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references.bib
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@article{duncan2004,
title = {A Theory of Impact Philanthropy},
author = {{Duncan}, {B}},
year = {2004},
date = {2004},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
pages = {2159{\textendash}2180},
volume = {88},
number = {9-10}
}
@article{atkinson2009,
title = {Giving overseas and public policy},
author = {{Atkinson}, {A B}},
year = {2009},
date = {2009},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
pages = {647{\textendash}653},
volume = {93},
number = {5-6}
}
@article{harbaugh1998,
title = {What do Donations Buy? A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow},
author = {{Harbaugh}, {William T}},
year = {1998},
month = {05},
date = {1998-05},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
pages = {269{\textendash}284},
volume = {67(2)},
number = {2}
}
@article{reinstein2011,
title = {Substitution Between (and Motivations for) Charitable Contributions: An Experimental Study},
author = {{Reinstein}, {David}},
year = {2011},
date = {2011},
journal = {Mimeo}
}
@inbook{västfjäll2020,
title = {A Psychological Perspective on Charitable Giving and Monetary Donations: The Role of Affect},
author = {{Västfjäll}, {Daniel} and {Slovic}, {Paul}},
year = {2020},
date = {2020},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
pages = {331--345},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45500-2_14},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45500-2_14}
}
@article{hsee2013,
title = {Unit Asking : A Method to Boost Donations and Beyond},
author = {{Hsee}, {Christopher K} and {Zhang}, {Jiao} and {Lu}, {Zoe Y} and {Xu}, {Fei}},
year = {2013},
date = {2013},
doi = {10.1177/0956797613482947}
}
@article{andreoni2003,
title = {Charitable Giving by Married Couples: Who Decides and Why Does It Matter?},
author = {{Andreoni}, {James} and {Brown}, {Eleanor} and {Rischall}, {Isaac}},
year = {2003},
date = {2003},
journal = {The Journal of Human Resources},
pages = {111{\textendash}133},
volume = {38},
number = {1},
url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-166X(200324)38:1%3C111:CGBMCW%3E2.0.CO;2-1}
}
@article{abramowicz2004,
title = {Information markets, administrative decisionmaking, and predictive cost-benefit analysis},
author = {{Abramowicz}, {Michael}},
year = {2004},
date = {2004},
journal = {The University of Chicago Law Review},
pages = {933{\textendash}1020}
}
@article{adenaGivingOnceGiving2019,
ids = {Adena2019},
title = {Giving Once, Giving Twice: {{A}} Two-Period Field Experiment on Intertemporal Crowding in Charitable Giving},
author = {Adena, Maja and Huck, Steffen},
date = {2019},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {172},
issn = {00472727},
doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.002},
abstract = {We study intertemporal crowding between two fundraising campaigns for the same charitable organization by manipulating donors' beliefs about the likelihood of future campaigns in two subsequent field experiments. The data shows that initial giving is decreasing in the likelihood of a future campaign while subsequent giving increases in initial giving. While this refutes the predictions of a simple expected utility model, the pattern is in line with a model that allows for (anticipated or unanticipated) habit formation provided that donations in the two periods are substitutes.}
}
@article{aggarwal2004effects,
title = {The Effects of Brand Relationship Norms on Consumer Attitudes and Behavior},
author = {Aggarwal, Pankaj},
date = {2004},
journaltitle = {Journal of consumer research},
volume = {31},
pages = {87--101},
publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
number = {1}
}
@article{Aknin2013,
ids = {Aknin2013a},
title = {Making a Difference Matters: {{Impact}} Unlocks the Emotional Benefits of Prosocial Spending},
author = {Aknin, Lara B and Dunn, Elizabeth W and Whillans, Ashley V and Grant, Adam M and Norton, Michael I},
date = {2013},
journaltitle = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.008},
abstract = {When does giving lead to happiness? Here, we present two studies demonstrating that the emotional benefits of spending money on others (prosocial spending) are unleashed when givers are aware of their positive impact. In Study 1, an experiment using real charitable appeals, giving more money to charity led to higher levels of happiness only when participants gave to causes that explained how these funds are used to make a difference in the life of a recipient. In Study 2, participants were asked to reflect upon a time they spent money on themselves or on others in a way that either had a positive impact or had no impact. Participants who recalled a time they spent on others that had a positive impact were happiest. Together, these results suggest that highlighting the impact of prosocial spending can increase the emotional rewards of giving.},
keywords = {philanthropy,ps}
}
@article{andreoniAvoidingAskField2017,
ids = {andreoni2017avoiding},
title = {Avoiding the Ask: {{A}} Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving},
author = {Andreoni, James and Rao, Justin M and Trachtman, Hannah},
date = {2017},
journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {125},
pages = {625--653},
publisher = {{University of Chicago Press Chicago, IL}},
number = {3}
}
@book{angner2012course,
title = {A Course in Behavioral Economics},
author = {Angner, Erik},
date = {2012},
publisher = {{Macmillan International Higher Education}}
}
@article{atkinsonGivingOverseasPublic2009,
ids = {Atkinson2009,Atkinson2009a},
title = {Giving Overseas and Public Policy},
author = {Atkinson, A B},
date = {2009},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {93},
pages = {647--653},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
issn = {0047-2727},
number = {5-6}
}
@article{Baron1997,
title = {Confusion of Relative and Absolute Risk in Valuation},
author = {Baron, Jonathan},
date = {1997},
journaltitle = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
volume = {14},
pages = {301--309},
issn = {08955646},
doi = {10.1023/A:1007796310463},
