From 6898f8a8e12f5db4665135c1cc006c1a9d27828e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 15:56:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 01/33] iommu/amd: Fix backport of 140456f994195b568ecd7fc2287a34eadffef3ca Clang warns: drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c:1335:6: warning: variable 'flags' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (!pte) ^~~~ drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c:1352:40: note: uninitialized use occurs here spin_unlock_irqrestore(&domain->lock, flags); ^~~~~ drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c:1335:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false if (!pte) ^~~~~~~~~ drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c:1331:21: note: initialize the variable 'flags' to silence this warning unsigned long flags; ^ = 0 1 warning generated. The backport of commit 140456f99419 ("iommu/amd: Fix sleeping in atomic in increase_address_space()") to 4.9 as commit 1d648460d7c5 ("iommu/amd: Fix sleeping in atomic in increase_address_space()") failed to keep the "return false", which in 4.9 needs to be a regular "return" due to a lack of commit f15d9a992f90 ("iommu/amd: Remove domain->updated"). This resolves the warning and matches the 4.14-4.19 backport. Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Will Deacon Fixes: 1d648460d7c5 ("iommu/amd: Fix sleeping in atomic in increase_address_space()") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Acked-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c index 8377bd388d67..14e9b06829d5 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ static void increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain, pte = (void *)get_zeroed_page(gfp); if (!pte) - goto out; + return; spin_lock_irqsave(&domain->lock, flags); From 088f160d6f6dc06cf858e864ba8e81548387af1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 15:56:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 02/33] tipc: Fix backport of b77413446408fdd256599daf00d5be72b5f3e7c6 Clang warns: net/tipc/link.c:896:23: warning: variable 'hdr' is uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized] imp = msg_importance(hdr); ^~~ net/tipc/link.c:890:22: note: initialize the variable 'hdr' to silence this warning struct tipc_msg *hdr; ^ = NULL 1 warning generated. The backport of commit b77413446408 ("tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_link_xmit()") to 4.9 as commit 310014f572a5 ("tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_link_xmit()") added the hdr initialization above the if (unlikely(msg_size(hdr) > mtu)) { like in the upstream commit; however, in 4.9, that check is below imp's first use because commit 365ad353c256 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion") is not present. This results in hdr being used uninitialized. Fix this by moving hdr's initialization before imp and after the if check like the original backport did. Cc: Hoang Le Cc: Jon Maloy Cc: Ying Xue Fixes: 310014f572a5 ("tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_link_xmit()") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/tipc/link.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/link.c b/net/tipc/link.c index 06327f78f203..6fc2fa75503d 100644 --- a/net/tipc/link.c +++ b/net/tipc/link.c @@ -893,6 +893,7 @@ int tipc_link_xmit(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff_head *list, if (pkt_cnt <= 0) return 0; + hdr = buf_msg(skb_peek(list)); imp = msg_importance(hdr); /* Match msg importance against this and all higher backlog limits: */ if (!skb_queue_empty(backlogq)) { @@ -902,7 +903,6 @@ int tipc_link_xmit(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff_head *list, } } - hdr = buf_msg(skb_peek(list)); if (unlikely(msg_size(hdr) > mtu)) { skb_queue_purge(list); return -EMSGSIZE; From 1f02ba8b5b42fe25cab3d8e6f400e10c4c688700 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 09:01:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 03/33] net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files commit f4e65870e5cede5ca1ec0006b6c9803994e5f7b8 upstream. We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is m/y. No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Acked-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe [ backported to older kernels to get access to unix_gc_lock - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/af_unix.h | 1 + net/Makefile | 2 +- net/unix/Kconfig | 5 ++ net/unix/Makefile | 2 + net/unix/af_unix.c | 76 +------------------- net/unix/garbage.c | 68 +----------------- net/unix/scm.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/unix/scm.h | 10 +++ 8 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/unix/scm.c create mode 100644 net/unix/scm.h diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h index fd60eccb59a6..79f2e1ccfcfb 100644 --- a/include/net/af_unix.h +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp); void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp); +void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb); void unix_gc(void); void wait_for_unix_gc(void); struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp); diff --git a/net/Makefile b/net/Makefile index 4cafaa2b4667..1955d89de75b 100644 --- a/net/Makefile +++ b/net/Makefile @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += ethernet/ 802/ sched/ netlink/ obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER) += netfilter/ obj-$(CONFIG_INET) += ipv4/ obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm/ -obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX) += unix/ +obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM) += unix/ obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += ipv6/ obj-$(CONFIG_PACKET) += packet/ obj-$(CONFIG_NET_KEY) += key/ diff --git a/net/unix/Kconfig b/net/unix/Kconfig index 8b31ab85d050..3b9e450656a4 100644 --- a/net/unix/Kconfig +++ b/net/unix/Kconfig @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ config UNIX Say Y unless you know what you are doing. +config UNIX_SCM + bool + depends on UNIX + default y + config UNIX_DIAG tristate "UNIX: socket monitoring interface" depends on UNIX diff --git a/net/unix/Makefile b/net/unix/Makefile index b663c607b1c6..dc686c6757fb 100644 --- a/net/unix/Makefile +++ b/net/unix/Makefile @@ -9,3 +9,5 @@ unix-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_unix.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG) += unix_diag.o unix_diag-y := diag.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM) += scm.o diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 8bbaa35937dd..1cc9d89b5cee 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ #include #include +#include "scm.h" + struct hlist_head unix_socket_table[2 * UNIX_HASH_SIZE]; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unix_socket_table); DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_table_lock); @@ -1505,80 +1507,6 @@ static int unix_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int *uaddr_ return err; } -static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - int i; - - scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp; - UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL; - - for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--) - unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); -} - -static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - struct scm_cookie scm; - memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); - scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid; - if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) - unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb); - - /* Alas, it calls VFS */ - /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */ - scm_destroy(&scm); - sock_wfree(skb); -} - -/* - * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage - * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go - * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing - * it across threads. Tough. - */ -static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p) -{ - struct user_struct *user = current_user(); - - if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE))) - return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); - return false; -} - -#define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4 - -static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - int i; - unsigned char max_level = 0; - - if (too_many_unix_fds(current)) - return -ETOOMANYREFS; - - for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]); - - if (sk) - max_level = max(max_level, - unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level); - } - if (unlikely(max_level > MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL)) - return -ETOOMANYREFS; - - /* - * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage - * collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a - * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued. - */ - UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp); - if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) - unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); - return max_level; -} - static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds) { int err = 0; diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c index c36757e72844..8bbe1b8e4ff7 100644 --- a/net/unix/garbage.c +++ b/net/unix/garbage.c @@ -86,77 +86,13 @@ #include #include +#include "scm.h" + /* Internal data structures and random procedures: */ -static LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list); static LIST_HEAD(gc_candidates); -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock); static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(unix_gc_wait); -unsigned int unix_tot_inflight; - -struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp) -{ - struct sock *u_sock = NULL; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); - - /* Socket ? */ - if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) { - struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode); - struct sock *s = sock->sk; - - /* PF_UNIX ? */ - if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX) - u_sock = s; - } - return u_sock; -} - -/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file - * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket. - */ - -void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) -{ - struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); - - spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); - - if (s) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); - - if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) { - BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link)); - list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list); - } else { - BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); - } - unix_tot_inflight++; - } - user->unix_inflight++; - spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); -} - -void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) -{ - struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); - - spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); - - if (s) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); - - BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight)); - BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); - - if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight)) - list_del_init(&u->link); - unix_tot_inflight--; - } - user->unix_inflight--; - spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); -} - static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *), struct sk_buff_head *hitlist) { diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..df8f636ab1d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/unix/scm.