---
bibtex: @article{mccrudden2016differences,
title={Differences in student reasoning about belief-relevant arguments: a mixed methods study},
author={McCrudden, Matthew T and Barnes, Ashleigh},
journal={Metacognition and Learning},
volume={11},
number={3},
pages={275--303},
year={2016},
publisher={Springer}
}
---
- [Belief inconsistent myside bias, Belief bias, Adolescent reasoning, Explanatory sequential mixed methods, Rationality]
This mixed methods study investigated high school students’ evaluations of scien- tific arguments. Myside bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent information more favorably than belief-inconsistent information. In the quantitative phase, participants (n=72 males) rated belief-consistent arguments more favorably than belief-inconsistent argu- ments; however, they also rated strong arguments more favorably than weak arguments, which indicated they did not evaluate the arguments exclusively on whether they were belief- consistent. In the follow-up qualitative phase, we conducted interviews with purposefully- sampled students who showed either higher or lower levels of myside bias. Results indicated that students in both groups applied normative evaluation criteria to the arguments. However, students who showed little or no myside bias applied the same evaluation criteria to arguments independent of whether they were belief-consistent, whereas students who showed high levels of myside bias applied different evaluation criteria to belief-inconsistent arguments. These findings suggest that procedural and conceptual metacognition may play a role in the extent to which individuals reason independent of their beliefs.
Myside bias or belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent information more favorably than belief-inconsistent information (Stanovich and West 2008; Stanovich et al. 2013; Thompson and Evans 2012). A seminal study by Lord et al. (1979) provides a clear illustration of myside bias (p2)
it is clear that individuals tend to evaluate belief-consistent information more favorably than belief-inconsistent information, and that individual difference variables predict whether individuals will successfully evaluate arguments independent of their beliefs. (p3)
Type 2 processing does not necessarily reduce or eliminate myside bias (Evans and Stanovich 2013). (p4)
Possible explaintations for this ....
Individuals use Type 1 (autonomous) to evaluate belief-consistent arguments, whereas they use Type 2 (deliberate) to evaluate belief-inconsistent arguments and, as a result, they appraise this information differently (Klaczynski 2000). (p4)
individuals use different modes of Type 2 processing to evaluate belief-relevant information. Although Type 2 processing is deliberate, it is not necessarily reflective (Moshman 2015). (p4)
This suggests that modes of Type 2 processing that are used when evaluating belief- relevant information may be related to differences in conceptual and procedural metacog- nition (Moshman 2015). (p4)
Thus, holding a belief does not necessarily lead to biased reasoning; rather, it may be due to the lack of understanding that one’s beliefs can bias one’s reasoning and the inability to inhibit one’s beliefs from influencing one’s reasoning. (p4)
Results
It was expected that individuals would evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favorably than belief-inconsistent arguments, which would indicate that individuals used Type 2 processing to evaluate belief-inconsistent arguments. The results supported this prediction, which replicated previous research. .... the quantitative data indicated that collectively, participants used the same form of processing (Type 2) to evaluate belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent arguments, but did not reason independent of their beliefs. It should be noted that the interaction effect indicated that the myside bias effect was larger for strong arguments than for weak arguments. (p10)
Two groups of participants emereged ...
More objective group
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The first theme was that they used normative evaluation criteria to justify their ratings; they explicitly focused on the quantity of evidence (i.e., amount of time and/or number of locations) used to support the argument. (p15)
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The second theme was uniform application of evaluation criteria; they applied their evaluation criteria consistently between belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent arguments. (p15)
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The third theme was in-depth scrutiny of the arguments; they evaluated arguments at a deep level. (p15)
Less objective group
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The first theme was that they used normative evaluation criteria to justify their ratings; they explicitly focused on the quantity of evidence used to support the argument. (p16)
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The second theme was belief-based application of normative evaluation criteria; these students applied the evaluation criteria differently based on whether the argument was consistent with their beliefs. (p16)
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The third theme was irrelevance; they drew upon ideas that were not relevant to the argument’s validity (i.e., the conclusion follows logically from its premises) to confer support for, or opposition to, an argument. (p17)
The main conclusion from the present study is that individuals primarily used the same form of processing (Type 2 processing) to evaluate belief-relevant arguments, but that they used different modes of Type 2 processing, which corresponded to differences in myside bias. (p17)
More objective students saw similar inference patterns ....
Students who were more- objective explicitly noted that the arguments were similar and indicated that they rated them similarly because the evidence used to support the arguments was equal in strength. However, none of the students who were less-objective appeared to perceive the overlapping similarities between the arguments or the evidence used to support the arguments. (p17)
Less objective group lacked metacognitive awareness ...
Thus, although they may have been aware of the criteria they used to evaluate both types of arguments, they did not show an awareness that they used different criteria to evaluate two opposing claims with equally compelling justifications. (p17)