abstract = {Subjects were less willing to pay for government medical insurance for diseases when the number of people who could not be cured was higher, holding constant the number who could be cured. In a second experiment, willingness to pay (from a hypothetical government windfall) for risk reduction was unaffected by whether the risk was described in terms of percentage or number of lives saved, even though subjects knew that the risks in question differed in prevalence. These results are consistent with the findings of Fetherstonhaugh et al., Jenni and Loewenstein, and others. I suggest that these results can be explained in terms of a general tendency to confuse proportions and differences, a confusion that is analogous to other confusions of quantitative dimensions in children, adults, the news media, and perhaps even the epidemiological literature.},
keywords = {Contingent valuation,Relative risk,Value of life},
number = {3}
}
@article{baron2011heuristics,
title = {Heuristics and Biases in Charity},
author = {Baron, Jonathan and Szymanska, Ewa},
date = {2011},
keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}
@article{Benartzi2007,
ids = {Benartzi2007b},
title = {Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior},
author = {Benartzi, Shlomo and Thaler, Richard H},
date = {2007},
journaltitle = {The journal of economic perspectives},
pages = {81--104},
publisher = {{JSTOR}}
}
@article{bergh2020empathic,
title = {Empathic and Numerate Giving: {{The}} Joint Effects of Victim Images and Charity Evaluations},
author = {Bergh, Robin and Reinstein, David},
date = {2020},
journaltitle = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
pages = {1948550619893968},
publisher = {{SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}}
}
@article{Berman2018,
title = {Impediments to Effective Altruism: {{The}} Role of Subjective Preferences in Charitable Giving},
author = {Berman, Jonathan Z. and Barasch, Alixandra and Levine, Emma E. and Small, Deborah A.},
date = {2018},
journaltitle = {Psychological Science},
pages = {095679761774764},
issn = {0956-7976},
doi = {10.1177/0956797617747648},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797617747648},
abstract = {Charity could do the most good if every dollar donated went to causes that produced the greatest welfare gains. In line with this proposition, the effective-altruism movement seeks to provide individuals with information regarding the effectiveness of charities in hopes that they will contribute to organizations that maximize the social return of their donation. In this research, we investigated the extent to which presenting effectiveness information leads people to choose more effective charities. We found that even when effectiveness information is made easily comparable across options, it has a limited impact on choice. Specifically, people frequently choose less effective charity options when those options represent more subjectively preferred causes. In contrast to making a personal donation decision, outcome metrics are used to a much greater extent when choosing financial investments and when allocating aid resources as an agent of an organization. Implications for effective altruism are discussed.},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/RGY5GRXT/Small Paper.pdf},
keywords = {15,17,charitable decision making,charity could do the,decision subjectivity,effective altruism,most good if donations,open data,preregistered,prosocial behavior,received 2,revision accepted 11,went to}
}
@article{borgloh2013small,
title = {Small Is Beautiful—{{Experimental}} Evidence of Donors’ Preferences for Charities},
author = {Borgloh, Sarah and Dannenberg, Astrid and Aretz, Bodo},
date = {2013},
journaltitle = {Economics Letters},
volume = {120},
pages = {242--244},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
number = {2}
}
@article{bowman2006should,
title = {Should Donors Care about Overhead Costs? {{Do}} They Care?},
author = {Bowman, Woods},
date = {2006},
journaltitle = {Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly},
volume = {35},
pages = {288--310},
publisher = {{Sage Publications Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA}},
number = {2}
}
@article{brewer1996we,
title = {Who Is This" {{We}}"? {{Levels}} of Collective Identity and Self Representations.},
author = {Brewer, Marilynn B and Gardner, Wendi},
date = {1996},
journaltitle = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
volume = {71},
pages = {83},
publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
number = {1}
}
@article{Brown2016,
ids = {Brown2016a},
title = {Social Distance and Quality Ratings in Charity Choice},
author = {Brown, A L and Meer, J and Williams, J F},
date = {2016},
journaltitle = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804316300209},
keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,Altruism,Charitable giving,Experiments,Philanthropy,Quality ratings,Social distance}
}
@article{burton2009global,
title = {The Global Burden of Trachoma: A Review},
author = {Burton, Matthew J and Mabey, David CW},
date = {2009},
journaltitle = {PLoS neglected tropical diseases},
shortjournal = {PLoS Negl Trop Dis},
volume = {3},
pages = {e460},
publisher = {{Public Library of Science}},
number = {10}
}
@article{burumEvolutionaryExplanationIneffective2020,
title = {An Evolutionary Explanation for Ineffective Altruism},
author = {Burum, Bethany and Nowak, Martin A. and Hoffman, Moshe},
date = {2020},
journaltitle = {Nature Human Behaviour},
pages = {1--13},
publisher = {{Nature Publishing Group}},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/NF3FKER9/s41562-020-00950-4.html},
keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}
@online{CAFWorldGiving,
title = {{{CAF World Giving Index}} 2018 | {{Research}} into Global Giving Behaviour},
url = {https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications/2018-publications/caf-world-giving-index-2018},
urldate = {2020-07-09},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/LVCWF2FZ/caf-world-giving-index-2018.html}
}
@article{Cairns2011,
ids = {Cairns2011a},
title = {Substitution Effects across Charitable Donations},
author = {Cairns, Jason and Slonim, Robert},
date = {2011},
journaltitle = {Economics Letters},
volume = {111},
pages = {173--175},
issn = {01651765},
doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.028},
