRVPA.X64.0138.B33.1606250842 06/25/2016 Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn 0000000000000000 ffff8800758577f0 ffffffff814507a5 ffffffff828b9900 ffffffff828b9900 ffff880075857830 ffffffff810dc6fa ffff880075857880 ffff88007584d688 0000000000000005 0000000000000006 ffff88007584d6b0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff814507a5>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92 [<ffffffff810dc6fa>] print_circular_bug+0x1aa/0x200 [<ffffffff810df0ac>] __lock_acquire+0x10fc/0x1260 [<ffffffff810df611>] lock_acquire+0xb1/0x200 [<ffffffff815afde0>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x120 [<ffffffff815afde0>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x120 [<ffffffff819a3097>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x3c0 [<ffffffff815afde0>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x120 [<ffffffff810fa85f>] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x7f/0x90 [<ffffffff81208218>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x248/0x2b0 [<ffffffff815afdc5>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all+0x25/0x120 [<ffffffff815afde0>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x120 [<ffffffff8158f79b>] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x2b/0x80 [<ffffffff8158f81d>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [<ffffffffa0105f7a>] intel_fbdev_set_par+0x1a/0x60 [i915] [<ffffffff814c13c6>] fbcon_init+0x586/0x610 [<ffffffff8154d16a>] visual_init+0xca/0x130 [<ffffffff8154e611>] do_bind_con_driver+0x1c1/0x3a0 [<ffffffff8154eaf6>] do_take_over_console+0x116/0x180 [<ffffffff814bd3a7>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff814c1e48>] fbcon_event_notify+0x658/0x750 [<ffffffff810abcae>] notifier_call_chain+0x3e/0xb0 [<ffffffff810ac1ad>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [<ffffffff810ac1e6>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff814c748b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff814c86b1>] register_framebuffer+0x251/0x330 [<ffffffff815b7e8d>] ? vga_switcheroo_client_fb_set+0x5d/0x70 [<ffffffff8158fa9f>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x25f/0x3f0 [<ffffffffa0106b48>] intel_fbdev_initial_config+0x18/0x30 [i915] [<ffffffff810adfd8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x48/0x150 [<ffffffff810a3947>] process_one_work+0x1e7/0x750 [<ffffffff810a38c9>] ? process_one_work+0x169/0x750 [<ffffffff810a3efb>] worker_thread+0x4b/0x4f0 [<ffffffff810a3eb0>] ? process_one_work+0x750/0x750 [<ffffffff810aad4f>] kthread+0xef/0x110 [<ffffffff819a85ef>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [<ffffffff810aac60>] ? kthread_stop+0x2e0/0x2e0 v2: Rebase onto the right branch (hand-editing patches ftw) and add more reporters. Reported-by: Imre Deak <[email protected]> Cc: Imre Deak <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Acked-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
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With debugobjects enabled and using SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, when a kmem_cache_node is destroyed the call_rcu() may trigger a slab allocation to fill the debug object pool (__debug_object_init:fill_pool). Everywhere but during kmem_cache_destroy(), discard_slab() is performed outside of the kmem_cache_node->list_lock and avoids a lockdep warning about potential recursion: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.8.0-rc1-gfxbench+ #1 Tainted: G U --------------------------------------------- rmmod/8895 is trying to acquire lock: (&(&n->list_lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff811c80d7>] get_partial_node.isra.63+0x47/0x430 but task is already holding lock: (&(&n->list_lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff811cbda4>] __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x54/0x320 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&n->list_lock)->rlock); lock(&(&n->list_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by rmmod/8895: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: driver_detach+0x42/0xc0 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: driver_detach+0x50/0xc0 #2: (cpu_hotplug.dep_map){++++++}, at: get_online_cpus+0x2d/0x80 #3: (slab_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: kmem_cache_destroy+0x3c/0x220 #4: (&(&n->list_lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x54/0x320 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 PID: 8895 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G U 4.8.0-rc1-gfxbench+ #1 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. H87M-D3H/H87M-D3H, BIOS F11 08/18/2015 Call Trace: __lock_acquire+0x1646/0x1ad0 lock_acquire+0xb2/0x200 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 get_partial_node.isra.63+0x47/0x430 ___slab_alloc.constprop.67+0x1a7/0x3b0 __slab_alloc.isra.64.constprop.66+0x43/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc+0x236/0x2d0 __debug_object_init+0x2de/0x400 debug_object_activate+0x109/0x1e0 __call_rcu.constprop.63+0x32/0x2f0 call_rcu+0x12/0x20 discard_slab+0x3d/0x40 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0xdb/0x320 shutdown_cache+0x19/0x60 kmem_cache_destroy+0x1ae/0x220 i915_gem_load_cleanup+0x14/0x40 [i915] i915_driver_unload+0x151/0x180 [i915] i915_pci_remove+0x14/0x20 [i915] pci_device_remove+0x34/0xb0 __device_release_driver+0x95/0x140 driver_detach+0xb6/0xc0 bus_remove_driver+0x53/0xd0 driver_unregister+0x27/0x50 pci_unregister_driver+0x25/0x70 i915_exit+0x1a/0x1e2 [i915] SyS_delete_module+0x193/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1c/0xac Fixes: 52b4b95 ("mm: slab: free kmem_cache_node after destroy sysfs file") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Dave Gordon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Gordon <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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ADS7846 regulator is disabled twice in a row in ads7846_remove(). Valid one is in ads7846_disable(). Removing the ads7846 module causes warning about unbalanced disables. ... WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 29269 at drivers/regulator/core.c:2251 _regulator_disable+0xf8/0x130 unbalanced disables for vads7846 CPU: 0 PID: 29269 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G D W 4.7.0+ #3 Hardware name: HTC Magician ... show_stack+0x10/0x14 __warn+0xd8/0x100 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x48 _regulator_disable+0xf8/0x130 regulator_disable+0x34/0x60 ads7846_remove+0x58/0xd4 [ads7846] spi_drv_remove+0x1c/0x34 __device_release_driver+0x84/0x114 driver_detach+0x8c/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x5c/0xc8 SyS_delete_module+0x1a0/0x238 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x38 Signed-off-by: Petr Cvek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
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There are three usercopy warnings which are currently being silenced for gcc 4.6 and newer: 1) "copy_from_user() buffer size is too small" compile warning/error This is a static warning which happens when object size and copy size are both const, and copy size > object size. I didn't see any false positives for this one. So the function warning attribute seems to be working fine here. Note this scenario is always a bug and so I think it should be changed to *always* be an error, regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS. 2) "copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct" compile warning This is another static warning which happens when I enable __compiletime_object_size() for new compilers (and CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS). It happens when object size is const, but copy size is *not*. In this case there's no way to compare the two at build time, so it gives the warning. (Note the warning is a byproduct of the fact that gcc has no way of knowing whether the overflow function will be called, so the call isn't dead code and the warning attribute is activated.) So this warning seems to only indicate "this is an unusual pattern, maybe you should check it out" rather than "this is a bug". I get 102(!) of these warnings with allyesconfig and the __compiletime_object_size() gcc check removed. I don't know if there are any real bugs hiding in there, but from looking at a small sample, I didn't see any. According to Kees, it does sometimes find real bugs. But the false positive rate seems high. 3) "Buffer overflow detected" runtime warning This is a runtime warning where object size is const, and copy size > object size. All three warnings (both static and runtime) were completely disabled for gcc 4.6 with the following commit: 2fb0815 ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+") That commit mistakenly assumed that the false positives were caused by a gcc bug in __compiletime_object_size(). But in fact, __compiletime_object_size() seems to be working fine. The false positives were instead triggered by #2 above. (Though I don't have an explanation for why the warnings supposedly only started showing up in gcc 4.6.) So remove warning #2 to get rid of all the false positives, and re-enable warnings #1 and #3 by reverting the above commit. Furthermore, since #1 is a real bug which is detected at compile time, upgrade it to always be an error. Having done all that, CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]> Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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On arm/arm64, we depend on the kvm_unmap_hva* callbacks (via mmu_notifiers::invalidate_*) to unmap the stage2 pagetables when the userspace buffer gets unmapped. However, when the Hypervisor process exits without explicit unmap of the guest buffers, the only notifier we get is kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all() (via mmu_notifier::release ) which does nothing on arm. Later this causes us to access pages that were already released [via exit_mmap() -> unmap_vmas()] when we actually get to unmap the stage2 pagetable [via kvm_arch_destroy_vm() -> kvm_free_stage2_pgd()]. This triggers crashes with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, which unmaps any free'd pages from the linear map. [ 757.644120] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800661e00000 [ 757.652046] pgd = ffff20000b1a2000 [ 757.655471] [ffff800661e00000] *pgd=00000047fffe3003, *pud=00000047fcd8c003, *pmd=00000047fcc7c003, *pte=00e8004661e00712 [ 757.666492] Internal error: Oops: 96000147 [#3] PREEMPT SMP [ 757.672041] Modules linked in: [ 757.675100] CPU: 7 PID: 3630 Comm: qemu-system-aar Tainted: G D 4.8.0-rc1 #3 [ 757.683240] Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.15 Aug 19 2016 [ 757.692938] task: ffff80069cdd3580 task.stack: ffff8006adb7c000 [ 757.698840] PC is at __flush_dcache_area+0x1c/0x40 [ 757.703613] LR is at kvm_flush_dcache_pmd+0x60/0x70 [ 757.708469] pc : [<ffff20000809dbdc>] lr : [<ffff2000080b4a70>] pstate: 20000145 ... [ 758.357249] [<ffff20000809dbdc>] __flush_dcache_area+0x1c/0x40 [ 758.363059] [<ffff2000080b6748>] unmap_stage2_range+0x458/0x5f0 [ 758.368954] [<ffff2000080b708c>] kvm_free_stage2_pgd+0x34/0x60 [ 758.374761] [<ffff2000080b2280>] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x20/0x68 [ 758.380570] [<ffff2000080aa330>] kvm_put_kvm+0x210/0x358 [ 758.385860] [<ffff2000080aa524>] kvm_vm_release+0x2c/0x40 [ 758.391239] [<ffff2000082ad234>] __fput+0x114/0x2e8 [ 758.396096] [<ffff2000082ad46c>] ____fput+0xc/0x18 [ 758.400869] [<ffff200008104658>] task_work_run+0x108/0x138 [ 758.406332] [<ffff2000080dc8ec>] do_exit+0x48c/0x10e8 [ 758.411363] [<ffff2000080dd5fc>] do_group_exit+0x6c/0x130 [ 758.416739] [<ffff2000080ed924>] get_signal+0x284/0xa18 [ 758.421943] [<ffff20000808a098>] do_signal+0x158/0x860 [ 758.427060] [<ffff20000808aad4>] do_notify_resume+0x6c/0x88 [ 758.432608] [<ffff200008083624>] work_pending+0x10/0x14 [ 758.437812] Code: 9ac32042 8b010001 d1000443 8a230000 (d50b7e20) This patch fixes the issue by moving the kvm_free_stage2_pgd() to kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(). Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.9+ Tested-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected]> Reported-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected]> Reported-by: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
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Since commit 4d4c474 ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix BTS PMI detection") my box goes boom on boot: | .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 | BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 | IP: [<ffffffff8100c463>] intel_bts_interrupt+0x43/0x130 | Call Trace: | <NMI> d [<ffffffff8100b341>] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x51/0x4b0 | [<ffffffff81004d47>] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x27/0x40 This happens because the code introduced in this commit dereferences the debug store pointer unconditionally. The debug store is not guaranteed to be available, so a NULL pointer check as on other places is required. Fixes: 4d4c474 ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix BTS PMI detection") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