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "scm.h" + +unsigned int unix_tot_inflight; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_tot_inflight); + +LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gc_inflight_list); + +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_gc_lock); + +struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp) +{ + struct sock *u_sock = NULL; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); + + /* Socket ? */ + if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) { + struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode); + struct sock *s = sock->sk; + + /* PF_UNIX ? */ + if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX) + u_sock = s; + } + return u_sock; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_get_socket); + +/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file + * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket. + */ +void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) +{ + struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); + + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); + + if (s) { + struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); + + if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) { + BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link)); + list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list); + } else { + BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); + } + unix_tot_inflight++; + } + user->unix_inflight++; + spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); +} + +void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) +{ + struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); + + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); + + if (s) { + struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); + + BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight)); + BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); + + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight)) + list_del_init(&u->link); + unix_tot_inflight--; + } + user->unix_inflight--; + spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); +} + +/* + * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage + * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go + * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing + * it across threads. Tough. + */ +static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct user_struct *user = current_user(); + + if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE))) + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + return false; +} + +#define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4 + +int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int i; + unsigned char max_level = 0; + + if (too_many_unix_fds(current)) + return -ETOOMANYREFS; + + for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]); + + if (sk) + max_level = max(max_level, + unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level); + } + if (unlikely(max_level > MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL)) + return -ETOOMANYREFS; + + /* + * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage + * collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a + * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued. + */ + UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp); + if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) + unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); + return max_level; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_attach_fds); + +void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int i; + + scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp; + UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL; + + for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--) + unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_detach_fds); + +void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct scm_cookie scm; + + memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); + scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid; + if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) + unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb); + + /* Alas, it calls VFS */ + /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */ + scm_destroy(&scm); + sock_wfree(skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_destruct_scm); diff --git a/net/unix/scm.h b/net/unix/scm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5a255a477f16 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/unix/scm.h @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +#ifndef NET_UNIX_SCM_H +#define NET_UNIX_SCM_H + +extern struct list_head gc_inflight_list; +extern spinlock_t unix_gc_lock; + +int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb); +void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb); + +#endif From a805a7bd94644207d762d9c287078fecfcf52b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 14:47:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/33] af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK commit cbcf01128d0a92e131bd09f1688fe032480b65ca upstream. unix_gc() assumes that candidate sockets can never gain an external reference (i.e. be installed into an fd) while the unix_gc_lock is held. Except for MSG_PEEK this is guaranteed by modifying inflight count under the unix_gc_lock. MSG_PEEK does not touch any variable protected by unix_gc_lock (file count is not), yet it needs to be serialized with garbage collection. Do this by locking/unlocking unix_gc_lock: 1) increment file count 2) lock/unlock barrier to make sure incremented file count is visible to garbage collection 3) install file into fd This is a lock barrier (unlike smp_mb()) that ensures that garbage collection is run completely before or completely after the barrier. Cc: Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 1cc9d89b5cee..bfdfb958a37d 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -1507,6 +1507,53 @@ static int unix_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int *uaddr_ return err; } +static void unix_peek_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp); + + /* + * Garbage collection of unix sockets starts by selecting a set of + * candidate sockets which have reference only from being in flight + * (total_refs == inflight_refs). This condition is checked once during + * the candidate collection phase, and candidates are marked as such, so + * that non-candidates can later be ignored. While inflight_refs is + * protected by unix_gc_lock, total_refs (file count) is not, hence this + * is an instantaneous decision. + * + * Once a candidate, however, the socket must not be reinstalled into a + * file descriptor while the garbage collection is in progress. + * + * If the above conditions are met, then the directed graph of + * candidates (*) does not change while unix_gc_lock is held. + * + * Any operations that changes the file count through file descriptors + * (dup, close, sendmsg) does not change the graph since candidates are + * not installed in fds. + * + * Dequeing a candidate via recvmsg would install it into an fd, but + * that takes unix_gc_lock to decrement the inflight count, so it's + * serialized with garbage collection. + * + * MSG_PEEK is special in that it does not change the inflight count, + * yet does install the socket into an fd. The following lock/unlock + * pair is to ensure serialization with garbage collection. It must be + * done between incrementing the file count and installing the file into + * an fd. + * + * If garbage collection starts after the barrier provided by the + * lock/unlock, then it will see the elevated refcount and not mark this + * as a candidate. If a garbage collection is already in progress + * before the file count was incremented, then the lock/unlock pair will + * ensure that garbage collection is finished before progressing to + * installing the fd. + * + * (*) A -> B where B is on the queue of A or B is on the queue of C + * which is on the queue of listening socket A. + */ + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); + spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); +} + static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds) { int err = 0; @@ -2140,7 +2187,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size); if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) - scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp); + unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb); } err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size; @@ -2385,7 +2432,7 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state, /* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg. */ if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) - scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp); + unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb); sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk); From 1f63eec1c8489c6edd9ca96dd36c8638f595e234 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 17:19:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/33] workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn() commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream. I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test: [ 152.880091][ T8030] ================================================================== [ 152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190 [ 152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030 [ 152.883578][ T8030] [ 152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249 [ 152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn [ 152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace: [ 152.887837][ T8030] dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b [ 152.888525][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190 [ 152.889371][ T8030] print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70 [ 152.890326][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190 [ 152.891163][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190 [ 152.891999][ T8030] kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb [ 152.892740][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190 [ 152.893594][ T8030] __asan_load4+0x69/0x90 [ 152.894243][ T8030] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190 [ 152.895057][ T8030] process_one_work+0x47b/0x890 [ 152.895778][ T8030] worker_thread+0x5c/0x790 [ 152.896439][ T8030] ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890 [ 152.897163][ T8030] kthread+0x223/0x250 [ 152.897747][ T8030] ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0 [ 152.898471][ T8030] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 152.899114][ T8030] [ 152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884: [ 152.900084][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50 [ 152.900769][ T8030] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 152.901416][ T8030] __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460 [ 152.902014][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0 [ 152.902690][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0 [ 152.903459][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0 [ 152.904198][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490 [ 152.904929][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0 [ 152.905599][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50 [ 