abstract = {This paper examines substitution effects across charitable donations, specifically the effect of 2nd collections on 1st collections at Catholic Masses. While 2nd collections increased total donations by 17.8\%, 18.4\% of 2nd collection donations came from 1st collections which fell 4.3\%. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.},
keywords = {Altruism,Charitable donations,field experiments,philanthropy,substitution,Substitution effects},
number = {2}
}
@article{camerer1995anomalies,
title = {Anomalies: {{Ultimatums}}, Dictators and Manners},
author = {Camerer, Colin F and Thaler, Richard H},
date = {1995},
journaltitle = {Journal of Economic perspectives},
volume = {9},
pages = {209--219},
number = {2}
}
@article{Caviola2014,
ids = {Caviola2014a},
title = {The Evaluability Bias in Charitable Giving: {{Saving}} Administration Costs or Saving Lives?},
author = {Caviola, Lucius and Faulmüller, Nadira and Everett, Jim. A C and Savulescu, Julian},
date = {2014},
journaltitle = {Judgment and Decision Making},
volume = {9},
pages = {303--315},
issn = {19302975},
doi = {None},
abstract = {We describe the “evaluability bias”: the tendency to weight the importance of an attribute in proportion to its ease of evaluation. We propose that the evaluability bias influences decision making in the context of charitable giving: people tend to have a strong preference for charities with low overhead ratios (lower administrative expenses) but not for charities with high cost-effectiveness (greater number of saved lives per dollar), because the former attribute is easier to evaluate than the latter. In line with this hypothesis, we report the results of four studies showing that, when presented with a single charity, people are willing to donate more to a charity with low overhead ratio, regardless of cost-effectiveness. However, when people are presented with two charities simultaneously—thereby enabling comparative evaluation—they base their donation behavior on cost-effectiveness (Study 1). This suggests that people primarily value cost-effectiveness but manifest the evaluability bias in cases where they find it difficult to evaluate. However, people seem also to value a low overhead ratio for its own sake (Study 2). The evaluability bias effect applies to charities of different domains (Study 3). We also show that overhead ratio is easier to evaluate when its presentation format is a ratio, suggesting an inherent reference point that allows meaningful interpretation (Study 4).},
eprint = {25279024},
eprinttype = {pmid},
isbn = {1930-2975 (Print)\textbackslash r1930-2975 (Linking)},
keywords = {altruism,charitable giving,cognitive,cost-effectiveness,evaluability bias,overhead ratio,pro-social behavior},
number = {4}
}
@article{caviola2020many,
title = {The Many Obstacles to Effective Giving},
author = {Caviola, Lucius and Schubert, Stefan and Nemirow, Jason},
date = {2020},
journaltitle = {Judgment and Decision Making},
volume = {15},
pages = {159},
publisher = {{Society for Judgment \& Decision Making}},
number = {2}
}
@online{CharitableGivingTops,
title = {U.{{S}}. Charitable Giving Tops \$400 Billion for First Time},
url = {https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-charitable-giving-tops-400-billion-for-first-time/},
urldate = {2020-07-09},
abstract = {Last year's record total boosted nearly every kind of philanthropy, but trouble could be looming},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/C4L6M2HK/u-s-charitable-giving-tops-400-billion-for-first-time.html},
langid = {american}
}
@article{charnessWhatNameAnonymity2008,
ids = {Charness2008,Charness2008a},
title = {What's in a Name? {{Anonymity}} and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games},
author = {Charness, G and Gneezy, U},
date = {2008},
journaltitle = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.001},
keywords = {anonymity,dictator games,experimental,social,ultimatum games}
}
@article{chenGroupIdentitySocial2009,
title = {Group {{Identity}} and {{Social Preferences}}},
author = {Chen, Yan and Li, Sherry Xin},
date = {2009-03},
journaltitle = {American Economic Review},
volume = {99},
pages = {431--457},
issn = {0002-8282},
doi = {10.1257/aer.99.1.431},
url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.431},
urldate = {2020-06-24},
abstract = {We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. We find that when participants are matched with an ingroup member, they show a 47 percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Likewise, participants are 19 percent more likely to reward an ingroup match for good behavior, but 13 percent less likely to punish an ingroup match for misbehavior. Furthermore, participants are significantly more likely to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member. All results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match. (JEL C91, D03, Z13)},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/RH2DTWIG/Chen and Li - 2009 - Group Identity and Social Preferences.pdf;/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/384MAR6Y/articles.html},
keywords = {Design of Experiments: Laboratory; Individual; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological; Emotional; Social; and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making; Economic Sociology,Economic Anthropology},
langid = {english},
number = {1}
}
@article{chhaochharia2008charity,
title = {Do Charity Ratings Matter},
author = {Chhaochharia, Vidhi and Ghosh, Suman and others},
date = {2008},
journaltitle = {Unpublished Manuscript, Florida Atlantic University}
}
@article{cialdini1998social,
title = {Social Influence: {{Social}} Norms, Conformity and Compliance.},
author = {Cialdini, Robert B and Trost, Melanie R},
date = {1998},
publisher = {{McGraw-Hill}}
}
@article{crimstonPsychologyMoralExpansiveness2018,
title = {Toward a Psychology of Moral Expansiveness},
author = {Crimston, Daniel and Hornsey, Matthew J. and Bain, Paul G. and Bastian, Brock},
date = {2018},
journaltitle = {Current Directions In Psychological Science},
volume = {27},
pages = {14--19},
publisher = {{Sage Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
doi = {10/gc2tm2},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/KVM9NM6Z/0963721417730888.html;/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/XJHXF66S/0963721417730888.html},
number = {1}
}
@article{cuddy2007bias,