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Function ib_create_qp() was failing to return an error when rdma_rw_init_mrs() fails, causing a crash further down in ib_create_qp() when trying to dereferece the qp pointer which was actually a negative errno. The crash: crash> log|grep BUG [ 136.458121] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098 crash> bt PID: 3736 TASK: ffff8808543215c0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "kworker/u64:2" #0 [ffff88084d323340] machine_kexec at ffffffff8105fbb0 #1 [ffff88084d3233b0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81116758 #2 [ffff88084d323480] crash_kexec at ffffffff8111682d #3 [ffff88084d3234b0] oops_end at ffffffff81032bd6 #4 [ffff88084d3234e0] no_context at ffffffff8106e431 #5 [ffff88084d323530] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e610 #6 [ffff88084d323590] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e6f4 #7 [ffff88084d3235a0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8106ebdc #8 [ffff88084d323620] do_page_fault at ffffffff8106f057 #9 [ffff88084d323660] page_fault at ffffffff816e3148 [exception RIP: ib_create_qp+427] RIP: ffffffffa02554fb RSP: ffff88084d323718 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: fffffffffffffff4 RCX: 000000018020001f RDX: ffff880830997fc0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88085f407200 RBP: ffff88084d323778 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffffea0020bae210 R10: ffffea0020bae218 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88084d3237c8 R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: ffff880859fa5000 R15: ffff88082eb89800 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff88084d323780] rdma_create_qp at ffffffffa0782681 [rdma_cm] #11 [ffff88084d3237b0] nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib at ffffffffa07c43f3 [nvmet_rdma] #12 [ffff88084d323860] nvmet_rdma_alloc_queue at ffffffffa07c5ba9 [nvmet_rdma] #13 [ffff88084d323900] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect at ffffffffa07c5c96 [nvmet_rdma] #14 [ffff88084d323980] nvmet_rdma_cm_handler at ffffffffa07c6450 [nvmet_rdma] #15 [ffff88084d3239b0] iw_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0787480 [rdma_cm] #16 [ffff88084d323a60] cm_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0775f06 [iw_cm] #17 [ffff88084d323ab0] process_event at ffffffffa0776019 [iw_cm] #18 [ffff88084d323af0] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa0776170 [iw_cm] #19 [ffff88084d323cb0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a1483 #20 [ffff88084d323d90] worker_thread at ffffffff810a211d #21 [ffff88084d323ec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6c5c #22 [ffff88084d323f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816e1ebf Fixes: 632bc3f ("IB/core, RDMA RW API: Do not exceed QP SGE send limit") Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
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Currently significant amount of memory is reserved only in kernel booted to capture kernel dump using the fa_dump method. Kernels compiled with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT will initialize only certain size memory per node. The certain size takes into account the dentry and inode cache sizes. Currently the cache sizes are calculated based on the total system memory including the reserved memory. However such a kernel when booting the same kernel as fadump kernel will not be able to allocate the required amount of memory to suffice for the dentry and inode caches. This results in crashes like Hence only implement arch_reserved_kernel_pages() for CONFIG_FA_DUMP configurations. The amount reserved will be reduced while calculating the large caches and will avoid crashes like the below on large systems such as 32 TB systems. Dentry cache hash table entries: 536870912 (order: 16, 4294967296 bytes) vmalloc: allocation failure, allocated 4097114112 of 17179934720 bytes swapper/0: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x2080020(GFP_ATOMIC) CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.6-master+ #3 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0 (unreliable) warn_alloc_failed+0x114/0x160 __vmalloc_node_range+0x304/0x340 __vmalloc+0x6c/0x90 alloc_large_system_hash+0x1b8/0x2c0 inode_init+0x94/0xe4 vfs_caches_init+0x8c/0x13c start_kernel+0x50c/0x578 start_here_common+0x20/0xa8 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <[email protected]> Cc: Hari Bathini <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Balbir Singh <[email protected]> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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[ 3843.132217] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1227 at kernel/softirq.c:150 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6b/0x90 [ 3843.142815] Modules linked in: ... [ 3843.294328] CPU: 20 PID: 1227 Comm: kworker/20:1H Tainted: G E 4.8.0-rc1+ #3 [ 3843.304944] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0X6H47, BIOS 1.4.8 10/25/2012 [ 3843.314798] Workqueue: kblockd blk_timeout_work [ 3843.321350] 0000000000000086 00000000a32f4533 ffff8802216d7bd8 ffffffff8135c3cf [ 3843.331146] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8802216d7c18 ffffffff8108d661 [ 3843.340918] 00000096216d7c50 0000000000000200 ffff8802d07cc828 ffff8801b3632550 [ 3843.350687] Call Trace: [ 3843.354866] [<ffffffff8135c3cf>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [ 3843.362061] [<ffffffff8108d661>] __warn+0xd1/0xf0 [ 3843.368851] [<ffffffff8108d79d>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 [ 3843.376791] [<ffffffff810930eb>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6b/0x90 [ 3843.384903] [<ffffffff816fe7be>] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1e/0x20 [ 3843.392940] [<ffffffffa085f710>] beiscsi_alloc_pdu+0x2f0/0x6e0 [be2iscsi] [ 3843.402076] [<ffffffffa06bc358>] __iscsi_conn_send_pdu+0xf8/0x370 [libiscsi] [ 3843.411549] [<ffffffffa06bc6fe>] iscsi_send_nopout+0xbe/0x110 [libiscsi] [ 3843.420639] [<ffffffffa06bd98b>] iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out+0x29b/0x2b0 [libiscsi] [ 3843.430339] [<ffffffff814cd1de>] scsi_times_out+0x5e/0x250 [ 3843.438119] [<ffffffff813374af>] blk_rq_timed_out+0x1f/0x60 [ 3843.446009] [<ffffffff8133759d>] blk_timeout_work+0xad/0x150 [ 3843.454010] [<ffffffff810a6642>] process_one_work+0x152/0x400 [ 3843.462114] [<ffffffff810a6f35>] worker_thread+0x125/0x4b0 [ 3843.469961] [<ffffffff810a6e10>] ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 [ 3843.478116] [<ffffffff810aca28>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0 [ 3843.485212] [<ffffffff816fedff>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [ 3843.492908] [<ffffffff810ac950>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [ 3843.500715] ---[ end trace 57ec0a1d8f0dd3a0 ]--- [ 3852.328667] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP blk_timeout_work takes queue_lock spin_lock with interrupts disabled before invoking iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out. This causes a WARN_ON_ONCE in spin_unlock_bh for wrb_lock/io_sgl_lock/mgmt_sgl_lock. CPU was kept busy in lot of bottom half work with interrupts disabled thus causing hard lock up. Signed-off-by: Jitendra Bhivare <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chris Leech <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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We shouldn't free cert->pub->key in x509_cert_parse() because x509_free_certificate() also does this: BUG: Double free or freeing an invalid pointer ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81896c20>] dump_stack+0x63/0x83 [<ffffffff81356571>] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 [<ffffffff81356ed9>] kasan_report_double_free+0x49/0x60 [<ffffffff813561ad>] kasan_slab_free+0x9d/0xc0 [<ffffffff81350b7a>] kfree+0x8a/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81844fbf>] public_key_free+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff818455d4>] x509_free_certificate+0x24/0x90 [<ffffffff818460bc>] x509_cert_parse+0x2bc/0x300 [<ffffffff81846cae>] x509_key_preparse+0x3e/0x330 [<ffffffff818444cf>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x6f/0x100 [<ffffffff8178bec0>] key_create_or_update+0x260/0x5f0 [<ffffffff8178e6d9>] SyS_add_key+0x199/0x2a0 [<ffffffff821d823b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad Object at ffff880110bd1900, in cache kmalloc-512 size: 512 .... Freed: PID = 2579 [<ffffffff8104283b>] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813558f6>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [<ffffffff81356183>] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 [<ffffffff81350b7a>] kfree+0x8a/0x1a0 [<ffffffff818460a3>] x509_cert_parse+0x2a3/0x300 [<ffffffff81846cae>] x509_key_preparse+0x3e/0x330 [<ffffffff818444cf>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x6f/0x100 [<ffffffff8178bec0>] key_create_or_update+0x260/0x5f0 [<ffffffff8178e6d9>] SyS_add_key+0x199/0x2a0 [<ffffffff821d823b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad Fixes: db6c43b ("crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
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This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Fixes: cdec9cb ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
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…/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull keys fixes from James Morris: "From David: - Fix mpi_powm()'s handling of a number with a zero exponent [CVE-2016-8650]. Integrate my and Andrey's patches for mpi_powm() and use mpi_resize() instead of RESIZE_IF_NEEDED() - the latter adds a duplicate check into the execution path of a trivial case we don't normally expect to be taken. - Fix double free in X.509 error handling" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver #3] X.509: Fix double free in x509_cert_parse() [ver #3]
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Several people report seeing warnings about inconsistent radix tree nodes followed by crashes in the workingset code, which all looked like use-after-free access from the shadow node shrinker. Dave Jones managed to reproduce the issue with a debug patch applied, which confirmed that the radix tree shrinking indeed frees shadow nodes while they are still linked to the shadow LRU: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 53 at lib/radix-tree.c:643 delete_node+0x1e4/0x200 CPU: 2 PID: 53 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc2-think+ #3 Call Trace: delete_node+0x1e4/0x200 __radix_tree_delete_node+0xd/0x10 shadow_lru_isolate+0xe6/0x220 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x9b/0x190 list_lru_walk_one+0x23/0x30 scan_shadow_nodes+0x2e/0x40 shrink_slab.part.44+0x23d/0x5d0 shrink_node+0x22c/0x330 kswapd+0x392/0x8f0 This is the WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&node->private_list)) placed in the inlined radix_tree_shrink(). The problem is with 14b4687 ("mm: workingset: move shadow entry tracking to radix tree exceptional tracking"), which passes an update callback into the radix tree to link and unlink shadow leaf nodes when tree entries change, but forgot to pass the callback when reclaiming a shadow node. While the reclaimed shadow node itself is unlinked by the shrinker, its deletion from the tree can cause the left-most leaf node in the tree to be shrunk. If that happens to be a shadow node as well, we don't unlink it from the LRU as we should. Consider this tree, where the s are shadow entries: root->rnode | [0 n] | | [s ] [sssss] Now the shadow node shrinker reclaims the rightmost leaf node through the shadow node LRU: root->rnode | [0 ] | [s ] Because the parent of the deleted node is the first level below the root and has only one child in the left-most slot, the intermediate level is shrunk and the node containing the single shadow is put in its place: root->rnode | [s ] The shrinker again sees a single left-most slot in a first level node and thus decides to store the shadow in root->rnode directly and free the node - which is a leaf node on the shadow node LRU. root->rnode | s Without the update callback, the freed node remains on the shadow LRU, where it causes later shrinker runs to crash. Pass the node updater callback into __radix_tree_delete_node() in case the deletion causes the left-most branch in the tree to collapse too. Also add warnings when linked nodes are freed right away, rather than wait for the use-after-free when the list is scanned much later. Fixes: 14b4687 ("mm: workingset: move shadow entry tracking to radix tree exceptional tracking") Reported-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Leech <[email protected]> Cc: Lee Duncan <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Reported by syzkaller: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001b0 IP: _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 PGD 3e28eb067 PUD 