CAP: 0046-09
Title: Network Configuration Ledger Entries
Working Group:
Owner: Dmytro Kozhevin <@dmkozh>
Authors: Dmytro Kozhevin <@dmkozh>, Siddharth Suresh <@sisuresh>
Consulted:
Status: Final
Created: 2022-11-01
Discussion:
Protocol version: 20
This proposal defines a new ledger entry type to store various network-wide configuration and a way to upgrade such configuration entries.
See the Soroban overview CAP for overall Soroban motivation.
The configuration entries in particular are motivated by the need to store a
large amount of Soroban-related configuration, such as the host function
metering data, contract fee structure, contract size limits etc. Currently the
network-wide configuration is only stored in the LedgerHeader
, which would be
infeasible to use given that the Soroban-related information may require tens
of kilobytes of space to be stored.
This CAP introduces a special type of configuration LedgerEntry
that can only
be modified via a validator vote. It also specifies the general rules for adding
and modifying these entries.
See the XDR diffs in the Soroban overview CAP, specifically those referring to
the ConfigSettingEntry
,ConfigUpgradeSet
, and ConfigUpgradeSetKey
.
This CAP adds a general mechanism for validators to store and update configuration settings using ledger upgrades. The smart contracts require a significant amount of configuration related to fees and metering and hence this CAP accounts for large and complex configuration settings.
In order to prevent bloating of the LedgerHeader
the settings are stored in
the ledger as a new type of LedgerEntry
: ConfigSettingEntry
. Every
ConfigSettingEntry
is uniquely identified by its type (ConfigSettingID
) and
hence at most one entry of each type may exist in the ledger. Setting entries
are represented by arbitrary XDR.
ConfigSettingID
and its corresponding payload should correspond to an 'atomic'
set of configuration settings, i.e. those that are expected to be used and
upgraded together. For example, contract size limit, metering data and fee data
would all be represented by the separate entries (or more granular entries if
needed).
New settings may only be introduced during the protocol version upgrades. Every CAP introducing the new setting must also define its default value to be used during the protocol version upgrade. When the upgrade happens, all the new settings defined for the upgrade are created in the ledger with respective default values.
Removal of the setting types could happen during the protocol version upgrade
too. However, given that the footprint of a single ledger entry is negligible
at the scale of ledger, there is really no need to maintain the removal
mechanism. Not being able to remove the setting by accident is also safer, as
the settings are fundamental components to any functionality needing them.
Hence this CAP assumes the settings are always persisted in the ledger after
they are introduced (similar to e.g. LedgerHeader
parameters).
Every configuration setting entry is considered to be atomic for the sake of the upgrade, i.e. an upgrade must provide the full XDR of the setting, even if it is only being partially updated. This is done to simplify the upgrade format (otherwise we'd need to introduce some key-value mechanism of specifying upgraded fields).
Multiple configuration setting entries may be upgraded at once using a
ConfigUpgradeSet
struct that contains all the updated ConfigSettingEntry
entries. The LedgerUpgrade
in StellarValue
that validators will vote on will
contain only an ConfigUpgradeSetKey
, which containts a contractID, and the
SHA-256 hash of the ConfigUpgradeSet
. The actual ConfigUpgradeSet
will need
to exist on ledger in a ContractDataEntry
, and the validators will look it up
using the ConfigUpgradeSetKey
. This means that a Wasm contract will need to be
used to write the proposed upgrade. The specs of the entry written is as follows -
- It should be a
TEMPORARY
entry, so make sure it's bumped to live long enough for the upgrade. - The
SCVal
key
should be of typeSCV_BYTES
, where the value is the SHA-256 hash of theConfigUpgradeSet
. - The
SCVal
val
should also be of typeSCV_BYTES
, where the value is the serialized XDR of theConfigUpgradeSet
.
Once the proposed upgrade is setup, you'll need to share the
ConfigUpgradeSetKey
with the other validators so they can vote for it. Note
that the validators will verify that the hash in ConfigUpgradeSetKey
matches
the hash of the upgrade stored in the ContractDataEntry
, and will only vote
for upgrades that follow this rule. Validators should however still apply any
valid hash the network accepts (even if that specific validator didn't vote for
the upgrade).
ConfigUpgradeSet
is considered valid when:
- all the
updatedEntry
values have uniqueconfigSettingID
values updateEntry
are ordered by the integer values of theConfigSettingID
enum- every
updatedEntry
is valid itself
Individual config settings are validated in the way defined by the CAPs introducing them.
The submission of Soroban transactions can be disabled by setting
ConfigSettingContractExecutionLanesV0::ledgerMaxTxCount
to 0 in under the
ConfigSettingID
CONFIG_SETTING_CONTRACT_EXECUTION_LANES
. Doing this will
lock the validators out from creating config setting upgrades using Wasm
contracts, which means the ConfigUpgradeSet
mechanism cannot be used to
re-enable Soroban.
To allow increasing ledgerMaxTxCount
from 0, we introduce the ability to set
the value using the traditional upgrade mechanism. There's a new LedgerUpgrade
type LEDGER_UPGRADE_MAX_SOROBAN_TX_SET_SIZE
, which contains a uint32 newMaxSorobanTxSetSize
to update
ConfigSettingContractExecutionLanesV0::ledgerMaxTxCount
.
The protocol should define minimum values for every upgradeable config setting
so that it should always be possible to install a contract (assuming
ledgerMaxTxCount
isn't 0) that saves enough state to write the largest
ConfigUpgradeEntry
to allow for any config setting upgrade. Any CAP that
introduces a new case under ConfigSettingEntry
should also define the minimum
values.
No substantial changes to resource utilization are expected, including the upgrade events.
Compared to the existing ledger upgrades that normally are limited to very simple changes like bumping the protocol version, the configuration upgrades to schedule are much harder to review from the validator perspective. It's also not plausible that every validator would do complex operations like host function cost calibration. Hence the upgrade sets to nominate have to be distributed via the trusted and secure channels. Both these issues increase the risks of applying a malicious upgrade to the network (for example by distributing it to validators as an impersonated trusted party). Although the influence scope of such a malicious upgrade would be reasonably limited and likely concern only the Smart Contracts.