152.906247][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190 [ 152.906916][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 [ 152.907535][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 152.908365][ T8030] [ 152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884: [ 152.909243][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50 [ 152.909893][ T8030] kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30 [ 152.910541][ T8030] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40 [ 152.911265][ T8030] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 [ 152.911964][ T8030] kfree+0x9e/0x3d0 [ 152.912501][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0 [ 152.913182][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0 [ 152.913949][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0 [ 152.914703][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490 [ 152.915402][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0 [ 152.916077][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50 [ 152.916729][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190 [ 152.917414][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 [ 152.918034][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 152.918872][ T8030] [ 152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00 [ 152.919203][ T8030] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of [ 152.921155][ T8030] 512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00) [ 152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318 [ 152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80 [ 152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 152.930759][ T8030] [ 152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 152.931851][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 152.932967][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 152.934068][ T8030] >ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 152.935189][ T8030] ^ [ 152.935763][ T8030] ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 152.936847][ T8030] ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 152.937940][ T8030] ================================================================== If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq() which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'. The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF. CPU0 CPU1 alloc_workqueue() alloc_and_link_pwqs() apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails apply_wqattrs_cleanup() schedule_work(&pwq->unbound_release_work) kfree(wq) worker_thread() pwq_unbound_release_workfn() <- trigger uaf here If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker, so add check pwq if linked to fix this. Fixes: 2d5f0764b526 ("workqueue: split apply_workqueue_attrs() into 3 stages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Reported-by: Hulk Robot Suggested-by: Lai Jiangshan Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan Tested-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/workqueue.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c index a410d5827a73..b3476a21a7b3 100644 --- a/kernel/workqueue.c +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c @@ -3397,15 +3397,21 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(struct work_struct *work) unbound_release_work); struct workqueue_struct *wq = pwq->wq; struct worker_pool *pool = pwq->pool; - bool is_last; + bool is_last = false; - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND))) - return; + /* + * when @pwq is not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the + * @wq, and @wq is invalid to access. + */ + if (!list_empty(&pwq->pwqs_node)) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND))) + return; - mutex_lock(&wq->mutex); - list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node); - is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs); - mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex); + mutex_lock(&wq->mutex); + list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node); + is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs); + mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex); + } mutex_lock(&wq_pool_mutex); put_unbound_pool(pool); From 5a08a0cd97f90cca1fbd9d0d2c9d55a8f4f6860c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 15:22:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 06/33] net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join() [ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ] I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64): comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ backtrace: [<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline] [<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline] [<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130 [<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline] [<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline] [<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530 [<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40 [<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292 [<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609 [<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767 [<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122 [<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448 [<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488 [<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552 [<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 [<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] [<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 [<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 [<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] [<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674 [<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350 [<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning from mrp_uninit_applicant(). Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/802/mrp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/802/mrp.c b/net/802/mrp.c index 72db2785ef2c..4ee3af3d400b 100644 --- a/net/802/mrp.c +++ b/net/802/mrp.c @@ -295,6 +295,19 @@ static void mrp_attr_destroy(struct mrp_applicant *app, struct mrp_attr *attr) kfree(attr); } +static void mrp_attr_destroy_all(struct mrp_applicant *app) +{ + struct rb_node *node, *next; + struct mrp_attr *attr; + + for (node = rb_first(&app->mad); + next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL; + node = next) { + attr = rb_entry(node, struct mrp_attr, node); + mrp_attr_destroy(app, attr); + } +} + static int mrp_pdu_init(struct mrp_applicant *app) { struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -900,6 +913,7 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl) spin_lock_bh(&app->lock); mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_TX); + mrp_attr_destroy_all(app); mrp_pdu_queue(app); spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock); From e74d662587847de5b92401ece06ea897dbdf7537 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:53:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/33] net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join() [ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ] I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64): comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ backtrace: [<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0 [<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190 [<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980 [<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460 [<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650 [<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280 [<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550 [<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 [<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0 [<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420 [<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750 [<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0 [<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820 [<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0 [<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0 Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant(). Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/802/garp.c b/net/802/garp.c index b38ee6dcba45..5239b8f244e7 100644 --- a/net/802/garp.c +++ b/net/802/garp.c @@ -206,6 +206,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr kfree(attr); } +static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app) +{ + struct rb_node *node, *next; + struct garp_attr *attr; + + for (node = rb_first(&app->gid); + next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL; + node = next) { + attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node); + garp_attr_destroy(app, attr); + } +} + static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app) { struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -612,6 +625,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl spin_lock_bh(&app->lock); garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU); + garp_attr_destroy_all(app); garp_pdu_queue(app); spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock); From 9172d455994f4d5da04cf3a1df9091619630552f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 23:34:08 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/33] sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ] The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be allowed to use in SCTP. As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope. Reported-by: Sérgio Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +--- net/sctp/protocol.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/sctp/constants.h b/include/net/sctp/constants.h index 8890fd66021d..9799c300603a 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/constants.