3f0ac6067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 2431 Comm: test Tainted: G OE 4.10.0-rc1+ #3 Call Trace: ? kvm_ioapic_scan_entry+0x3e/0x110 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x10a8/0x15f0 [kvm] ? pick_next_task_fair+0xe1/0x4e0 ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0xea/0x260 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33a/0x600 [kvm] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x29/0x130 ? do_nanosleep+0x97/0xf0 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x5d0 ? __hrtimer_init+0x90/0x90 ? do_nanosleep+0x5b/0xf0 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x180 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 RSP: ffffa43688973cc0 The syzkaller folks reported a NULL pointer dereference due to ENABLE_CAP succeeding even without an irqchip. The Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller is activated, resulting in a wrong request to rescan the ioapic and a NULL pointer dereference. #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #ifndef KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC 123 #endif void* thr(void* arg) { struct kvm_enable_cap cap; cap.flags = 0; cap.cap = KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC; ioctl((long)arg, KVM_ENABLE_CAP, &cap); return 0; } int main() { void *host_mem = mmap(0, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); int kvmfd = open("/dev/kvm", 0); int vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0); struct kvm_userspace_memory_region memreg; memreg.slot = 0; memreg.flags = 0; memreg.guest_phys_addr = 0; memreg.memory_size = 0x1000; memreg.userspace_addr = (unsigned long)host_mem; host_mem[0] = 0xf4; ioctl(vmfd, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, &memreg); int cpufd = ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0); struct kvm_sregs sregs; ioctl(cpufd, KVM_GET_SREGS, &sregs); sregs.cr0 = 0; sregs.cr4 = 0; sregs.efer = 0; sregs.cs.selector = 0; sregs.cs.base = 0; ioctl(cpufd, KVM_SET_SREGS, &sregs); struct kvm_regs regs = { .rflags = 2 }; ioctl(cpufd, KVM_SET_REGS, ®s); ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, 0); pthread_t th; pthread_create(&th, 0, thr, (void*)(long)cpufd); usleep(rand() % 10000); ioctl(cpufd, KVM_RUN, 0); pthread_join(th, 0); return 0; } This patch fixes it by failing ENABLE_CAP if without an irqchip. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Fixes: 5c91941 (kvm/x86: Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller) Cc: [email protected] # 4.5+ Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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When using the flushoncommit mount option, during almost every transaction commit we trigger a warning from __writeback_inodes_sb_nr(): $ cat fs/fs-writeback.c: (...) static void __writeback_inodes_sb_nr(struct super_block *sb, ... { (...) WARN_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&sb->s_umount)); (...) } (...) The trace produced in dmesg looks like the following: [947.473890] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 930 at fs/fs-writeback.c:2610 __writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x7e/0xb3 [947.481623] Modules linked in: nfsd nls_cp437 cifs asn1_decoder cifs_arc4 fscache cifs_md4 ipmi_ssif [947.489571] CPU: 5 PID: 930 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 95.16.3-srb-asrock-00001-g36437ad63879 #186 [947.497969] RIP: 0010:__writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x7e/0xb3 [947.502097] Code: 24 10 4c 89 44 24 18 c6 (...) [947.519760] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000777e10 EFLAGS: 00010246 [947.523818] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000963300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [947.529765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000fa51 RDI: ffffc90000777e50 [947.535740] RBP: ffff888101628a90 R08: ffff888100955800 R09: ffff888100956000 [947.541701] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888100963488 [947.547645] R13: ffff888100963000 R14: ffff888112fb7200 R15: ffff888100963460 [947.553621] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88841fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [947.560537] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [947.565122] CR2: 0000000008be50c4 CR3: 000000000220c000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [947.571072] Call Trace: [947.572354] <TASK> [947.573266] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1f1/0x998 [947.576785] ? start_transaction+0x3ab/0x44e [947.579867] ? schedule_timeout+0x8a/0xdd [947.582716] transaction_kthread+0xe9/0x156 [947.585721] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction.isra.0+0x407/0x407 [947.590104] kthread+0x131/0x139 [947.592168] ? set_kthread_struct+0x32/0x32 [947.595174] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [947.597561] </TASK> [947.598553] ---[ end trace 644721052755541c ]--- This is because we started using writeback_inodes_sb() to flush delalloc when committing a transaction (when using -o flushoncommit), in order to avoid deadlocks with filesystem freeze operations. This change was made by commit ce8ea7c ("btrfs: don't call btrfs_start_delalloc_roots in flushoncommit"). After that change we started producing that warning, and every now and then a user reports this since the warning happens too often, it spams dmesg/syslog, and a user is unsure if this reflects any problem that might compromise the filesystem's reliability. We can not just lock the sb->s_umount semaphore before calling writeback_inodes_sb(), because that would at least deadlock with filesystem freezing, since at fs/super.c:freeze_super() sync_filesystem() is called while we are holding that semaphore in write mode, and that can trigger a transaction commit, resulting in a deadlock. It would also trigger the same type of deadlock in the unmount path. Possibly, it could also introduce some other locking dependencies that lockdep would report. To fix this call try_to_writeback_inodes_sb() instead of writeback_inodes_sb(), because that will try to read lock sb->s_umount and then will only call writeback_inodes_sb() if it was able to lock it. This is fine because the cases where it can't read lock sb->s_umount are during a filesystem unmount or during a filesystem freeze - in those cases sb->s_umount is write locked and sync_filesystem() is called, which calls writeback_inodes_sb(). In other words, in all cases where we can't take a read lock on sb->s_umount, writeback is already being triggered elsewhere. An alternative would be to call btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() with a number of pages different from LONG_MAX, for example matching the number of delalloc bytes we currently have, in which case we would end up starting all delalloc with filemap_fdatawrite_wbc() and not with an async flush via filemap_flush() - that is only possible after the rather recent commit e076ab2 ("btrfs: shrink delalloc pages instead of full inodes"). However that creates a whole new can of worms due to new lock dependencies, which lockdep complains, like for example: [ 8948.247280] ====================================================== [ 8948.247823] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 8948.248353] 5.17.0-rc1-btrfs-next-111 #1 Not tainted [ 8948.248786] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 8948.249320] kworker/u16:18/933570 is trying to acquire lock: [ 8948.249812] ffff9b3de1591690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs] [ 8948.250638] but task is already holding lock: [ 8948.251140] ffff9b3e09c717d8 (&root->delalloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: start_delalloc_inodes+0x78/0x400 [btrfs] [ 8948.252018] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 8948.252710] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 8948.253343] -> #2 (&root->delalloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 8948.253950] __mutex_lock+0x90/0x900 [ 8948.254354] start_delalloc_inodes+0x78/0x400 [btrfs] [ 8948.254859] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x194/0x2a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.255408] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x32f/0xc00 [btrfs] [ 8948.255942] btrfs_mksubvol+0x380/0x570 [btrfs] [ 8948.256406] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x81/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 8948.256870] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x17f/0x190 [btrfs] [ 8948.257413] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xbb/0x140 [btrfs] [ 8948.257961] btrfs_ioctl+0x1196/0x3630 [btrfs] [ 8948.258418] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 8948.258793] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 8948.259146] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 8948.259709] -> #1 (&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 8948.260330] __mutex_lock+0x90/0x900 [ 8948.260692] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x97/0x2a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.261234] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x32f/0xc00 [btrfs] [ 8948.261766] btrfs_set_free_space_cache_v1_active+0x38/0x60 [btrfs] [ 8948.262379] btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0x119/0x180 [btrfs] [ 8948.262909] open_ctree+0x1511/0x171e [btrfs] [ 8948.263359] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 8948.263863] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 8948.264242] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 8948.264594] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 8948.265017] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.265462] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 8948.265851] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 8948.266203] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 8948.266554] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 8948.266940] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 8948.267300] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 8948.267790] -> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 8948.268322] __lock_acquire+0x12e8/0x2260 [ 8948.268733] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 8948.269092] start_transaction+0x44c/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 8948.269591] find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs] [ 8948.270087] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x14b/0x280 [btrfs] [ 8948.270588] cow_file_range+0x17e/0x490 [btrfs] [ 8948.271051] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x345/0x7a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.271586] writepage_delalloc+0xb5/0x170 [btrfs] [ 8948.272071] __extent_writepage+0x156/0x3c0 [btrfs] [ 8948.272579] extent_write_cache_pages+0x263/0x460 [btrfs] [ 8948.273113] extent_writepages+0x76/0x130 [btrfs] [ 8948.273573] do_writepages+0xd2/0x1c0 [ 8948.273942] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x68/0x90 [ 8948.274371] start_delalloc_inodes+0x17f/0x400 [btrfs] [ 8948.274876] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x194/0x2a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.275417] flush_space+0x1f2/0x630 [btrfs] [ 8948.275863] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x108/0x1b0 [btrfs] [ 8948.276438] process_one_work+0x252/0x5a0 [ 8948.276829] worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0 [ 8948.277189] kthread+0xf2/0x120 [ 8948.277506] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 8948.277868] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8948.278548] Chain exists of: sb_internal#2 --> &fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex --> &root->delalloc_mutex [ 8948.279601] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 8948.280102] CPU0 CPU1 [ 8948.280508] ---- ---- [ 8948.280915] lock(&root->delalloc_mutex); [ 8948.281271] lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex); [ 8948.281915] lock(&root->delalloc_mutex); [ 8948.282487] lock(sb_internal#2); [ 8948.282800] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 8948.283333] 4 locks held by kworker/u16:18/933570: [ 8948.283750] #0: ffff9b3dc00a9d48 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d2/0x5a0 [ 8948.284609] #1: ffffa90349dafe70 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d2/0x5a0 [ 8948.285637] #2: ffff9b3e14db5040 (&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x97/0x2a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.286674] #3: ffff9b3e09c717d8 (&root->delalloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: start_delalloc_inodes+0x78/0x400 [btrfs] [ 8948.287596] stack backtrace: [ 8948.287975] CPU: 3 PID: 933570 Comm: kworker/u16:18 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-btrfs-next-111 #1 [ 8948.288677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 8948.289649] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs] [ 8948.290298] Call Trace: [ 8948.290517] <TASK> [ 8948.290700] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 8948.291026] check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 [ 