title = {The {{BIAS}} Map: Behaviors from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes.},
author = {Cuddy, Amy JC and Fiske, Susan T and Glick, Peter},
date = {2007},
journaltitle = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
volume = {92},
pages = {631},
publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
number = {4}
}
@article{dellavigna2012testing,
title = {Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving},
author = {DellaVigna, Stefano and List, John A and Malmendier, Ulrike},
date = {2012},
journaltitle = {The quarterly journal of economics},
volume = {127},
pages = {1--56},
publisher = {{MIT Press}},
number = {1}
}
@article{Deryugina2015,
title = {Do Causes Crowd Each Other out ? {{Evidence}} from Tornado Strikes},
author = {Deryugina, Tatyana and Marx, Benjamin},
date = {2015},
pages = {1--19},
issue = {December}
}
@article{Donkers2017,
ids = {Donkers2017a},
title = {Journal of {{Behavioral}} and {{Experimental Economics Do}} Charities Get More When They Ask More Often ? {{Evidence}} from a Unique Field Experiment ✩},
author = {Donkers, Bas and Diepen, Merel Van and Franses, Philip Hans},
date = {2017},
volume = {66},
pages = {58--65},
publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2016.05.006},
keywords = {Competition,Direct mailing,Field exper,Fundraising}
}
@incollection{dovidio1984helping,
title = {Helping Behavior and Altruism: {{An}} Empirical and Conceptual Overview},
booktitle = {Advances in Experimental Social Psychology},
author = {Dovidio, John F},
date = {1984},
volume = {17},
pages = {361--427},
publisher = {{Elsevier}}
}
@article{dovidio1997nature,
title = {On the Nature of Prejudice: {{Automatic}} and Controlled Processes},
author = {Dovidio, John F and Kawakami, Kerry and Johnson, Craig and Johnson, Brenda and Howard, Adaiah},
date = {1997},
journaltitle = {Journal of experimental social psychology},
volume = {33},
pages = {510--540},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
number = {5}
}
@article{Drouvelis2016,
ids = {Drouvelis2016a},
title = {The Effects of Induced Emotions on Pro-Social Behaviour},
author = {Drouvelis, Michalis and Grosskopf, Brit},
date = {2016},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {134},
pages = {1--8},
publisher = {{Elsevier}}
}
@article{duncanTheoryImpactPhilanthropy2004,
ids = {Duncan2004,Duncan2004a,Duncan2004b,Duncan2004c},
title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Impact Philanthropy}}},
author = {Duncan, B},
date = {2004},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {88},
pages = {2159--2180},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00037-9},
abstract = {This article develops a new model of altruism called impact philanthropy. An impact philanthropist is someone who wants to personally ‘make a difference.' While that motive is straightforward, its logical implications are significantly different from other models of philanthropy. For example, the contributions of other donors can reduce an impact philanthropist's charitable fulfillment. As a result, cooperation among impact philanthropists can reduce aggregate giving. In addition, impact philanthropy can lead to a codependent relationship between givers and receivers in which both benefit from the other. Finally, the model suggests a conflict between charitable organizations and its donors concerning the allocation of charitable gifts. In particular, a charitable organization prefers to spread a donor's contribution across many goods, whereas a donor prefers to target his or her contribution at a specific good.},
keywords = {applied theory,crowd-out,ft,FT,impact,nonprofits,philanthropy,social,theory of giving},
number = {9-10}
}
@article{ebert2007fragility,
title = {The Fragility of Time: {{Time}}-Insensitivity and Valuation of the near and Far Future},
author = {Ebert, Jane EJ and Prelec, Drazen},
date = {2007},
journaltitle = {Management science},
volume = {53},
pages = {1423--1438},
publisher = {{INFORMS}},
number = {9}
}
@article{eisenseeNewsFloodsNews2007,
ids = {Eisensee2007,Eisensee2007a},
title = {News {{Floods}}, {{News Droughts}}, and {{US Disaster Relief}}},
author = {Eisensee, T and Stromberg, D},
date = {2007},
journaltitle = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
volume = {122},
pages = {693--728},
doi = {10.1162/qjec.122.2.693},
keywords = {[philanthropy],crowding-out,development,disasters,empirical,Empirical,news,substitution},
number = {2}
}
@article{elster1989social,
title = {Social Norms and Economic Theory},
author = {Elster, Jon},
date = {1989},
journaltitle = {Journal of economic perspectives},
volume = {3},
pages = {99--117},
number = {4}
}
@online{epsteinCrisisMentalitySSIR2006,
title = {Crisis {{Mentality}} ({{SSIR}})},
author = {Epstein, Keith},
date = {2006},
url = {https://ssir.org/articles/entry/crisis_mentality},
urldate = {2020-06-23},
abstract = {Why sudden emergencies attract more funds than do chronic conditions, and how nonprofits can change that.},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/9QHCYJQY/crisis_mentality.html},
langid = {american}
}
@article{erlandsson2014perceived,
title = {Perceived Utility (Not Sympathy) Mediates the Proportion Dominance Effect in Helping Decisions},
author = {Erlandsson, Arvid and Björklund, Fredrik and Bäckström, Martin},
date = {2014},
journaltitle = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
volume = {27},
pages = {37--47},
publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
number = {1}
}
@article{erlandssonArgumentinconsistencyCharityAppeals,
ids = {Erlandssona},
title = {Argument-Inconsistency in Charity Appeals: {{Statistical}} Information about the Scope of the Problem Decrease Helping toward a Single Identified Victim but Not Helping},
author = {Erlandsson, A and Västfjäll, D and Sundfelt, O and of Economic, P Slovic - Journal and 2016, undefined},
journaltitle = {Elsevier},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487016300538},
keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
options = {useprefix=true}
}
@article{erlandssonEmotionalReactionsPerceived2015,
ids = {Erlandsson,Erlandsson2015,Erlandsson2015a,Erlandssonb,erlandssonEmotionalReactionsPerceived,erlandssonEmotionalReactionsPerceiveda},
title = {Emotional Reactions, Perceived Impact and Perceived Responsibility Mediate the Identifiable Victim Effect, Proportion Dominance Effect and in-Group Effect Respectively},