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/constants.h @@ -344,8 +344,7 @@ typedef enum { } sctp_scope_policy_t; /* Based on IPv4 scoping , - * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.18.0.0/24, - * 192.88.99.0/24. + * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 192.88.99.0/24. * Also, RFC 8.4, non-unicast addresses are not considered valid SCTP * addresses. */ @@ -353,7 +352,6 @@ typedef enum { ((htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST) == a) || \ ipv4_is_multicast(a) || \ ipv4_is_zeronet(a) || \ - ipv4_is_test_198(a) || \ ipv4_is_anycast_6to4(a)) /* Flags used for the bind address copy functions. */ diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c index b2c242facf1b..b1932fd125da 100644 --- a/net/sctp/protocol.c +++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ static sctp_scope_t sctp_v4_scope(union sctp_addr *addr) retval = SCTP_SCOPE_LINK; } else if (ipv4_is_private_10(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || ipv4_is_private_172(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || - ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) { + ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || + ipv4_is_test_198(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) { retval = SCTP_SCOPE_PRIVATE; } else { retval = SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL; From cb49f4a65bc13554b595261a56bec643f8659e14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 09/33] hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super [ Upstream commit 16ee572eaf0d09daa4c8a755fdb71e40dbf8562d ] Patch series "hfs: fix various errors", v2. This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1]. The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into three patches: 1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in hfs_fill_super 2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap 3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking hierarchy is safe This patch (of 3): Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to release the lock held on the btree. The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-2-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva Cc: Al Viro Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfs/super.c b/fs/hfs/super.c index bf6304a350a6..c2a5a0ca3948 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/super.c +++ b/fs/hfs/super.c @@ -427,14 +427,12 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) if (!res) { if (fd.entrylength > sizeof(rec) || fd.entrylength < 0) { res = -EIO; - goto bail; + goto bail_hfs_find; } hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, fd.entrylength); } - if (res) { - hfs_find_exit(&fd); - goto bail_no_root; - } + if (res) + goto bail_hfs_find; res = -EINVAL; root_inode = hfs_iget(sb, &fd.search_key->cat, &rec); hfs_find_exit(&fd); @@ -450,6 +448,8 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) /* everything's okay */ return 0; +bail_hfs_find: + hfs_find_exit(&fd); bail_no_root: pr_err("get root inode failed\n"); bail: From 81d6d87a80f2efe75b0f05dc4bd9a774d8495a88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 10/33] hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read [ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ] Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid memory access. To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant portions of data. An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen in the following crash report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26 Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634 CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186 memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26 hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline] hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365 hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126 hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165 hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194 hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419 mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368 hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457 legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline] path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433 do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x45e63a Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120 RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff) raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-3-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Cc: Al Viro Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva Cc: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c index d77d844b668b..1ff979c9d0a3 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c +++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c @@ -14,16 +14,31 @@ #include "btree.h" -void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, - int off, int len) +void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len) { struct page *page; + int pagenum; + int bytes_read; + int bytes_to_read; + void *vaddr; off += node->page_offset; - page = node->page[0]; + pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT; + off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */ - memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len); - kunmap(page); + for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) { + if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode) + break; + page = node->page[pagenum]; + bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off); + + vaddr = kmap_atomic(page); + memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read); + kunmap_atomic(vaddr); + + pagenum++; + off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */ + } } u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off) From e2c06c712ad1fcc7d05649b98d528a5ae781c954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 11/33] hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init [ Upstream commit b3b2177a2d795e35dc11597b2609eb1e7e57e570 ] Syzbot reports a possible recursive lock in [1]. This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem. While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to __hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on the extents btree. Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock. To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-4-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi Reported-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Cc: Al Viro Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva Cc: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 +++++++++++++- fs/hfs/btree.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c index de69d8a24f6d..7f2ef95dcd05 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c +++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c @@ -24,7 +24,19 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd) fd->key = ptr + tree->max_key_len + 2; hfs_dbg(BNODE_REFS, "find_init: %d (%p)\n", tree->cnid, __builtin_return_address(0)); - mutex_lock(&tree->tree_lock); + switch (tree->cnid) { + case HFS_CAT_CNID: + mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX); + break; + case HFS_EXT_CNID: + mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX); + break; + case HFS_ATTR_CNID: + mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX); + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } return 0; } diff --git a/fs/hfs/btree.h b/fs/hfs/btree.h index 2715f416b5a8..308b5f1af65b 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/btree.h +++ b/fs/hfs/btree.h @@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ typedef int (*btree_keycmp)(const btree_key *, const btree_key *); #define NODE_HASH_SIZE 256 +/* B-tree mutex nested subclasses */ +enum hfs_btree_mutex_classes { + CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX, + EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX, + ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX, +}; + /* A HFS BTree held in memory */ struct hfs_btree { struct super_block *sb; From fdf21153e6b33d57ff28387933776c982fe72218 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sudeep Holla Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 14:21:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 12/33] ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names [ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ] Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get the below warnings: arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml: intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$' arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml: intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid clear-mask property. Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla Acked-by: Linus Walleij Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210701132118.759454-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com' Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 ++--- arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts index 00d7d28e86f0..4633b79bf5ea 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts @@ -154,16 +154,15 @@ #size-cells = <1>; ranges; - vic: intc@10140000 { + vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 { compatible = "arm,versatile-vic"; interrupt-controller; #interrupt-cells = <1>; reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>; - clear-mask = <0xffffffff>; valid-mask = <0xffffffff>; }; - sic: intc@10003000 { + sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 { compatible = "arm,versatile-sic"; interrupt-controller; #interrupt-cells = <1>; diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts index 33a8eb28374e..3a23164c2c2d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ amba { /* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */ - sic: intc@10003000 { + sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 { clear-mask = <0xffffffff>; /* * Valid interrupt lines mask according to From fe0bc3fd86c71ebdbf1cb29660078752f2238910 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Wilcox Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 16:13:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 13/33] lib/string.c: add multibyte memset functions commit 3b3c4babd898715926d24ae10aa64778ace33aae upstream. Patch series "Multibyte memset variations", v4. A relatively common idiom we're missing is a function to fill an area of memory with a pattern which is larger than a single byte. I first noticed this with a zram patch which wanted to fill a page with an 'unsigned long' value. There turn out to be quite a few places in the kernel which can benefit from using an optimised function rather than a loop; sometimes text size, sometimes speed, and sometimes both. The optimised PowerPC version (not included here) improves performance by about 30% on POWER8 on just the raw memset_l(). Most of the extra lines of code come from the three testcases I added. This patch (of 8): memset16(), memset32() and memset64() are like memset(), but allow the caller to fill the destination with a value larger than a single byte. memset_l() and memset_p() allow the caller to use unsigned long and pointer values respectively. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170720184539.31609-2-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" Cc: David Miller Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky Cc: Matt Turner Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Russell King Cc: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky Cc: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu (CIP) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/string.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ lib/string.