8948.291375] ? start_transaction+0x228/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 8948.291826] __lock_acquire+0x12e8/0x2260 [ 8948.292241] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 8948.292714] ? find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs] [ 8948.293241] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140 [ 8948.293601] start_transaction+0x44c/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 8948.294055] ? find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs] [ 8948.294518] find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs] [ 8948.294957] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [ 8948.295312] ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x124/0x290 [btrfs] [ 8948.295813] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x14b/0x280 [btrfs] [ 8948.296270] cow_file_range+0x17e/0x490 [btrfs] [ 8948.296691] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x345/0x7a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.297175] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x247/0x270 [btrfs] [ 8948.297678] writepage_delalloc+0xb5/0x170 [btrfs] [ 8948.298123] __extent_writepage+0x156/0x3c0 [btrfs] [ 8948.298570] extent_write_cache_pages+0x263/0x460 [btrfs] [ 8948.299061] extent_writepages+0x76/0x130 [btrfs] [ 8948.299495] do_writepages+0xd2/0x1c0 [ 8948.299817] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x110 [ 8948.300160] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [ 8948.300494] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x68/0x90 [ 8948.300874] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 [ 8948.301243] start_delalloc_inodes+0x17f/0x400 [btrfs] [ 8948.301706] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [ 8948.302055] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x194/0x2a0 [btrfs] [ 8948.302564] flush_space+0x1f2/0x630 [btrfs] [ 8948.302970] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x108/0x1b0 [btrfs] [ 8948.303510] process_one_work+0x252/0x5a0 [ 8948.303860] ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0 [ 8948.304221] worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0 [ 8948.304543] ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0 [ 8948.304904] kthread+0xf2/0x120 [ 8948.305184] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 8948.305598] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 8948.305921] </TASK> It all comes from the fact that btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() takes the delalloc_root_mutex, in the transaction commit path we are holding a read lock on one of the superblock's freeze semaphores (via sb_start_intwrite()), the async reclaim task can also do a call to btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(), which ends up triggering writeback with calls to filemap_fdatawrite_wbc(), resulting in extent allocation which in turn can call btrfs_start_transaction(), which will result in taking the freeze semaphore via sb_start_intwrite(), forming a nasty dependency on all those locks which can be taken in different orders by different code paths. So just adopt the simple approach of calling try_to_writeback_inodes_sb() at btrfs_start_delalloc_flush(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> [ add more link reports ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.17, take #3 - Fix pending state read of a HW interrupt
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This driver, like several others, uses a chained IRQ for each GPIO bank, and forwards .irq_set_wake to the GPIO bank's upstream IRQ. As a result, a call to irq_set_irq_wake() needs to lock both the upstream and downstream irq_desc's. Lockdep considers this to be a possible deadlock when the irq_desc's share lockdep classes, which they do by default: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.17.0-rc3-00394-gc849047c2473 #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- init/307 is trying to acquire lock: c2dfe27c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: c3c0ac7c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by init/307: #0: c1f29f18 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_reboot+0x90/0x23c #1: c20f7760 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_shutdown+0xf4/0x224 #2: c2e804d8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_shutdown+0x104/0x224 #3: c3c0ac7c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 307 Comm: init Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-00394-gc849047c2473 #1 Hardware name: Allwinner sun8i Family unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x1680/0x31a0 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x148/0x3dc lock_acquire from _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x6c _raw_spin_lock_irqsave from __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 __irq_get_desc_lock from irq_set_irq_wake+0x2c/0x19c irq_set_irq_wake from irq_set_irq_wake+0x13c/0x19c [tail call from sunxi_pinctrl_irq_set_wake] irq_set_irq_wake from gpio_keys_suspend+0x80/0x1a4 gpio_keys_suspend from gpio_keys_shutdown+0x10/0x2c gpio_keys_shutdown from device_shutdown+0x180/0x224 device_shutdown from __do_sys_reboot+0x134/0x23c __do_sys_reboot from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c However, this can never deadlock because the upstream and downstream IRQs are never the same (nor do they even involve the same irqchip). Silence this erroneous lockdep splat by applying what appears to be the usual fix of moving the GPIO IRQs to separate lockdep classes. Fixes: a59c99d ("pinctrl: sunxi: Forward calls to irq_set_irq_wake") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <[email protected]> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
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The io-specific memcpy/memset functions use string mmio accesses to do their work. Under SEV, the hypervisor can't emulate these instructions because they read/write directly from/to encrypted memory. KVM will inject a page fault exception into the guest when it is asked to emulate string mmio instructions for an SEV guest: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000065068 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 8000100000067 P4D 8000100000067 PUD 80001000fb067 PMD 80001000fc067 PTE 80000000fed40173 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7 #3 As string mmio for an SEV guest can not be supported by the hypervisor, unroll the instructions for CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO enabled kernels. This issue appears when kernels are launched in recent libvirt-managed SEV virtual machines, because virt-install started to add a tpm-crb device to the guest by default and proactively because, raisins: virt-manager/virt-manager@eb58c09 and as that commit says, the default adding of a TPM can be disabled with "virt-install ... --tpm none". The kernel driver for tpm-crb uses memcpy_to/from_io() functions to access MMIO memory, resulting in a page-fault injected by KVM and crashing the kernel at boot. [ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ] Fixes: d8aa7ee ('x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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There is possible circular locking dependency detected on event_mutex (see below logs). This is due to set fail safe mode is done at dp_panel_read_sink_caps() within event_mutex scope. To break this possible circular locking, this patch move setting fail safe mode out of event_mutex scope. [ 23.958078] ====================================================== [ 23.964430] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 23.970777] 5.17.0-rc2-lockdep-00088-g05241de1f69e #148 Not tainted [ 23.977219] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 23.983570] DrmThread/1574 is trying to acquire lock: [ 23.988763] ffffff808423aab0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_dp_displ ay_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 23.997895] [ 23.997895] but task is already holding lock: [ 24.003895] ffffff808420b280 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_c rtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.012495] [ 24.012495] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 24.012495] [ 24.020886] [ 24.020886] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 24.028570] [ 24.028570] -> #5 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.035472] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.039695] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.044272] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.048222] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.053413] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.057452] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.062826] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.067403] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.072508] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.077086] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.081123] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.085602] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.090895] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.095294] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.100668] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.105242] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.109548] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.114381] el0t_32_sync+0x178 [ 24.118688] [ 24.118688] -> #4 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.125408] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.129628] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.134204] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.138155] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.143345] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.147382] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.152755] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.157323] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x68/0x90 [ 24.162869] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x394/0x648 [ 24.167535] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.172102] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.176135] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.180621] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.185904] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.190302] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.195673] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.200241] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.204544] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.209378] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 [ 24.213680] -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.220308] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.20+0xe8/0x878 [ 24.225951] ww_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd0 [ 24.230166] modeset_lock+0x190/0x19c [ 24.234467] drm_modeset_lock+0x34/0x54 [ 24.238953] drmm_mode_config_init+0x550/0x764 [ 24.244065] msm_drm_bind+0x170/0x59c [ 24.248374] try_to_bring_up_master+0x244/0x294 [ 24.253572] __component_add+0xf4/0x14c [ 24.258057] component_add+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.262273] dsi_dev_attach+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.266575] dsi_host_attach+0xc4/0x120 [ 24.271060] mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x48 [ 24.275456] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x28/0x68 [ 24.280298] ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x2b4/0x2dc [ 24.285137] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x78/0x90 [ 24.289893] really_probe+0x1e4/0x3d8 [ 24.294194] __driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x164 [ 24.299298] driver_probe_device+0x54/0xf8 [ 24.304043] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x118 [ 24.309145] bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd4 [ 24.313628] __device_attach+0xcc/0x158 [ 24.318112] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30 [ 24.322954] bus_probe_device+0x38/0x9c [ 24.327439] deferred_probe_work_func+0xd4/0xf0 [ 24.332628] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.337289] process_scheduled_works+0x44/0x48 [ 24.342391] worker_thread+0x1e4/0x26c [ 24.346788] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.350470] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 24.361489] drm_modeset_acquire_init+0xe4/0x138 [ 24.366777] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x44/0x114 [ 24.372327] check_connector_changed+0xbc/0x198 [ 24.377517] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xcc/0x11c [ 24.382804] dsi_hpd_worker+0x24/0x30 [ 24.387104] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.391762] worker_thread+0x1d0/0x26c [ 24.396158] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.399840] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.404053] [ 24.404053] -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.411032] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.415247] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.419819] dp_panel_read_sink_caps+0x23c/0x26c [ 24.425108] dp_display_process_hpd_high+0x34/0xd4 [ 24.430570] dp_display_usbpd_configure_cb+0x30/0x3c [ 24.436205] hpd_event_thread+0x2ac/0x550 [ 24.440864] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.444544] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.448757] [ 24.448757] -> #0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.455116] __lock_acquire+0xe2c/0x10d8 [ 24.459690] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x2d0 [ 24.463988] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.468201] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.472773] msm_dp_display_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 24.477789] dp_bridge_enable+0x24/0x30 [ 24.482273] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x78/0x9c [ 24.488006] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x1bc/0x244 [ 24.494801] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x248/0x3d0 [ 24.499992] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.504031] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.509404] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.513976] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.519079] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.523650] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.527689] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.532175] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.537463] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.541861] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.547235] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.551806] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.556106] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.560948] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 Changes in v2: -- add circular lockiing trace Fixes: d4aca42 ("drm/msm/dp: always add fail-safe mode into connector mode list") Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481396/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]>
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Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep #6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- [email protected] Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]>
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While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <[email protected]> Tested-by: David Christensen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: [email protected] # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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'rmmod pmt_telemetry' panics with: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 1697 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W -------- --- 5.18.0-rc4 #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR5 RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.3056.B00.2201310233 01/31/2022 RIP: 0010:device_del+0x1b/0x3d0 Code: e8 1a d9 e9 ff e9 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 08 eb dc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d af 80 00 00 00 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 18 <4c> 8b 67 40 48 89 ef 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 31 RSP: 0018:ffffb520415cfd60 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffb520415cfd78 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb520415cfd78 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f7e198e5740(0000) GS:ffff905c9f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000010782a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __xa_erase+0x53/0xb0 device_unregister+0x13/0x50 intel_pmt_dev_destroy+0x34/0x60 [pmt_class] pmt_telem_remove+0x40/0x50 [pmt_telemetry] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0xc1/0x150 driver_detach+0x44/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xd0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x12/0x20 pmt_telem_exit+0xc/0xe4a [pmt_telemetry] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13a/0x250 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x11e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1803a05b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2d 4e 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fd 4d 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 The probe function, pmt_telem_probe(), adds an entry for devices even if they have not been initialized. This results in the array of initialized devices containing both initialized and uninitialized entries. This causes a panic in the remove function, pmt_telem_remove() which expects the array to only contain initialized entries. Only use an entry when a device is initialized. Cc: "David E. Box" <[email protected]> Cc: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Gross <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Arcari <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David E. Box <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
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The following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() is triggered when memory error event happens on the (thp/folio) pages which are about to be freed: [ 1160.232771] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.236916] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.240684] flags: 0x57ffffc0800000(hwpoison|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 1160.243458] raw: 0057ffffc0800000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 1160.246268] raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1160.249197] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) [ 1160.251815] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1160.253438] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:788! [ 1160.256162] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1160.258172] CPU: 2 PID: 115368 Comm: mceinj.sh Tainted: G E 5.18.0-rc1-v5.18-rc1-220404-2353-005-g83111+ #3 [ 1160.262049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [ 1160.265103] RIP: 0010:dump_page.cold+0x27e/0x2bd [ 1160.266757] Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 81 f1 5a 98 e9 4c fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 a1 95 59 98 e9 40 fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 50 bf 5a 98 48 89 ef e8 9d 04 6d ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 c4 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 9f fd ff ff 49 8b 04 24 a9 00 00 [ 1160.273180] RSP: 0018:ffffaa2c4d59fd18 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1160.274969] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1160.277263] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff985995a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1160.279571] RBP: ffffdc9c45a80000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 1160.281794] R10: ffffaa2c4d59fb08 R11: ffffffff98940d08 R12: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.283920] R13: ffffffff985b6f94 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.286641] FS: 00007eff54ce1740(0000) GS:ffff99c67bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1160.289498] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1160.291106] CR2: 00005628381a5f68 CR3: 0000000104712003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 [ 1160.293031] Call Trace: [ 1160.293724] <TASK> [ 1160.294334] get_hwpoison_page+0x47d/0x570 [ 1160.295474] memory_failure+0x106/0xaa0 [ 1160.296474] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 [ 1160.297524] hard_offline_page_store+0x43/0x80 [ 1160.298684] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 1160.299829] new_sync_write+0xf9/0x160 [ 1160.300810] vfs_write+0x209/0x290 [ 1160.301835] ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0 [ 1160.302718] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1160.303664] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1160.304981] RIP: 0033:0x7eff54b018b7 As shown in the RIP address, this VM_BUG_ON in folio_entire_mapcount() is called from dump_page("hwpoison: unhandlable page") in get_any_page(). The below explains the mechanism of the race: CPU 0 CPU 1 memory_failure get_hwpoison_page get_any_page dump_page compound = PageCompound free_pages_prepare page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP folio_entire_mapcount VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) So replace dump_page() with safer one, pr_err(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 74e8ee4 ("mm: Turn head_compound_mapcount() into folio_entire_mapcount()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: William Kucharski <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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'rmmod pmt_telemetry' panics with: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 1697 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W -------- --- 5.18.0-rc4 #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR5 RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.3056.B00.2201310233 01/31/2022 RIP: 0010:device_del+0x1b/0x3d0 Code: e8 1a d9 e9 ff e9 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 08 eb dc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d af 80 00 00 00 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 18 <4c> 8b 67 40 48 89 ef 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 31 RSP: 0018:ffffb520415cfd60 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffb520415cfd78 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb520415cfd78 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f7e198e5740(0000) GS:ffff905c9f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000010782a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __xa_erase+0x53/0xb0 device_unregister+0x13/0x50 intel_pmt_dev_destroy+0x34/0x60 [pmt_class] pmt_telem_remove+0x40/0x50 [pmt_telemetry] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0xc1/0x150 driver_detach+0x44/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xd0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x12/0x20 pmt_telem_exit+0xc/0xe4a [pmt_telemetry] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13a/0x250 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x11e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1803a05b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2d 4e 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fd 4d 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 The probe function, pmt_telem_probe(), adds an entry for devices even if they have not been initialized. This results in the array of initialized devices containing both initialized and uninitialized entries. This causes a panic in the remove function, pmt_telem_remove() which expects the array to only contain initialized entries. Only use an entry when a device is initialized. Cc: "David E. Box" <[email protected]> Cc: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Gross <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Arcari <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David E. Box <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.18, take #3 - Correctly expose GICv3 support even if no irqchip is created so that userspace doesn't observe it changing pointlessly (fixing a regression with QEMU) - Don't issue a hypercall to set the id-mapped vectors when protected mode is enabled (fix for pKVM in combination with CPUs affected by Spectre-v3a)
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Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured. When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing null RX ring pointer. PID: 1449 TASK: ff187d28ed658040 CPU: 34 COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51" #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c #6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4 #7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91] RIP: ffffffffc076db8b RSP: ff1966a94a713e98 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4 RBX: ff187d269dd3c180 RCX: ff187d269cd4d018 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ff187d269cfcc644 R8: ff187d339b9641b0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff187d269cfcc648 R13: ffffffff9f128784 R14: ffffffff9d101b70 R15: ff187d269cfcc640 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice] #9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b #10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d #11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping") Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dave Cain <[email protected]> Tested-by: Gurucharan <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