author = {Erlandsson, Arvid and Björklund, Fredrik and Bäckström, Martin},
date = {2015},
journaltitle = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
volume = {127},
pages = {1--14},
publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
issn = {07495978},
doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.11.003},
abstract = {This study investigated possible mediators of the identifiable victim effect (IVE), the proportion dominance effect (PDE), and the in-group effect (IGE) in helping situations. In Studies 1-3, participants rated their emotional reactions (distress and sympathy toward the victims), perceived impact of helping, perceived responsibility to help, and helping motivation toward four versions of a helping situation. Gradually increasing victim identifiability in the helping situations primarily affected emotional reactions and sympathy completely mediated the IVE. Gradually making the reference-group smaller primarily affected perceived impact, and impact completely mediated the PDE. Gradually increasing in-groupness primarily affected perceived responsibility, and responsibility completely mediated the IGE. Study 4 included real monetary allocations and largely replicated the results using a between-subject design. Together, the results shed light on how contextual factors trigger help motivation, and indicate that different helping effects are primarily mediated by different mechanisms.},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/UYJIZHMW/Emotional reactions, perceived impact and perceived responsibility mediate the identifiable victim effect, proportion dominance effect and in-group effect respectively-main.pdf},
isbn = {0749-5978 1095-9920},
keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,Decision modes,Emotional reactions,Helping,Identifiable victim effect,In-group bias,Perceived impact,Perceived responsibility,Proportion dominance effect,sympathy,Sympathy}
}
@article{evans2013dual,
title = {Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: {{Advancing}} the Debate},
author = {Evans, Jonathan St BT and Stanovich, Keith E},
date = {2013},
journaltitle = {Perspectives on psychological science},
volume = {8},
pages = {223--241},
publisher = {{Sage Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
number = {3}
}
@article{Everett2016,
title = {Inference of Trustworthiness from Intuitive Moral Judgments},
author = {Everett, Jim A.C. and Pizarro, David A. and Crockett, M. J.},
date = {2016},
journaltitle = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
volume = {145},
pages = {772--787},
issn = {00963445},
doi = {10.1037/xge0000165},
abstract = {Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms.},
keywords = {Deontological,Intuition,Morality,Partner choice,Utilitarian},
number = {6}
}
@article{everettInferenceTrustworthinessIntuitive2016,
title = {Inference of Trustworthiness from Intuitive Moral Judgments.},
author = {Everett, Jim AC and Pizarro, David A. and Crockett, Molly J.},
date = {2016},
journaltitle = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
volume = {145},
pages = {772},
publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
doi = {10.1037/xge0000165},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/ACL4I8AP/Everett et al. - 2016 - Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral .pdf;/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/FGB6X2JP/2016-17150-001.html},
keywords = {effective giving,social signalling},
number = {6}
}
@article{exleyExcusingSelfishnessCharitable2016,
ids = {Exley2016c,Exley2016d,exleyExcusingSelfishnessCharitable2016a},
title = {Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: {{The}} Role of Risk},
author = {Exley, Christine L.},
date = {2016},
journaltitle = {Review of Economic Studies},
issn = {1467937X},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdv051},
abstract = {Decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk. A common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact. While this behavior could be fully rationalized by standard economic models, this paper shows that an additional mechanism is relevant: the use of risk as an excuse not to give. In a laboratory study, participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity. When their decisions do not involve tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity, they respond very similarly to self risk and charity risk. By contrast, when their decisions force tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity, participants act more averse to charity risk and less averse to self risk. These altered responses to risk bias participants towards choosing payoffs for themselves more often, consistent with excuse-driven responses to risk. Additional results support the existence of excuse-driven types.},
isbn = {00346527},
keywords = {altruism,Altruism,Charitable giving,Prosocial behaviour,risk preferences,Risk preferences}
}
@article{exleyImpactSurpriseDonation2018,
title = {The {{Impact}} of a {{Surprise Donation Ask}}},
author = {Exley, Christine L and Petrie, Ragan},
date = {2018},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.015}
}
@article{farmer2009hyperbolic,
title = {Hyperbolic Discounting Is Rational: {{Valuing}} the Far Future with Uncertain Discount Rates},
author = {Farmer, J Doyne and Geanakoplos, John},
date = {2009},
publisher = {{Cowles foundation discussion paper}}
}
@article{fetherstonhaughInsensitivityValueHuman1997,
ids = {fetherstonhaugh1997insensitivity},
title = {Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: {{A}} Study of Psychophysical Numbing},
author = {Fetherstonhaugh, David and Slovic, Paul and Johnson, Stephen and Friedrich, James},
date = {1997},
journaltitle = {Journal of Risk and uncertainty},
volume = {14},
pages = {283--300},
publisher = {{Springer}},
doi = {10.1023/A:1007744326393},
number = {3}
}
@article{Filiz-Ozbay2019,
title = {Demand for Giving to Multiple Charities: {{An}} Experimental Study},
author = {Filiz-Ozbay, Emel and Uler, Neslihan},
date = {2019},
journaltitle = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
volume = {17},
pages = {725--753},
issn = {15424774},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvy011},