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h index 66a91f5a3449..dd810d4739ee 100644 --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -103,6 +103,36 @@ extern __kernel_size_t strcspn(const char *,const char *); #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET extern void * memset(void *,int,__kernel_size_t); #endif + +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16 +extern void *memset16(uint16_t *, uint16_t, __kernel_size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32 +extern void *memset32(uint32_t *, uint32_t, __kernel_size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64 +extern void *memset64(uint64_t *, uint64_t, __kernel_size_t); +#endif + +static inline void *memset_l(unsigned long *p, unsigned long v, + __kernel_size_t n) +{ + if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32) + return memset32((uint32_t *)p, v, n); + else + return memset64((uint64_t *)p, v, n); +} + +static inline void *memset_p(void **p, void *v, __kernel_size_t n) +{ + if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32) + return memset32((uint32_t *)p, (uintptr_t)v, n); + else + return memset64((uint64_t *)p, (uintptr_t)v, n); +} + #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY extern void * memcpy(void *,const void *,__kernel_size_t); #endif diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c index 8fe13371aed7..ec1ba61b358f 100644 --- a/lib/string.c +++ b/lib/string.c @@ -754,6 +754,72 @@ void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(memzero_explicit); +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16 +/** + * memset16() - Fill a memory area with a uint16_t + * @s: Pointer to the start of the area. + * @v: The value to fill the area with + * @count: The number of values to store + * + * Differs from memset() in that it fills with a uint16_t instead + * of a byte. Remember that @count is the number of uint16_ts to + * store, not the number of bytes. + */ +void *memset16(uint16_t *s, uint16_t v, size_t count) +{ + uint16_t *xs = s; + + while (count--) + *xs++ = v; + return s; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset16); +#endif + +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32 +/** + * memset32() - Fill a memory area with a uint32_t + * @s: Pointer to the start of the area. + * @v: The value to fill the area with + * @count: The number of values to store + * + * Differs from memset() in that it fills with a uint32_t instead + * of a byte. Remember that @count is the number of uint32_ts to + * store, not the number of bytes. + */ +void *memset32(uint32_t *s, uint32_t v, size_t count) +{ + uint32_t *xs = s; + + while (count--) + *xs++ = v; + return s; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset32); +#endif + +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64 +/** + * memset64() - Fill a memory area with a uint64_t + * @s: Pointer to the start of the area. + * @v: The value to fill the area with + * @count: The number of values to store + * + * Differs from memset() in that it fills with a uint64_t instead + * of a byte. Remember that @count is the number of uint64_ts to + * store, not the number of bytes. + */ +void *memset64(uint64_t *s, uint64_t v, size_t count) +{ + uint64_t *xs = s; + + while (count--) + *xs++ = v; + return s; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset64); +#endif + #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY /** * memcpy - Copy one area of memory to another From aa1b5f2fe4532e99986f1eee2c04bb7d314e3007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Russell King Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 10:19:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 14/33] ARM: ensure the signal page contains defined contents commit 9c698bff66ab4914bb3d71da7dc6112519bde23e upstream. Ensure that the signal page contains our poison instruction to increase the protection against ROP attacks and also contains well defined contents. Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu (CIP) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c index 0a066f03b5ec..180c1782ad63 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c @@ -625,18 +625,20 @@ struct page *get_signal_page(void) addr = page_address(page); + /* Poison the entire page */ + memset32(addr, __opcode_to_mem_arm(0xe7fddef1), + PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(u32)); + /* Give the signal return code some randomness */ offset = 0x200 + (get_random_int() & 0x7fc); signal_return_offset = offset; - /* - * Copy signal return handlers into the vector page, and - * set sigreturn to be a pointer to these. - */ + /* Copy signal return handlers into the page */ memcpy(addr + offset, sigreturn_codes, sizeof(sigreturn_codes)); - ptr = (unsigned long)addr + offset; - flush_icache_range(ptr, ptr + sizeof(sigreturn_codes)); + /* Flush out all instructions in this page */ + ptr = (unsigned long)addr; + flush_icache_range(ptr, ptr + PAGE_SIZE); return page; } From 7e7269ae84944731803823ba0518b381b6442467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 17:41:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/33] x86/kvm: fix vcpu-id indexed array sizes commit 76b4f357d0e7d8f6f0013c733e6cba1773c266d3 upstream. KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID is the maximum vcpu-id of a guest, and not the number of vcpu-ids. Fix array indexed by vcpu-id to have KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID+1 elements. Note that this is currently no real problem, as KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID is an odd number, resulting in always enough padding being available at the end of those arrays. Nevertheless this should be fixed in order to avoid rare problems in case someone is using an even number for KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Message-Id: <20210701154105.23215-2-jgross@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c index aa34b16e62c2..a069d0dd3ded 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, static void rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic) { ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi = 0; - bitmap_zero(ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map.map, KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID); + bitmap_zero(ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map.map, KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID + 1); } static void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h index 1cc6e54436db..2f3df43489f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h @@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu; struct dest_map { /* vcpu bitmap where IRQ has been sent */ - DECLARE_BITMAP(map, KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID); + DECLARE_BITMAP(map, KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID + 1); /* * Vector sent to a given vcpu, only valid when * the vcpu's bit in map is set */ - u8 vectors[KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID]; + u8 vectors[KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID + 1]; }; From 439e209bc22f76a932d05f0c65e8259166060fa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junxiao Bi Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 14:53:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 16/33] ocfs2: fix zero out valid data commit f267aeb6dea5e468793e5b8eb6a9c72c0020d418 upstream. If append-dio feature is enabled, direct-io write and fallocate could run in parallel to extend file size, fallocate used "orig_isize" to record i_size before taking "ip_alloc_sem", when ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster() zeroout EOF blocks, i_size maybe already extended by ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), that will cause valid data zeroed out. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210722054923.24389-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Fixes: 6bba4471f0cc ("ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/file.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/file.c b/fs/ocfs2/file.c index 3aa4441f5ab5..3cb0d9ef1cb2 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c @@ -1918,7 +1918,6 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, struct inode *inode, goto out_inode_unlock; } - orig_isize = i_size_read(inode); switch (sr->l_whence) { case 0: /*SEEK_SET*/ break; @@ -1926,7 +1925,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, struct inode *inode, sr->l_start += f_pos; break; case 2: /*SEEK_END*/ - sr->l_start += orig_isize; + sr->l_start += i_size_read(inode); break; default: ret = -EINVAL; @@ -1981,6 +1980,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, struct inode *inode, ret = -EINVAL; } + orig_isize = i_size_read(inode); /* zeroout eof blocks in the cluster. */ if (!ret && change_size && orig_isize < size) { ret = ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(inode, orig_isize, From fc3f43d556d1f69035499b7542863da91087ad22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junxiao Bi Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 14:53:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 17/33] ocfs2: issue zeroout to EOF blocks commit 9449ad33be8480f538b11a593e2dda2fb33ca06d upstream. For punch holes in EOF blocks, fallocate used buffer write to zero the EOF blocks in last cluster. But since ->writepage will ignore EOF pages, those zeros will not be flushed. This "looks" ok as commit 6bba4471f0cc ("ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate") will zero the EOF blocks when extend the file size, but it isn't. The problem happened on those EOF pages, before writeback, those pages had DIRTY flag set and all buffer_head in them also had DIRTY flag set, when writeback run by write_cache_pages(), DIRTY flag on the page was cleared, but DIRTY flag on the buffer_head not. When next write happened to those EOF pages, since buffer_head already had DIRTY flag set, it would not mark page DIRTY again. That made writeback ignore them forever. That will cause data corruption. Even directio write can't work because it will fail when trying to drop pages caches before direct io, as it found the buffer_head for those pages still had DIRTY flag set, then it will fall back to buffer io mode. To make a summary of the issue, as writeback ingores EOF pages, once any EOF page is generated, any write to it will only go to the page cache, it will never be flushed to disk even file size extends and that page is not EOF page any more. The fix is to avoid zero EOF blocks with buffer write. The following code snippet from qemu-img could trigger the corruption. 656 open("6b3711ae-3306-4bdd-823c-cf1c0060a095.conv.2", O_RDWR|O_DIRECT|O_CLOEXEC) = 11 ... 660 fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2275868672, 327680 660 fallocate(11, 0, 2275868672, 327680) = 0 658 pwrite64(11, " Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210722054923.24389-2-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/file.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/file.c b/fs/ocfs2/file.c index 3cb0d9ef1cb2..d526e86cf5bb 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c @@ -1511,6 +1511,45 @@ static void ocfs2_truncate_cluster_pages(struct inode *inode, u64 byte_start, } } +/* + * zero out partial blocks of one cluster. + * + * start: file offset where zero starts, will be made upper block aligned. + * len: it will be trimmed to the end of current cluster if "start + len" + * is bigger than it. + */ +static int ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(struct inode *inode, + u64 start, u64 len) +{ + int ret; + u64 start_block, end_block, nr_blocks; + u64 p_block, offset; + u32 cluster, p_cluster, nr_clusters; + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + u64 end = ocfs2_align_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start); + + if (start + len < end) + end = start + len; + + start_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, start); + end_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, end); + nr_blocks = end_block - start_block; + if (!nr_blocks) + return 0; + + cluster = ocfs2_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start); + ret = ocfs2_get_clusters(inode, cluster, &p_cluster, + &nr_clusters, NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (!p_cluster) + return 0; + + offset = start_block - ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, cluster); + p_block = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, p_cluster) + offset; + return sb_issue_zeroout(sb, p_block, nr_blocks, GFP_NOFS); +} + static int ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 len) { @@ -1520,6 +1559,7 @@ static int ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(struct inode *inode, struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb); unsigned int csize = osb->s_clustersize; handle_t *handle; + loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode); /* * The "start" and "end" values are NOT necessarily part of @@ -1540,6 +1580,26 @@ static int ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(struct inode *inode, if ((start & (csize - 1)) == 0 && (end & (csize - 1)) == 