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In idtentry_vc(), vc_switch_off_ist() determines a safe stack to switch to, off of the IST stack. Annotate the new stack switch with ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER in case UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER is used. A stack walk before looks like this: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl dump_stack kernel_exc_vmm_communication asm_exc_vmm_communication ? native_read_msr ? __x2apic_disable.part.0 ? x2apic_setup ? cpu_init ? trap_init ? start_kernel ? x86_64_start_reservations ? x86_64_start_kernel ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify </TASK> and with the fix, the stack dump is exact: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl dump_stack kernel_exc_vmm_communication asm_exc_vmm_communication RIP: 0010:native_read_msr Code: ... < snipped regs > ? __x2apic_disable.part.0 x2apic_setup cpu_init trap_init start_kernel x86_64_start_reservations x86_64_start_kernel secondary_startup_64_no_verify </TASK> [ bp: Test in a SEV-ES guest and rewrite the commit message to explain what exactly this does. ] Fixes: a13644f ("x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler") Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The splat below can be seen when running kvm-unit-test: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.18.0-rc7 #5 Tainted: G IOE ----------------------------- /home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:80 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 4 locks held by qemu-system-x86/35124: #0: ffff9725391d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x77/0x710 [kvm] #1: ffffbd25cfb2a0b8 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: vcpu_enter_guest+0xdeb/0x1900 [kvm] #2: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0x79/0x1e0 [kvm] #3: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: irqfd_resampler_ack+0x5/0x110 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 35124 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G IOE 5.18.0-rc7 #5 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9b irqfd_resampler_ack+0xfd/0x110 [kvm] kvm_notify_acked_gsi+0x32/0x90 [kvm] kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0xc5/0x1e0 [kvm] kvm_hv_set_msr_common+0xec1/0x1160 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x7c3/0xf60 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0x394/0x1240 [kvm_intel] kvm_set_msr_ignored_check+0x86/0x200 [kvm] kvm_emulate_wrmsr+0x4f/0x1f0 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x6fb/0x7e0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0xe5a/0x1900 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16e/0xac0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x710 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae resampler-list is protected by irq_srcu (see kvm_irqfd_assign), so fix the false positive by using list_for_each_entry_srcu(). Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This was missed in c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") and causes a panic when mounting with '-o trunkdiscovery': PID: 1604 TASK: ffff93dac3520000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffffb79140f738f8] machine_kexec at ffffffffaec64bee #1 [ffffb79140f73950] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda67fd #2 [ffffb79140f73a18] crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda76ed #3 [ffffb79140f73a30] oops_end at ffffffffaec2658d #4 [ffffb79140f73a50] general_protection at ffffffffaf60111e [exception RIP: nfs_fattr_init+0x5] RIP: ffffffffc0c18265 RSP: ffffb79140f73b08 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93dac304a800 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffb79140f73bb0 RSI: ffff93dadc8cbb40 RDI: d03ee11cfaf6bd50 RBP: ffffb79140f73be8 R8: ffffffffc0691560 R9: 0000000000000006 R10: ffff93db3ffd3df8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff93dac4040000 R13: ffff93dac2848e00 R14: ffffb79140f73b60 R15: ffffb79140f73b30 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffb79140f73b08] _nfs41_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c73d53 [nfsv4] #6 [ffffb79140f73bf0] nfs4_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c83e90 [nfsv4] #7 [ffffb79140f73c60] nfs4_discover_trunking at ffffffffc0c83fb7 [nfsv4] #8 [ffffb79140f73cd8] nfs_probe_fsinfo at ffffffffc0c0f95f [nfs] #9 [ffffb79140f73da0] nfs_probe_server at ffffffffc0c1026a [nfs] RIP: 00007f6254fce26e RSP: 00007ffc69496ac8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6254fce26e RDX: 00005600220a82a0 RSI: 00005600220a64d0 RDI: 00005600220a6520 RBP: 00007ffc69496c50 R8: 00005600220a8710 R9: 003035322e323231 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc69496c50 R13: 00005600220a8440 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 0000560020650ef9 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Fixes: c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
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…tion Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time. Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with the following sequence on cgroup1: #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS & #4> PID=$! #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration, non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader is doing an actual one. After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens: 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader. 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads. 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list. 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy. 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and putting references accordingly. 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on the dst list. This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free. This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too. This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into ->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst preloadings don't interfere with each other. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Reported-by: shisiyuan <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html Fixes: f817de9 ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy") Cc: [email protected] # v3.16+
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…0.3.7 On the GC 10.3.7 platform the initial MEC release version #3 can support atomic operation,so need correct and set its MEC atomic support version to #3. Signed-off-by: Prike Liang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Aaron Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # 5.18.x
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On powerpc, 'perf trace' is crashing with a SIGSEGV when trying to process a perf.data file created with 'perf trace record -p': #0 0x00000001225b8988 in syscall_arg__scnprintf_augmented_string <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1492 #1 syscall_arg__scnprintf_filename <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1492 #2 syscall_arg__scnprintf_filename <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1486 #3 0x00000001225bdd9c in syscall_arg_fmt__scnprintf_val <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1973 #4 syscall__scnprintf_args <snip> at builtin-trace.c:2041 #5 0x00000001225bff04 in trace__sys_enter <snip> at builtin-trace.c:2319 That points to the below code in tools/perf/builtin-trace.c: /* * If this is raw_syscalls.sys_enter, then it always comes with the 6 possible * arguments, even if the syscall being handled, say "openat", uses only 4 arguments * this breaks syscall__augmented_args() check for augmented args, as we calculate * syscall->args_size using each syscalls:sys_enter_NAME tracefs format file, * so when handling, say the openat syscall, we end up getting 6 args for the * raw_syscalls:sys_enter event, when we expected just 4, we end up mistakenly * thinking that the extra 2 u64 args are the augmented filename, so just check * here and avoid using augmented syscalls when the evsel is the raw_syscalls one. */ if (evsel != trace->syscalls.events.sys_enter) augmented_args = syscall__augmented_args(sc, sample, &augmented_args_size, trace->raw_augmented_syscalls_args_size); As the comment points out, we should not be trying to augment the args for raw_syscalls. However, when processing a perf.data file, we are not initializing those properly. Fix the same. Reported-by: Claudio Carvalho <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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…ernel/git/at91/linux into arm/fixes AT91 fixes for 5.19 #3 It contains one fix for LAN966 based SoCs fixing the frequency of sys_clk. sys_clk is feeding different IPs so having proper frequency for it in DT is necessary for proper working of different drivers. * tag 'at91-fixes-5.19-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux: ARM: dts: lan966x: fix sys_clk frequency Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
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When use 'echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger' to trigger kdump, riscv_crash_save_regs() will be called to save regs for vmcore, we found "epc" value 00ffffffa5537400 is not a valid kernel virtual address, but is a user virtual address. Other regs(eg, ra, sp, gp...) are correct kernel virtual address. Actually 0x00ffffffb0dd9400 is the user mode PC of 'PID: 113 Comm: sh', which is saved in the task's stack. [ 21.201701] CPU: 0 PID: 113 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.9 #45 [ 21.201979] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 21.202160] epc : 00ffffffa5537400 ra : ffffffff80088640 sp : ff20000010333b90 [ 21.202435] gp : ffffffff810dde38 tp : ff6000000226c200 t0 : ffffffff8032be7c [ 21.202707] t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 30203a7375746174 s0 : ff20000010333cf0 [ 21.202973] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ff20000010333b98 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 21.203243] a2 : 0000000000000010 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 28c8f0aeffea4e00 [ 21.203519] a5 : 28c8f0aeffea4e00 a6 : 0000000000000009 a7 : ffffffff8035c9b8 [ 21.203794] s2 : ffffffff810df0a8 s3 : ffffffff810df718 s4 : ff20000010333b98 [ 21.204062] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000007 s7 : ffffffff80c4a468 [ 21.204331] s8 : 00ffffffef451410 s9 : 0000000000000007 s10: 00aaaaaac0510700 [ 21.204606] s11: 0000000000000001 t3 : ff60000001218f00 t4 : ff60000001218f00 [ 21.204876] t5 : ff60000001218000 t6 : ff200000103338b8 [ 21.205079] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000008 With the incorrect PC, the backtrace showed by crash tool as below, the first stack frame is abnormal, crash> bt PID: 113 TASK: ff60000002269600 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "sh" #0 [ff2000001039bb90] __efistub_.Ldebug_info0 at 00ffffffa5537400 <-- Abnormal #1 [ff2000001039bcf0] panic at ffffffff806578ba #2 [ff2000001039bd50] sysrq_reset_seq_param_set at ffffffff8038c030 #3 [ff2000001039bda0] __handle_sysrq at ffffffff8038c5f8 #4 [ff2000001039be00] write_sysrq_trigger at ffffffff8038cad8 #5 [ff2000001039be20] proc_reg_write at ffffffff801b7edc #6 [ff2000001039be40] vfs_write at ffffffff80152ba6 #7 [ff2000001039be80] ksys_write at ffffffff80152ece #8 [ff2000001039bed0] sys_write at ffffffff80152f46 With the patch, we can get current kernel mode PC, the output as below, [ 17.607658] CPU: 0 PID: 113 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.9 #42 [ 17.607937] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 17.608150] epc : ffffffff800078f8 ra : ffffffff8008862c sp : ff20000010333b90 [ 17.608441] gp : ffffffff810dde38 tp : ff6000000226c200 t0 : ffffffff8032be68 [ 17.608741] t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 666666666666663c s0 : ff20000010333cf0 [ 17.609025] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ff20000010333b98 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 17.609320] a2 : 0000000000000010 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 17.609601] a5 : ff60000001c78000 a6 : 000000000000003c a7 : ffffffff8035c9a4 [ 17.609894] s2 : ffffffff810df0a8 s3 : ffffffff810df718 s4 : ff20000010333b98 [ 17.610186] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000007 s7 : ffffffff80c4a468 [ 17.610469] s8 : 00ffffffca281410 s9 : 0000000000000007 s10: 00aaaaaab5bb6700 [ 17.610755] s11: 0000000000000001 t3 : ff60000001218f00 t4 : ff60000001218f00 [ 17.611041] t5 : ff60000001218000 t6 : ff20000010333988 [ 17.611255] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000008 With the correct PC, the backtrace showed by crash tool as below, crash> bt PID: 113 TASK: ff6000000226c200 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "sh" #0 [ff20000010333b90] riscv_crash_save_regs at ffffffff800078f8 <--- Normal #1 [ff20000010333cf0] panic at ffffffff806578c6 #2 [ff20000010333d50] sysrq_reset_seq_param_set at ffffffff8038c03c #3 [ff20000010333da0] __handle_sysrq at ffffffff8038c604 #4 [ff20000010333e00] write_sysrq_trigger at ffffffff8038cae4 #5 [ff20000010333e20] proc_reg_write at ffffffff801b7ee8 #6 [ff20000010333e40] vfs_write at ffffffff80152bb2 #7 [ff20000010333e80] ksys_write at ffffffff80152eda #8 [ff20000010333ed0] sys_write at ffffffff80152f52 Fixes: e53d281 ("RISC-V: Add kdump support") Co-developed-by: Guo Ren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xianting Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes for PTP support This set fixes several issues in mlxsw PTP code. - Patch #1 fixes compilation warnings. - Patch #2 adjusts the order of operation during cleanup, thereby closing the window after PTP state was already cleaned in the ASIC for the given port, but before the port is removed, when the user could still in theory make changes to the configuration. - Patch #3 protects the PTP configuration with a custom mutex, instead of relying on RTNL, which is not held in all access paths. - Patch #4 forbids enablement of PTP only in RX or only in TX. The driver implicitly assumed this would be the case, but neglected to sanitize the configuration. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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We have been hitting the following lockdep splat with btrfs/187 recently WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.19.0-rc8+ #775 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/752500 is trying to acquire lock: ffff97e1875a97b8 (btrfs-treloc-02#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 but task is already holding lock: ffff97e1875a9278 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_init_new_buffer+0x7d/0x2c0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x120/0x3b0 __btrfs_cow_block+0x136/0x600 btrfs_cow_block+0x10b/0x230 btrfs_search_slot+0x53b/0xb70 btrfs_lookup_inode+0x2a/0xa0 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x280 btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x24c/0x290 btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0 process_one_work+0x271/0x590 worker_thread+0x52/0x3b0 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}: down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_search_slot+0x3c3/0xb70 do_relocation+0x10c/0x6b0 relocate_tree_blocks+0x317/0x6d0 relocate_block_group+0x1f1/0x560 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140 btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (btrfs-treloc-02#2){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1122/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2d0 down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_lock_root_node+0x31/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x1cb/0xb70 replace_path+0x541/0x9f0 merge_reloc_root+0x1d6/0x610 merge_reloc_roots+0xe2/0x260 relocate_block_group+0x2c8/0x560 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140 btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-treloc-02#2 --> btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 7 locks held by btrfs/752500: #0: ffff97e292fdf460 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x208/0x2c90 #1: ffff97e284c02050 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_balance+0x55f/0xe40 #2: ffff97e284c00878 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x236/0x400 #3: ffff97e292fdf650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xef/0x610 #4: ffff97e284c02378 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x1a8/0x5a0 #5: ffff97e284c023a0 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x1a8/0x5a0 #6: ffff97e1875a9278 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 752500 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #775 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73 check_noncircular+0xd6/0x100 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1122/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2d0 ? __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 ? __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_lock_root_node+0x31/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x1cb/0xb70 ? lock_release+0x137/0x2d0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? release_extent_buffer+0x128/0x180 replace_path+0x541/0x9f0 merge_reloc_root+0x1d6/0x610 merge_reloc_roots+0xe2/0x260 relocate_block_group+0x2c8/0x560 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140 btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd This isn't necessarily new, it's just tricky to hit in practice. There are two competing things going on here. With relocation we create a snapshot of every fs tree with a reloc tree. Any extent buffers that get initialized here are initialized with the reloc root lockdep key. However since it is a snapshot, any blocks that are currently in cache that originally belonged to the fs tree will have the normal tree lockdep key set. This creates the lock dependency of reloc tree -> normal tree for the extent buffer locking during the first phase of the relocation as we walk down the reloc root to relocate blocks. However this is problematic because the final phase of the relocation is merging the reloc root into the original fs root. This involves searching down to any keys that exist in the original fs root and then swapping the relocated block and the original fs root block. We have to search down to the fs root first, and then go search the reloc root for the block we need to replace. This creates the dependency of normal tree -> reloc tree which is why lockdep complains. Additionally even if we were to fix this particular mismatch with a different nesting for the merge case, we're still slotting in a block that has a owner of the reloc root objectid into a normal tree, so that block will have its lockdep key set to the tree reloc root, and create a lockdep splat later on when we wander into that block from the fs root. Unfortunately the only solution here is to make sure we do not set the lockdep key to the reloc tree lockdep key normally, and then reset any blocks we wander into from the reloc root when we're doing the merged. This solves the problem of having mixed tree reloc keys intermixed with normal tree keys, and then allows us to make sure in the merge case we maintain the lock order of normal tree -> reloc tree We handle this by setting a bit on the reloc root when we do the search for the block we want to relocate, and any block we search into or COW at that point gets set to the reloc tree key. This works correctly because we only ever COW down to the parent node, so we aren't resetting the key for the block we're linking into the fs root. With this patch we no longer have the lockdep splat in btrfs/187. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() calls __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags() to obtain the value of sk->sk_user_data, but that function is only usable if the RCU read lock is held, and neither that function nor any of its callers hold it. Fix this by adding a new helper, __locked_read_sk_user_data_with_flags() that checks to see if sk->sk_callback_lock() is held and use that here instead. Alternatively, making __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags() use rcu_dereference_checked() might suffice. Without this, the following warning can be occasionally observed: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.0.0-rc1-build2+ #563 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/net/sock.h:592 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by locktest/29873: #0: ffff88812734b550 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release+0x77/0x121 #1: ffff88812f5621b0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_close+0x1c/0x70 #2: ffff88810312f5c8 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: inet_unhash+0x76/0x1c0 #3: ffffffff83768bb8 (reuseport_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: reuseport_detach_sock+0x18/0xdd #4: ffff88812f562438 (clock-AF_INET){++..}-{2:2}, at: bpf_sk_reuseport_detach+0x24/0xa4 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 29873 Comm: locktest Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-build2+ #563 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x5f bpf_sk_reuseport_detach+0x6d/0xa4 reuseport_detach_sock+0x75/0xdd inet_unhash+0xa5/0x1c0 tcp_set_state+0x169/0x20f ? lockdep_sock_is_held+0x3a/0x3a ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13e/0x220 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x1bb/0x1bb ? hlock_class+0x31/0x96 ? mark_lock+0x9e/0x1af __tcp_close+0x50/0x4b6 tcp_close+0x28/0x70 inet_release+0x8e/0xa7 __sock_release+0x95/0x121 sock_close+0x14/0x17 __fput+0x20f/0x36a task_work_run+0xa3/0xcc exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9c/0x14d syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x44 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: cf8c1e9 ("net: refactor bpf_sk_reuseport_detach()") Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Hawkins Jiawei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166064248071.3502205.10036394558814861778.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…odel' Petr Machata says: ==================== selftests: mlxsw: Add ordering tests for unified bridge model Amit Cohen writes: Commit 798661c ("Merge branch 'mlxsw-unified-bridge-conversion-part-6'") converted mlxsw driver to use unified bridge model. In the legacy model, when a RIF was created / destroyed, it was firmware's responsibility to update it in the relevant FID classification records. In the unified bridge model, this responsibility moved to software. This set adds tests to check the order of configuration for the following classifications: 1. {Port, VID} -> FID 2. VID -> FID 3. VNI -> FID (after decapsulation) In addition, in the legacy model, software is responsible to update a table which is used to determine the packet's egress VID. Add a test to check that the order of configuration does not impact switch behavior. See more details in the commit messages. Note that the tests supposed to pass also using the legacy model, they are added now as with the new model they test the driver and not the firmware. Patch set overview: Patch #1 adds test for {Port, VID} -> FID Patch #2 adds test for VID -> FID Patch #3 adds test for VNI -> FID Patch #4 adds test for egress VID classification ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Oct 3, 2022
The lag_lock is taken from both process and softirq contexts which results lockdep warning[0] about potential deadlock. However, just disabling softirqs by using *_bh spinlock API is not enough since it will cause warning in some contexts where the lock is obtained with hard irqs disabled. To fix the issue save current irq state, disable them before obtaining the lock an re-enable irqs from saved state after releasing it. [0]: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ================================ [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] 5.19.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_04_16_06 #1 Not tainted [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] -------------------------------- [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] swapper/0/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ffffffffa06dc0d8 (lag_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_lag_add_netdev+0x13b/0x480 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_nic_enable+0x114/0x470 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_attach_netdev+0x30e/0x6a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_resume+0x105/0x160 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_probe+0xac3/0x14f0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __driver_attach+0x1e4/0x4d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] bus_for_each_dev+0x11e/0x1a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] bus_add_driver+0x3f4/0x5a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] driver_register+0x20f/0x390 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __auxiliary_driver_register+0x14e/0x260 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_init+0x38/0x90 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] vhost_iotlb_itree_augment_rotate+0xcb/0x180 [vhost_iotlb] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_init_module+0x18a/0x620 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] load_module+0x563a/0x7040 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __do_sys_finit_module+0x122/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] irq event stamp: 3596508 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] hardirqs last enabled at (3596508): [<ffffffff813687c2>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa2/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] hardirqs last disabled at (3596507): [<ffffffff813687da>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xba/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] softirqs last enabled at (3596488): [<ffffffff81368a2a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] softirqs last disabled at (3596495): [<ffffffff81368a2a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] other info that might help us debug this: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] CPU0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ---- [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock(lag_lock); [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <Interrupt> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock(lag_lock); [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] *** DEADLOCK *** [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] 4 locks held by swapper/0/0: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #0: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: mlx5e_napi_poll+0x43/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #1: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x2d7/0xd60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #2: ffff888144a18b58 (&br->hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: br_fdb_update+0x301/0x570 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #3: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] stack backtrace: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_04_16_06 #1 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Call Trace: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <IRQ> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mark_lock.part.0.cold+0x5f/0x92 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? unwind_next_frame+0x1c4/0x1b50 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? stack_access_ok+0x1d0/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? start_kernel+0x3a7/0x3c5 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __lock_acquire+0x1260/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xed/0x3060 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_esw_bridge_rep_vport_num_vhca_id_get+0x1a0/0x600 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x90/0x90 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_esw_bridge_switchdev_event+0x185/0x8f0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_esw_bridge_port_obj_attr_set+0x3e0/0x3e0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xea/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_switchdev_set_port_flag+0x310/0x310 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] fdb_notify+0x11b/0x150 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_fdb_update+0x34c/0x570 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_fdb_add_local+0x50/0x50 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_allowed_ingress+0x5f/0x1070 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_handle_frame_finish+0x786/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? sctp_inet_bind_verify+0x4d/0x190 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? xlog_unpack_data+0x2e0/0x310 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x227/0x380 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? setup_pre_routing+0x460/0x460 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x48b/0x69c [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_pre_routing_finish_ipv6+0x5c2/0xbf0 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x4c6/0x69c [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_validate_ipv6+0x9e0/0x9e0 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_forward_arp+0xb70/0xb70 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_pre_routing+0xacf/0x1160 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_handle_frame+0x8a9/0x1270 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x18e0/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? bond_handle_frame+0xf9/0xac0 [bonding] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x18e0/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x7c0/0x2c70 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? generic_xdp_tx+0x5b0/0x5b0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2d7/0x8a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? process_backlog+0x960/0x960 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x129/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f4/0xd60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? do_xdp_generic+0x150/0x150 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_poll_rx_cq+0xf6b/0x2960 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_poll_ico_cq+0x3d/0x1590 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x710 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __queue_work+0x53c/0xeb0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __napi_poll+0x9f/0x540 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] net_rx_action+0x420/0xb70 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? napi_threaded_poll+0x470/0x470 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __do_softirq+0x271/0x92c [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] common_interrupt+0x7d/0xa0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] </IRQ> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <TASK> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 6b f1 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d 80 3b 4a 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 e0 07 7e 85 e8 21 bd 40 fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RSP: 0018:ffffffff84407e18 EFLAGS: 00000242 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ec4a68 RCX: 1ffffffff0afc0fc [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835b1fac [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8884d2c44ac3 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] R10: ffffed109a588958 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] R13: ffffffff84efac20 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x460 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] default_idle_call+0xec/0x460 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_idle+0x394/0x450 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] rest_init+0x156/0x250 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] arch_call_rest_init+0xf/0x15 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] start_kernel+0x3a7/0x3c5 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] </TASK> Fixes: ff9b752 ("net/mlx5: Bridge, support LAG") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
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Add a lock_class_key per mlx5 device to avoid a false positive "possible circular locking dependency" warning by lockdep, on flows which lock more than one mlx5 device, such as adding SF. kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.19.0-rc8+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u20:0/8 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88812dfe0d98 (&dev->intf_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] but task is already holding lock: ffff888101aa7898 (&(¬ifier->n_head)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&(¬ifier->n_head)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: down_write+0x90/0x150 blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x53/0xa0 mlx5_sf_table_init+0x369/0x4a0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_init_one+0x261/0x490 [mlx5_core] probe_one+0x430/0x680 [mlx5_core] local_pci_probe+0xd6/0x170 work_for_cpu_fn+0x4e/0xa0 process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 worker_thread+0x6f6/0xec0 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (&dev->intf_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2fc7/0x6720 lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] mlx5_sf_dev_probe+0x29c/0x370 [mlx5_core] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 __device_attach_driver+0x1b8/0x280 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 __device_attach+0x1a3/0x460 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0x9b1/0x1b40 __auxiliary_device_add+0x88/0xc0 mlx5_sf_dev_state_change_handler+0x67e/0x9d0 [mlx5_core] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd5/0x130 mlx5_vhca_state_work_handler+0x2b0/0x3f0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(¬ifier->n_head)->rwsem); lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex); lock(&(¬ifier->n_head)->rwsem); lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u20:0/8: #0: ffff888150612938 ((wq_completion)mlx5_events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x6e2/0x1340 #1: ffff888100cafdb8 ((work_completion)(&work->work)#3){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x70f/0x1340 #2: ffff888101aa7898 (&(¬ifier->n_head)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x130 #3: ffff88813682d0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at:__device_attach+0x76/0x460 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u20:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_events mlx5_vhca_state_work_handler [mlx5_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d check_noncircular+0x278/0x300 ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460 ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 __lock_acquire+0x2fc7/0x6720 ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 ? mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 ? mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x1f/0x30 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1320/0x1320 ? __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x306/0x490 ? mlx5_sf_dev_probe+0x269/0x370 [mlx5_core] ? iounmap+0x160/0x160 mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] mlx5_sf_dev_probe+0x29c/0x370 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_sf_dev_remove+0x130/0x130 [mlx5_core] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 ? auxiliary_match_id+0xe9/0x140 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 __device_attach_driver+0x1b8/0x280 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x140/0x140 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_for_each_dev+0x1a0/0x1a0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x100 __device_attach+0x1a3/0x460 ? device_driver_attach+0x1e0/0x1e0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x22d/0xf10 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0x9b1/0x1b40 ? dev_set_name+0xab/0xe0 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x260/0x260 ? memset+0x20/0x40 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x21a/0x7d0 __auxiliary_device_add+0x88/0xc0 ? auxiliary_device_init+0x86/0xa0 mlx5_sf_dev_state_change_handler+0x67e/0x9d0 [mlx5_core] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd5/0x130 mlx5_vhca_state_work_handler+0x2b0/0x3f0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_vhca_event_arm+0x100/0x100 [mlx5_core] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 ? process_one_work+0x1340/0x1340 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: 6a32732 ("net/mlx5: SF, Port function state change support") Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Introduce modular system support by minimal driver Vadim Pasternak writes: This patchset adds line cards support in mlxsw_minimal, which is used for monitoring purposes on BMC systems. The BMC is connected to the ASIC over I2C bus, unlike the host CPU that is connected to the ASIC via PCI bus. The BMC system needs to be notified whenever line cards become active or inactive, so that, for example, netdevs will be registered / unregistered by mlxsw_minimal. However, traps cannot be generated towards the BMC over the I2C bus. To overcome that, the I2C bus driver (i.e., mlxsw_i2c) registers an handler for an IRQ that is fired upon specific system wide changes, like line card activation and deactivation. The generated event is handled by mlxsw_core, which checks whether anything changed in the state of available line cards. If a line card becomes active or inactive, interested parties such as mlxsw_minimal are notified via their registered line card event callback. Patch set overview: Patches #1 is preparations. Patches #2-#3 extend mlxsw_core with an infrastructure to handle the previously mentioned system events. Patch #4 extends the I2C bus driver to register an handler for the IRQ fired upon specific system wide changes. Patches #5-#8 gradually add line cards support in mlxsw_minimal by dynamically registering / unregistering netdevs for ports found on line cards, whenever a line card becomes active / inactive. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Oct 3, 2022
Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Configure max LAG ID for Spectrum-4 Amit Cohen writes: In the device, LAG identifiers are stored in the port group table (PGT). During initialization, firmware reserves a certain amount of entries at the beginning of this table for LAG identifiers. In Spectrum-4, the size of the PGT table did not increase, but the maximum number of LAG identifiers was doubled, leaving less room for others entries (e.g., flood entries) that also reside in the PGT. Therefore, in order to avoid a regression and as long as there is no explicit requirement to support 256 LAGs, configure the firmware to allocate the same amount of LAG entries (128) as in Spectrum-{2,3}. This can be done via the 'max_lag' field in CONFIG_PROFILE command. Patch set overview: Patch #1 edits the comment of the existing 'max_lag' field. Patch #2 adds support for configuring 'max_lag' field via CONFIG_PROFILE command. Patch #3 adds an helper function to get the actual 'max_lag' in the device. Patch #4 adjusts Spectrum-4 to configure 'max_lag' field. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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