abstract = {We study how competition among charities affects individuals' giving behavior. We characterize situations where charities benefitting substitute or complementary causes incentivize donations by offering subsidies in the form of rebates. Our theory predicts that an increase in the rebate rate offered by a given charity relative to a substitute charity will shift donations away from the substitute charity, but this “stealing” effect is not expected when complementary charities are considered. Our model further characterizes the conditions under which total donations increase with rebates. We test the model in an experimental setting, and demonstrate that the experimental results support our theoretical predictions. We derive the demand for giving as rebates vary for both substitute and complementary causes. The social net benefit of rebates is calculated by comparing campaign costs with new donations generated.},
keywords = {c90,charitable giving,charities,competition,d62,h41,jel codes,price elasticity of giving,rebate subsidies,substitute and complementary},
number = {3}
}
@article{fiskeFourElementaryForms1992,
title = {The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory of Social Relations.},
shorttitle = {The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality},
author = {Fiske, Alan P.},
date = {1992},
journaltitle = {Psychological review},
volume = {99},
pages = {689},
publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/YA2LZT35/Fiske - 1992 - The four elementary forms of sociality framework .pdf;/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/WYPAY5D4/doiLanding.html},
number = {4}
}
@article{fongTruthGivingExperimental2010,
ids = {Fong,Fong2010,Fong2010a,Fong2011,Fong2011a,Fonga,M.Fong2011},
title = {Truth in Giving: {{Experimental}} Evidence on the Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor},
author = {Fong, Christina and Oberholzer-Gee, Felix},
date = {2010},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
publisher = {{Elsevier B.V.}},
abstract = {It is often difficult for donors to predict the value of charitable giving because they know little about their 22 recipients. This concern is particularly acute when making contributions to organizations that serve 23 heterogeneouspopulations.Priorresearchshowsthatdonorsaremoregenerousiftheyknowtheirassistance 24 benefitsagrouptheylike.Butweknowlittleaboutthedemandforsuchinformation.Tostartclosingthisgap, 25 we study transfers of income to real-world poor people in dictator games. Our dictators can purchase signals 26 about why the recipients are poor. We find that a third of the dictators are willing to pay money to learn more 27 about their recipient. Dictators who acquire information mostly use it to withhold resources from less- 28 preferred types, leading to a drastic decline in aggregate transfers. With endogenous information about 29 recipients, we find that all types of poor recipients are worse off. 30},
keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,Altruism,Charitable giving,Dictator games,experiments,Fairness,information,philanthropy,Philanthropy,Redistribution,self-serving motivations}
}
@article{fox2005subjective,
title = {How Subjective Grouping of Options Influences Choice and Allocation: Diversification Bias and the Phenomenon of Partition Dependence.},
author = {Fox, Craig R and Ratner, Rebecca K and Lieb, Daniel S},
date = {2005},
journaltitle = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
volume = {134},
pages = {538},
publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
number = {4}
}
@article{friedrichPsychophysicalNumbingWhen1999,
ids = {Friedrich1999},
title = {Psychophysical Numbing: {{When}} Lives Are Valued Less as the Lives at Risk Increase},
author = {Friedrich, James and Barnes, Paul and Chapin, Kathryn and Dawson, Ian and Garst, Valerie and Kerr, David},
date = {1999},
journaltitle = {Journal of Consumer Psychology},
volume = {8},
pages = {277--299},
issn = {10577408},
doi = {10.1207/s15327663jcp0803_05},
abstract = {Costly life-saving interventions can often be described not only in terms ofthe num-ber of lives that may be saved but also in terms of the proportion of lives saved out of some total number at risk. In a phenomenon that has been referred to as psychophysical numbing (PN), Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich (1997) found that participants rated an intervention saving a fixed number of lives to be less worth investing in when more total lives were at risk (i,e,, when saved lives represented a smaller proportion of the total threat or problem). In two new experi-ments, life-valuation correlates of PN responding, as well as manipulations of death salience, accountability, and economics focus, were explored in the context of stu-dents' willingness to support mandatory antilock brake requirements for new cars, PN responding was pervasive, but non-PN responders were clearly distinguished by the greater overall value they placed on saving lives. Salience and accountability manipu-lations did not debias judgments but did tend to rule out low-effort processing as an explanation for these quantity confusions. An emphasis on economic considerations was consistently related to greater PN responding. As participants in a larger social system, each of us is routinely called on to make judgments concerning the appropriateness of mandating risk-reducing and life-saving interventions. Many decisions of this type (e,g,, requiring costly auto safety features to prevent some number of injuries or deaths) have substantial con-sp,quences for consumers. How do we make such decisions? The dynamics influ-encing our choices are no doubt a complicated interplay of attitudes and ideology Requests for reprints should be sent to},
number = {3}
}
@article{frumkin2001strategic,
title = {Strategic Positioning and the Financing of Nonprofit Organizations: {{Is}} Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace?},
author = {Frumkin, Peter and Kim, Mark T},
date = {2001},
journaltitle = {Public administration review},
volume = {61},
pages = {266--275},
publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
number = {3}
}
@article{gneezyAvoidingOverheadAversion2014,
ids = {Gneezy2014,Gneezy2014a,Gneezy2014b},
title = {Avoiding Overhead Aversion in Charity},
author = {Gneezy, Uri and Keenan, Elizabeth A. and Gneezy, Ayelet},