0) goto out; + /* No page cache for EOF blocks, issue zero out to disk. */ + if (end > isize) { + /* + * zeroout eof blocks in last cluster starting from + * "isize" even "start" > "isize" because it is + * complicated to zeroout just at "start" as "start" + * may be not aligned with block size, buffer write + * would be required to do that, but out of eof buffer + * write is not supported. + */ + ret = ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(inode, isize, + end - isize); + if (ret) { + mlog_errno(ret); + goto out; + } + if (start >= isize) + goto out; + end = isize; + } handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { ret = PTR_ERR(handle); @@ -1838,45 +1898,6 @@ static int ocfs2_remove_inode_range(struct inode *inode, return ret; } -/* - * zero out partial blocks of one cluster. - * - * start: file offset where zero starts, will be made upper block aligned. - * len: it will be trimmed to the end of current cluster if "start + len" - * is bigger than it. - */ -static int ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(struct inode *inode, - u64 start, u64 len) -{ - int ret; - u64 start_block, end_block, nr_blocks; - u64 p_block, offset; - u32 cluster, p_cluster, nr_clusters; - struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; - u64 end = ocfs2_align_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start); - - if (start + len < end) - end = start + len; - - start_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, start); - end_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, end); - nr_blocks = end_block - start_block; - if (!nr_blocks) - return 0; - - cluster = ocfs2_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start); - ret = ocfs2_get_clusters(inode, cluster, &p_cluster, - &nr_clusters, NULL); - if (ret) - return ret; - if (!p_cluster) - return 0; - - offset = start_block - ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, cluster); - p_block = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, p_cluster) + offset; - return sb_issue_zeroout(sb, p_block, nr_blocks, GFP_NOFS); -} - /* * Parts of this function taken from xfs_change_file_space() */ From f61dd3dcc0422fccb2a1cb66aea65c0ffde75a4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 19:59:57 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 18/33] can: usb_8dev: fix memory leak commit 0e865f0c31928d6a313269ef624907eec55287c4 upstream. In usb_8dev_start() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them: 1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all 2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see usb_8dev_start) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers. So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly. Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for coherent buffers. Fixes: 0024d8ad1639 ("can: usb_8dev: Add support for USB2CAN interface from 8 devices") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d39b458cd425a1cf7f512f340224e6e9563b07bd.1627404470.git.paskripkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-stable Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c index 3e4416473607..df99354ec12a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c @@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ struct usb_8dev_priv { u8 *cmd_msg_buffer; struct mutex usb_8dev_cmd_lock; - + void *rxbuf[MAX_RX_URBS]; + dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[MAX_RX_URBS]; }; /* tx frame */ @@ -744,6 +745,7 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8dev_priv *priv) for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) { struct urb *urb = NULL; u8 *buf; + dma_addr_t buf_dma; /* create a URB, and a buffer for it */ urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -753,7 +755,7 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8dev_priv *priv) } buf = usb_alloc_coherent(priv->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, - &urb->transfer_dma); + &buf_dma); if (!buf) { netdev_err(netdev, "No memory left for USB buffer\n"); usb_free_urb(urb); @@ -761,6 +763,8 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8dev_priv *priv) break; } + urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma; + usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, priv->udev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(priv->udev, USB_8DEV_ENDP_DATA_RX), @@ -778,6 +782,9 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8dev_priv *priv) break; } + priv->rxbuf[i] = buf; + priv->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma; + /* Drop reference, USB core will take care of freeing it */ usb_free_urb(urb); } @@ -847,6 +854,10 @@ static void unlink_all_urbs(struct usb_8dev_priv *priv) usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_submitted); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i) + usb_free_coherent(priv->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, + priv->rxbuf[i], priv->rxbuf_dma[i]); + usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->tx_submitted); atomic_set(&priv->active_tx_urbs, 0); From 22a75d8f046f818366848a237dcca0be5af70e7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 20:00:33 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 19/33] can: ems_usb: fix memory leak commit 9969e3c5f40c166e3396acc36c34f9de502929f6 upstream. In ems_usb_start() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them: 1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all 2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see ems_usb_start) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers. So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly. Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for coherent buffers. Fixes: 702171adeed3 ("ems_usb: Added support for EMS CPC-USB/ARM7 CAN/USB interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/59aa9fbc9a8cbf9af2bbd2f61a659c480b415800.1627404470.git.paskripkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-stable Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c index 022a9b3c7d4e..d62d61d734ea 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c @@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ struct ems_usb { unsigned int free_slots; /* remember number of available slots */ struct ems_cpc_msg active_params; /* active controller parameters */ + void *rxbuf[MAX_RX_URBS]; + dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[MAX_RX_URBS]; }; static void ems_usb_read_interrupt_callback(struct urb *urb) @@ -598,6 +600,7 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb *dev) for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) { struct urb *urb = NULL; u8 *buf = NULL; + dma_addr_t buf_dma; /* create a URB, and a buffer for it */ urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -607,7 +610,7 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb *dev) } buf = usb_alloc_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, - &urb->transfer_dma); + &buf_dma); if (!buf) { netdev_err(netdev, "No memory left for USB buffer\n"); usb_free_urb(urb); @@ -615,6 +618,8 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb *dev) break; } + urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma; + usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, dev->udev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev->udev, 2), buf, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, ems_usb_read_bulk_callback, dev); @@ -630,6 +635,9 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb *dev) break; } + dev->rxbuf[i] = buf; + dev->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma; + /* Drop reference, USB core will take care of freeing it */ usb_free_urb(urb); } @@ -695,6 +703,10 @@ static void unlink_all_urbs(struct ems_usb *dev) usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i) + usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, + dev->rxbuf[i], dev->rxbuf_dma[i]); + usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted); atomic_set(&dev->active_tx_urbs, 0); From 9fae312f27a7c5e93da228f7f4d5df69d4b55817 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 20:00:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 20/33] can: esd_usb2: fix memory leak commit 928150fad41ba16df7fcc9f7f945747d0f56cbb6 upstream. In esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them: 1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all 2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers. So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly. Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for coherent buffers. Fixes: 96d8e90382dc ("can: Add driver for esd CAN-USB/2 device") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b31b096926dcb35998ad0271aac4b51770ca7cc8.1627404470.git.paskripkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-stable Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c index c6dcf93675c0..592c6e7f3dca 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c @@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ struct esd_usb2 { int net_count; u32 version; int rxinitdone; + void *rxbuf[MAX_RX_URBS]; + dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[MAX_RX_URBS]; }; struct esd_usb2_net_priv { @@ -556,6 +558,7 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct esd_usb2 *dev) for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) { struct urb *urb = NULL; u8 *buf = NULL; + dma_addr_t buf_dma; /* create a URB, and a buffer for it */ urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -565,7 +568,7 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct esd_usb2 *dev) } buf = usb_alloc_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, - &urb->transfer_dma); + &buf_dma); if (!buf) { dev_warn(dev->udev->dev.parent, "No memory left for USB buffer\n"); @@ -573,6 +576,8 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct esd_usb2 *dev) goto freeurb; } + urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma; + usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, dev->udev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev->udev, 1), buf, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, @@ -585,8 +590,12 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct esd_usb2 *dev) usb_unanchor_urb(urb); usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, buf, urb->transfer_dma); + goto freeurb; } + dev->rxbuf[i] = buf; + dev->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma; + freeurb: /* Drop reference, USB core will take care of freeing it */ usb_free_urb(urb); @@ -674,6 +683,11 @@ static void unlink_all_urbs(struct esd_usb2 *dev) int i, j; usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i) + usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, + dev->rxbuf[i], dev->rxbuf_dma[i]); + for (i = 0; i < dev->net_count; i++) { priv = dev->nets[i]; if (priv) { From 5c2b6075cee06850cbc1d867346e430e217c5d39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Jakma Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2021 16:13:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 21/33] NIU: fix incorrect error return, missed in previous revert commit 15bbf8bb4d4ab87108ecf5f4155ec8ffa3c141d6 upstream. Commit 7930742d6, reverting 26fd962, missed out on reverting an incorrect change to a return value. The niu_pci_vpd_scan_props(..) == 1 case appears to be a normal path - treating it as an error and return -EINVAL was breaking VPD_SCAN and causing the driver to fail to load. Fix, so my Neptune card works again. Cc: Kangjie Lu Cc: Shannon Nelson Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: stable Fixes: 7930742d ('Revert "niu: fix missing checks of niu_pci_eeprom_read"') Signed-off-by: Paul