diff --git a/proofreading/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead.html b/proofreading/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead.html index 9016000..e58db6b 100644 --- a/proofreading/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead.html +++ b/proofreading/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead.html @@ -3633,7 +3633,7 @@
If tag verification fails, the unverified plaintext and computed authentication tag MUST NOT be released. As shown in [VV18], even a partial leak of the plaintext without verification would facilitate chosen ciphertext attacks.¶
+If tag verification fails, the unverified plaintext and computed authentication tag MUST NOT be released. As shown in [VV18], even a partial leak of the plaintext without verification facilitates chosen ciphertext attacks.¶
The security of AEGIS against timing and physical attacks is limited by the implementation of the underlying AESRound
function. Failure to implement AESRound
in a fashion safe against timing and physical attacks, such as differential power analysis, timing analysis, or fault injection attacks, may lead to leakage of secret key material or state information. The exact mitigations required for timing and physical attacks depend on the threat model in question.¶
Regardless of the variant, the key
and nonce
are only required by the Init
function; other functions only depend on the resulting state. Therefore, implementations can overwrite ephemeral keys with zeros right after the last Update
call of the initialization function.¶