date = {2014},
journaltitle = {Science},
issn = {10959203},
doi = {10.1126/science.1253932},
abstract = {Donors tend to avoid charities that dedicate a high percentage of expenses to administrative and fundraising costs, limiting the ability of nonprofits to be effective. We propose a solution to this problem: Use donations from major philanthropists to cover overhead expenses and offer potential donors an overhead-free donation opportunity. A laboratory experiment testing this solution confirms that donations decrease when overhead increases, but only when donors pay for overhead themselves. In a field experiment with 40,000 potential donors, we compared the overhead-free solution with other common uses of initial donations. Consistent with prior research, informing donors that seed money has already been raised increases donations, as does a \$1:\$1 matching campaign. Our main result, however, clearly shows that informing potential donors that overhead costs are covered by an initial donation significantly increases the donation rate by 80\% (or 94\%) and total donations by 75\% (or 89\%) compared with the seed (or matching) approach.},
eprint = {25359974},
eprinttype = {pmid},
isbn = {1095-9203 (Electronic)\textbackslash r0036-8075 (Linking)}
}
@article{goodwin2008psychology,
title = {The Psychology of Meta-Ethics: {{Exploring}} Objectivism},
author = {Goodwin, Geoffrey P and Darley, John M},
date = {2008},
journaltitle = {Cognition},
volume = {106},
pages = {1339--1366},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
number = {3}
}
@article{Gordon2009,
ids = {Gordon2009a},
title = {The Role of Rating Agencies in the Market for Charitable Contributions: {{An}} Empirical Test},
author = {Gordon, Teresa P and Knock, Cathryn L and Neely, Daniel G},
date = {2009},
journaltitle = {Journal of accounting and public policy},
volume = {28},
pages = {469--484},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
doi = {10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.08.001},
number = {6}
}
@article{greenhalghSystematicReviewBarriers2020,
title = {A Systematic Review of the Barriers to and Facilitators of the Use of Evidence by Philanthropists When Determining Which Charities (Including Health Charities or Programmes) to Fund},
author = {Greenhalgh, Caroline and Montgomery, Paul},
date = {2020},
journaltitle = {Systematic reviews},
volume = {9},
pages = {1--13},
publisher = {{Springer}},
doi = {10/gh3785},
file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/6BXYIGT7/s13643-020-01448-w.html},
number = {1}
}
@article{harbaughWhatDonationsBuy1998,
ids = {Harbaugh1998a,Harbaugh1998c},
title = {What Do {{Donations Buy}}? {{A Model}} of {{Philanthropy Based}} on {{Prestige}} and {{Warm Glow}}},
author = {Harbaugh, William T},
date = {1998-05},
journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {67(2)},
pages = {269--284},
publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
issn = {0002-8282},
doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00062-5},
keywords = {empirical,motives for giving,philanthropy,prestige,reputation,social giving,theory},
number = {2}
}
@article{Harwell,
ids = {Harwella},
title = {Did the Ice Bucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic Reservoir ?: {{Evidence}} from a Real-Donation Lab Experiment Version as of November 19 , 2015 {{DRAFT}} : {{DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHORS}} ' {{PERMISSION}}},
author = {Harwell, Haley and Candidate, Ph D and Eckel, Catherine},
pages = {1--37}
}
@article{Heckman2015a,
ids = {Heckman2015},
title = {Econometric Mediation Analyses: {{Identifying}} the Sources of Treatment Effects from Experimentally Estimated Production Technologies with Unmeasured and Mismeasured Inputs},
author = {Heckman, James J and Pinto, Rodrigo},
date = {2015},
journaltitle = {Econometric Reviews},
volume = {34},
pages = {6--31},
issn = {15324168},
doi = {10.1080/07474938.2014.944466},
abstract = {This paper presents an econometric mediation analysis. It considers identification of production functions and the sources of output effects (treatment effects) from experimental interventions when some inputs are mismeasured and others are entirely omitted.},
archiveprefix = {arXiv},
arxivid = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
eprint = {25400327},
eprinttype = {pmid},
isbn = {9788578110796},
issue = {September 2016},
keywords = {Measurement error,Mediation analysis,Missing inputs,Production function}
}
@article{heyman2004effort,
title = {Effort for Payment: {{A}} Tale of Two Markets},
author = {Heyman, James and Ariely, Dan},
date = {2004},
journaltitle = {Psychological science},
volume = {15},
pages = {787--793},
publisher = {{SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
number = {11}
}
@article{Hoffman2015,
title = {Cooperate without Looking: {{Why}} We Care What People Think and Not Just What They Do},
author = {Hoffman, Moshe and Yoeli, Erez and Nowak, Martin A.},
date = {2015},
journaltitle = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
volume = {112},
pages = {1727--1732},
issn = {10916490},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1417904112},
abstract = {Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to "look" at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love.},
keywords = {Cooperation,Emotion,Evolution,Game theory,Motive},
number = {6}
}
@article{hseeUnitAskingMethod2013,
ids = {Hsee2013},
title = {Unit {{Asking}} : {{A Method}} to {{Boost Donations}} and {{Beyond}}},
author = {Hsee, Christopher K and Zhang, Jiao and Lu, Zoe Y and Xu, Fei},
date = {2013},
doi = {10.1177/0956797613482947},
keywords = {11,12,13,4,considerable time,decision making,judgment,raising charitable donations requires,received 12,revision accepted 2}
}
@article{jamisonDeceiveNotDeceive2008,
ids = {Jamison2008,Jamison2008a},
title = {To Deceive or Not to Deceive: {{The}} Effect of Deception on Behavior in Future Laboratory Experiments},
author = {Jamison, Julian and Karlan, Dean and Schechter, Laura},
date = {2008},
journaltitle = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
volume = {68},
pages = {477--488},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
keywords = {Cross-experiment},
number = {3}
}
@article{jenniExplainingIdentifiableVictim1997,
ids = {Jenni1997,Jenni1997a},