Jakma Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c index 306d5d08141e..f3aed26656a3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c @@ -8213,8 +8213,9 @@ static int niu_pci_vpd_fetch(struct niu *np, u32 start) err = niu_pci_vpd_scan_props(np, here, end); if (err < 0) return err; + /* ret == 1 is not an error */ if (err == 1) - return -EINVAL; + return 0; } return 0; } From 6a965e5e9f7330f3f64434a9e3e297494baafc1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 08:49:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/33] nfc: nfcsim: fix use after free during module unload MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 5e7b30d24a5b8cb691c173b45b50e3ca0191be19 upstream. There is a use after free memory corruption during module exit: - nfcsim_exit() - nfcsim_device_free(dev0) - nfc_digital_unregister_device() This iterates over command queue and frees all commands, - dev->up = false - nfcsim_link_shutdown() - nfcsim_link_recv_wake() This wakes the sleeping thread nfcsim_link_recv_skb(). - nfcsim_link_recv_skb() Wake from wait_event_interruptible_timeout(), call directly the deb->cb callback even though (dev->up == false), - digital_send_cmd_complete() Dereference of "struct digital_cmd" cmd which was freed earlier by nfc_digital_unregister_device(). This causes memory corruption shortly after (with unrelated stack trace): nfc nfc0: NFC: nfcsim_recv_wq: Device is down llcp: nfc_llcp_recv: err -19 nfc nfc1: NFC: nfcsim_recv_wq: Device is down BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffed Call Trace: fsnotify+0x54b/0x5c0 __fsnotify_parent+0x1fe/0x300 ? vfs_write+0x27c/0x390 vfs_write+0x27c/0x390 ksys_write+0x63/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in digital_send_cmd_complete+0x16/0x50 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800a05f720 by task kworker/0:2/71 Workqueue: events nfcsim_recv_wq [nfcsim] Call Trace:  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140  ? digital_send_cmd_complete+0x16/0x50  ? digital_send_cmd_complete+0x16/0x50  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b  ? digital_send_cmd_complete+0x16/0x50  ? digital_dep_link_down+0x60/0x60  digital_send_cmd_complete+0x16/0x50  nfcsim_recv_wq+0x38f/0x3d5 [nfcsim]  ? nfcsim_in_send_cmd+0x4a/0x4a [nfcsim]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x98/0x110  ? finish_wait+0x110/0x110  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x9c/0xd0  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x1f0 This flow of calling digital_send_cmd_complete() callback on driver exit is specific to nfcsim which implements reading and sending work queues. Since the NFC digital device was unregistered, the callback should not be called. Fixes: 204bddcb508f ("NFC: nfcsim: Make use of the Digital layer") Cc: Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/nfcsim.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcsim.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcsim.c index a466e7978466..11aa6a04ff46 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nfcsim.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcsim.c @@ -201,8 +201,7 @@ static void nfcsim_recv_wq(struct work_struct *work) if (!IS_ERR(skb)) dev_kfree_skb(skb); - - skb = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); + return; } dev->cb(dev->nfc_digital_dev, dev->arg, skb); From 9c2c5bb21fa70d8231d3c4f48258ca62af2c5927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kiszka Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2021 10:12:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/33] x86/asm: Ensure asm/proto.h can be included stand-alone MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit f7b21a0e41171d22296b897dac6e4c41d2a3643c ] Fix: ../arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h:14:30: warning: ‘struct task_struct’ declared \ inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2); ^~~~~~~~~~~ .../arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h:40:34: warning: ‘struct task_struct’ declared \ inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option, ^~~~~~~~~~~ if linux/sched.h hasn't be included previously. This fixes a build error when this header is used outside of the kernel tree. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b76b4be3-cf66-f6b2-9a6c-3e7ef54f9845@web.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h index 9b9b30b19441..36a7a3f11839 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ #include +struct task_struct; + /* misc architecture specific prototypes */ void syscall_init(void); From f6ba582293b84ab28b8e3e7a2cc5f99bedecb6c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nguyen Dinh Phi Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 21:23:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 24/33] cfg80211: Fix possible memory leak in function cfg80211_bss_update commit f9a5c358c8d26fed0cc45f2afc64633d4ba21dff upstream. When we exceed the limit of BSS entries, this function will free the new entry, however, at this time, it is the last door to access the inputed ies, so these ies will be unreferenced objects and cause memory leak. Therefore we should free its ies before deallocating the new entry, beside of dropping it from hidden_list. Signed-off-by: Nguyen Dinh Phi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628132334.851095-1-phind.uet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/wireless/scan.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/scan.c b/net/wireless/scan.c index 71a8e6980e2f..901a8742a28d 100644 --- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -949,16 +949,14 @@ cfg80211_bss_update(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, * be grouped with this beacon for updates ... */ if (!cfg80211_combine_bsses(rdev, new)) { - kfree(new); + bss_ref_put(rdev, new); goto drop; } } if (rdev->bss_entries >= bss_entries_limit && !cfg80211_bss_expire_oldest(rdev)) { - if (!list_empty(&new->hidden_list)) - list_del(&new->hidden_list); - kfree(new); + bss_ref_put(rdev, new); goto drop; } From 789a3a3c94a8f594612543969a2d125178d17941 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sun, 18 Jul 2021 18:36:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/33] netfilter: conntrack: adjust stop timestamp to real expiry value [ Upstream commit 30a56a2b881821625f79837d4d968c679852444e ] In case the entry is evicted via garbage collection there is delay between the timeout value and the eviction event. This adjusts the stop value based on how much time has passed. Fixes: b87a2f9199ea82 ("netfilter: conntrack: add gc worker to remove timed-out entries") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index ddd90a3820d3..d03f06717844 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -491,8 +491,13 @@ bool nf_ct_delete(struct nf_conn *ct, u32 portid, int report) return false; tstamp = nf_conn_tstamp_find(ct); - if (tstamp && tstamp->stop == 0) + if (tstamp) { + s32 timeout = ct->timeout - nfct_time_stamp; + tstamp->stop = ktime_get_real_ns(); + if (timeout < 0) + tstamp->stop -= jiffies_to_nsecs(-timeout); + } if (nf_conntrack_event_report(IPCT_DESTROY, ct, portid, report) < 0) { From 2e3301b484bc593f59da2be15454625f41caa518 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2021 18:22:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/33] netfilter: nft_nat: allow to specify layer 4 protocol NAT only [ Upstream commit a33f387ecd5aafae514095c2c4a8c24f7aea7e8b ] nft_nat reports a bogus EAFNOSUPPORT if no layer 3 information is specified. Fixes: d07db9884a5f ("netfilter: nf_tables: introduce nft_validate_register_load()") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c index d2510e432c18..d338d69a0e0b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c @@ -157,7 +157,9 @@ static int nft_nat_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, alen = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct nf_nat_range, min_addr.ip6); break; default: - return -EAFNOSUPPORT; + if (tb[NFTA_NAT_REG_ADDR_MIN]) + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; + break; } priv->family = family; From a1d2c2ed0650ad924d9007dc2931020c47c41394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hoang Le Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2021 09:25:34 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 27/33] tipc: fix sleeping in tipc accept routine [ Upstream commit d237a7f11719ff9320721be5818352e48071aab6 ] The release_sock() is blocking function, it would change the state after sleeping. In order to evaluate the stated condition outside the socket lock context, switch to use wait_woken() instead. Fixes: 6398e23cdb1d8 ("tipc: standardize accept routine") Acked-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: Hoang Le Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tipc/socket.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c index c1b9074f3325..607785077445 100644 --- a/net/tipc/socket.c +++ b/net/tipc/socket.c @@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int tipc_listen(struct socket *sock, int len) static int tipc_wait_for_accept(struct socket *sock, long timeo) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - DEFINE_WAIT(wait); + DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); int err; /* True wake-one mechanism for incoming connections: only @@ -1994,12 +1994,12 @@ static int tipc_wait_for_accept(struct socket *sock, long timeo) * anymore, the common case will execute the loop only once. */ for (;;) { - prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, - TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (timeo && skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) { + add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); release_sock(sk); - timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo); + timeo = wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeo); lock_sock(sk); + remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); } err = 0; if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) @@ -2014,7 +2014,6 @@ static int tipc_wait_for_accept(struct socket *sock, long timeo) if (signal_pending(current)) break; } - finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); return err; } From 4c2d067114166a159c9540a15b4635b6570ac640 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiapeng Chong Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2021 18:36:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 28/33] mlx4: Fix missing error code in mlx4_load_one() [ Upstream commit 7e4960b3d66d7248b23de3251118147812b42da2 ] The error code is missing in this code scenario, add the error code '-EINVAL' to the return value 'err'. Eliminate the follow smatch warning: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c:3538 mlx4_load_one() warn: missing error code 'err'. Reported-by: Abaci Robot Fixes: 7ae0e400cd93 ("net/mlx4_core: Flexible (asymmetric) allocation of EQs and MSI-X vectors for PF/VFs") Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c index 9b6a96074df8..78b04f271344 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c @@ -3445,6 +3445,7 @@ static int mlx4_load_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, int pci_dev_data, if (!SRIOV_VALID_STATE(dev->flags)) { mlx4_err(dev, "Invalid SRIOV state\n"); + err = -EINVAL; goto err_close; } } From 52350dddfd29e033096a7198d3b6b3347ce61ba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2021 00:11:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 29/33] net: llc: fix skb_over_panic [ Upstream commit c7c9d2102c9c098916ab9e0ab248006107d00d6c ] Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations. Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is doing following steps: 1. skb allocation with size = len + header size len is passed from userpace and header size is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set. 2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3 3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg() Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be filled. Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3 bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons: 1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function was overwriting payload. 2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704) So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after all steps we just transmit buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/llc_pdu.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- net/llc/af_llc.c | 10 +++++++++- net/llc/llc_s_ac.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/llc_pdu.h b/include/net/llc_pdu.h index c0f0a13ed818..49aa79c7b278 100644 --- a/include/net/llc_pdu.h +++ b/include/net/llc_pdu.h @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ #include /* Lengths of frame formats */ -#define LLC_PDU_LEN_I 4 /* header and 2 control bytes */ -#define LLC_PDU_LEN_S 4 -#define LLC_PDU_LEN_U 3 /* header and 1 control byte */ +#define LLC_PDU_LEN_I 4 /* header and 2 control bytes */ +#define LLC_PDU_LEN_S 4 +#define LLC_PDU_LEN_U 3 /* header and 1 control byte */ +/* header and 1 control byte and XID info */ +#define LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID (LLC_PDU_LEN_U + sizeof(struct llc_xid_info)) /* Known SAP addresses */ #define LLC_GLOBAL_SAP 0xFF #define LLC_NULL_SAP 0x00 /* not network-layer visible */ @@ -50,9 +52,10 @@ #define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_MASK 0x03 /* 8-bit control field */ #define LLC_PDU_TYPE_MASK 0x03 -#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_I 0 /* first bit */ -#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_S 1 /* first two bits */ -#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U 3 /* first two bits */ +#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_I 0 /* first bit */ +#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_S 1 /* first two bits */ +#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U 3 /* first two bits */ +#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID 4 /* private type for detecting XID commands */ #define LLC_PDU_TYPE_IS_I(pdu) \ ((!(pdu->ctrl_1 & LLC_PDU_TYPE_I_MASK)) ? 1 : 0) @@ -230,9 +233,18 @@ static inline struct llc_pdu_un *llc_pdu_un_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb) static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 ssap, u8 dsap, u8 cr) { - const int hlen = type == LLC_PDU_TYPE_U ? 3 : 4; + int hlen = 4; /* default value for I and S types */ struct llc_pdu_un *pdu; + switch (type) { + case LLC_PDU_TYPE_U: + hlen = 3; + break; + case LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID: + hlen = 6; + break; + } + skb_push(skb, hlen); skb_reset_network_header(skb); pdu = llc_pdu_un_hdr(skb); @@ -374,7 +386,10 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, xid_info->fmt_id = LLC_XID_FMT_ID; /* 0x81 */ xid_info->type = svcs_supported; xid_info->rw = rx_window << 1; /* size of receive window */ - skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct llc_xid_info)); + + /* no need to push/put since llc_pdu_header_init() has already + * pushed 3 + 3 bytes + */ } /** diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 1a77d0687d74..a8866455e8b2 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -96,8 +96,16 @@ static inline u8 llc_ui_header_len(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_llc *addr) { u8 rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U; - if (addr->sllc_test || addr->sllc_xid) + if (addr->sllc_test) rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U; + else if (addr->sllc_xid) + /* We need to expand header to sizeof(struct llc_xid_info) + * since llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd() sets 4,5,6 bytes of LLC header + * as XID PDU. In llc_ui_sendmsg() we reserved header size and then + * filled all other space with user data. If we won't reserve this + * bytes, llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd() will overwrite user data + */ + rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID; else if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_I; return rc; diff --git a/net/llc/llc_s_ac.c b/net/llc/llc_s_ac.c index 7ae4cc684d3a..9fa3342c7a82 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_s_ac.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_s_ac.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb) struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb); int rc; - llc_pdu_header_init(skb, LLC_PDU_TYPE_U, ev->saddr.lsap, + llc_pdu_header_init(skb, LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID, ev->saddr.lsap, ev->daddr.lsap, LLC_PDU_CMD); llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(skb, LLC_XID_NULL_CLASS_2, 0); rc = llc_mac_hdr_init(skb, ev->saddr.mac, ev->daddr.mac); From b2076a4400d3a11ca4a0db4f46ca3b820a394682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maor Gottlieb Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2021 09:20:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 30/33] net/mlx5: Fix flow table chaining [ Upstream commit 8b54874ef1617185048029a3083d510569e93751 ] Fix a bug when flow table is created in priority that already has other flow tables as shown in the below diagram. If the new flow table (FT-B) has the lowest level in the priority, we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0) to this new table. In addition when this flow table is destroyed (FT-B), we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0) to the next level flow table (FT-C) in the same priority of the destroyed table (if exists). --------- |root_ns| --------- | -------------------------------- | | | ---------- ---------- --------- |p(prio)-x| | p-y | | p-n | ---------- ---------- --------- | | ---------------- ------------------ |ns(e.g bypass)| |ns(e.g. kernel) | ---------------- ------------------ | | | ------- ------ ---- | p0 | | p1 | |p2| ------- ------ ---- | | \ -------- ------- ------ | FT-A | |FT-B | |FT-C| -------- ------- ------ Fixes: f90edfd279f3 ("net/mlx5_core: Connect flow tables") Signed-off-by: Maor Gottlieb Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c index 13dfc197bdd8..6c092dc41c82 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c @@ -701,17 +701,19 @@ static int connect_fwd_rules(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, static int connect_flow_table(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_flow_table *ft, struct fs_prio *prio) { - struct mlx5_flow_table *next_ft; + struct mlx5_flow_table *next_ft, *first_ft; int err = 0; /* Connect_prev_fts and update_root_ft_create are mutually exclusive */ - if (list_empty(&prio->node.children)) { + first_ft = list_first_entry_or_null(&prio->node.children, + struct mlx5_flow_table, node.list); + if (!first_ft || first_ft->level > ft->level) { err = connect_prev_fts(dev, ft, prio); if (err) return err; - next_ft = find_next_chained_ft(prio); + next_ft = first_ft ? first_ft : find_next_chained_ft(prio); err = connect_fwd_rules(dev, ft, next_ft); if (err) return err; @@ -1357,7 +1359,7 @@ static int disconnect_flow_table(struct mlx5_flow_table *ft) node.list) == ft)) return 0; - next_ft = find_next_chained_ft(prio); + next_ft = find_next_ft(ft); err = connect_fwd_rules(dev, next_ft, ft); if (err) return err; From e7500fd7b9c8dbe054736009584fa06456bc9ae8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Hai Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 15:43:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 31/33] tulip: windbond-840: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove [ Upstream commit 76a16be07b209a3f507c72abe823bd3af1c8661a ] Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(), pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be called in release automatically. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Wang Hai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c index 1f62b9423851..31dfb695eded 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static int w840_probe1(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) int i, option = find_cnt < MAX_UNITS ? options[find_cnt] : 0; void __iomem *ioaddr; - i = pci_enable_device(pdev); + i = pcim_enable_device(pdev); if (i) return i; pci_set_master(pdev); @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static int w840_probe1(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) ioaddr = pci_iomap(pdev, TULIP_BAR, netdev_res_size); if (!ioaddr) - goto err_out_free_res; + goto err_out_netdev; for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ((__le16 *)dev->dev_addr)[i] = cpu_to_le16(eeprom_read(ioaddr, i)); @@ -469,8 +469,6 @@ static int w840_probe1(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) err_out_cleardev: pci_iounmap(pdev, ioaddr); -err_out_free_res: - pci_release_regions(pdev); err_out_netdev: free_netdev (dev); return -ENODEV; @@ -1537,7 +1535,6 @@ static void w840_remove1(struct pci_dev *pdev) if (dev) { struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev); unregister_netdev(dev); - pci_release_regions(pdev); pci_iounmap(pdev, np->base_addr); free_netdev(dev); } From f91217dee76b281a797bff055a5c04f18d263c0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Hai Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 20:11:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 32/33] sis900: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove [ Upstream commit 89fb62fde3b226f99b7015280cf132e2a7438edf ] Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(), pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be called in release automatically. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Wang Hai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c index ae9b983e8e5c..4a0e69a2d4f5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int sis900_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, #endif /* setup various bits in PCI command register */ - ret = pci_enable_device(pci_dev); + ret = pcim_enable_device(pci_dev); if(ret) return ret; i = pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32)); @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static int sis900_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, ioaddr = pci_iomap(pci_dev, 0, 0); if (!ioaddr) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err_out_cleardev; + goto err_out; } sis_priv = netdev_priv(net_dev); @@ -576,8 +576,6 @@ static int sis900_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, sis_priv->tx_ring_dma); err_out_unmap: pci_iounmap(pci_dev, ioaddr); -err_out_cleardev: - pci_release_regions(pci_dev); err_out: free_netdev(net_dev); return ret; @@ -2425,7 +2423,6 @@ static void sis900_remove(struct pci_dev *pci_dev) sis_priv->tx_ring_dma); pci_iounmap(pci_dev, sis_priv->ioaddr); free_netdev(net_dev); - pci_release_regions(pci_dev); } #ifdef CONFIG_PM From 29bb8b3fc24fda91eecc1df462f055d60eab817f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 4 Aug 2021 11:58:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 33/33] Linux 4.9.278 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802134332.931915241@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 560a7e2b5efc..82fc1c747592 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 9 -SUBLEVEL = 277 +SUBLEVEL = 278 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Roaring Lionus