title = {Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect},
author = {Jenni, Karen and Loewenstein, George},
date = {1997},
journaltitle = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
volume = {14},
pages = {235--257},
publisher = {{Springer}},
doi = {10.1023/A:1007740225484},
abstract = {It is widely believed that people are willing to expend greater resources to save the lives of identified victims than to save equal numbers of unidentified or statistical victims. There are many possible causes of this disparity which have not been enumerated previously or tested empirically. We discuss four possible causes of the “identifiable victim effect” and present the results of two studies which indicate that the most important cause of the disparity in treatment of identifiable and statistical lives is that, for identifiable victims, a high proportion of those at risk can be saved},
keywords = {impact,philanthropy,psychological},
number = {3}
}
@article{jin2006information,
title = {Information and Consumer Choice: The Value of Publicized Health Plan Ratings},
author = {Jin, Ginger Zhe and Sorensen, Alan T},
date = {2006},
journaltitle = {Journal of health economics},
volume = {25},
pages = {248--275},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
number = {2}
}
@article{Jordan2016b,
title = {Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness},
author = {Jordan, Jillian J. and Hoffman, Moshe and Nowak, Martin A. and Rand, David G.},
date = {2016},
journaltitle = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
volume = {113},
pages = {8658--8663},
issn = {10916490},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1601280113},
abstract = {Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so.Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decisionmaking is operationalized by either a subject's choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.},
number = {31}
}
@article{kahane2018beyond,
title = {Beyond Sacrificial Harm: {{A}} Two-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology.},
author = {Kahane, Guy and Everett, Jim AC and Earp, Brian D and Caviola, Lucius and Faber, Nadira S and Crockett, Molly J and Savulescu, Julian},
date = {2018},
journaltitle = {Psychological Review},
volume = {125},
pages = {131},
publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
number = {2}
}
@article{kahneman1986fairness,
title = {Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics},
author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Knetsch, Jack L and Thaler, Richard H},
date = {1986},
journaltitle = {Journal of business},
pages = {S285--S300},
publisher = {{JSTOR}}
}
@article{kahnemanProspectTheoryAnalysis1979,
ids = {Kahneman1979,Kahneman1979a},
title = {Prospect {{Theory}}: {{An Analysis}} of {{Decision}} under {{Risk}}},
author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos},
date = {1979},
journaltitle = {Econometrica},
volume = {47},
pages = {263--291},
publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
issn = {00129682},
doi = {10.2307/1914185},
abstract = {This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. CR - Copyright \&\#169; 1979 The Econometric Society},
eprint = {1914185},
eprinttype = {pmid},
isbn = {0012-9682},
number = {2}
}
@book{kahnemanThinkingFastSlow2011,
title = {Thinking, {{Fast}} and {{Slow}}},
author = {Kahneman, Daniel},
date = {2011},
publisher = {{Penguin Books}}
}
@article{karlanEffectEffectivenessDonor2017a,
ids = {Karlan2017,Karlan2017a,karlan2017effect,karlanEffectEffectivenessDonor2017,karlanEffectEffectivenessDonor2017b},
title = {The Effect of Effectiveness: {{Donor}} Response to Aid Effectiveness in a Direct Mail Fundraising Experiment},
author = {Karlan, Dean and Wood, Daniel H.},
date = {2017},
journaltitle = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
volume = {66},
pages = {1--8},
publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
issn = {22148051},
doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2016.05.005},
abstract = {We test how donors respond to new information about a charity's effectiveness. Freedom from Hunger implemented a test of its direct marketing solicitations, varying letters by whether they include a discussion of their program's impact as measured by scientific research. The base script, used for both treatment and control, included a standard qualitative story about an individual beneficiary. Adding scientific impact information has no effect on average likelihood of giving or average gift amount. However, we find important heterogeneity: large prior donors both are more likely to give and also give more, whereas small prior donors are less likely to give. This pattern is consistent with two different types of donors: warm glow donors who respond negatively to analytical effectiveness information, and altruism donors who respond positively to such information.},
archiveprefix = {arXiv},
arxivid = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
eprint = {25246403},
eprinttype = {pmid},
isbn = {9788578110796},
keywords = {Aid effectiveness,Charitable fundraising,Pure altruism,Warm glow},
mendeley-groups = {giving-keywords}
}
@article{kinsbergenExplainingMonetaryDonations2013,
ids = {kinsbergen2013explaining},
title = {Explaining Monetary Donations to International Development Organisations: {{A}} Factorial Survey Approach},
author = {Kinsbergen, Sara and Tolsma, Jochem},
date = {2013},
journaltitle = {Social science research},
volume = {42},
pages = {1571--1586},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
doi = {10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.06.011},
number = {6}
}
@article{kogut2005singularity,
title = {The Singularity Effect of Identified Victims in Separate and Joint Evaluations},
author = {Kogut, Tehila and Ritov, Ilana},
date = {2005},
journaltitle = {Organizational behavior and human decision processes},
volume = {97},
pages = {106--116},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
number = {2}
}
@article{kogut2011identifiable,
title = {The Identifiable Victim Effect: {{Causes}} and Boundary Conditions},
author = {Kogut, Tehila and Ritov, Ilana},
date = {2011},
journaltitle = {The science of giving: Experimental approaches to the study of charity},
pages = {133--145},
publisher = {{New York: Taylor and Francis Group}}
}