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Is Democracy Possible Here.md

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Dworkin, R. 2006, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dworkin outlines his normative account of political justice and legitimacy and implications for human rights, religion and taxation. His thesis is based on two fundamental principals: intrinsic value and personal responsibility.

The principle of intrinsic value holds that each human life holds a special kind of objective value, that the success of any human life is important as its own end. The principle of personal responsibility holds that each person has a special responsibility for realising the success of their own life.

These two principles are shared deep enough throughout western society that they can form the foundations of common ground and political innovation. Some interesting claims that then stem from these foundations:

It is impossible to act in a way that denies the intrinsic importance of the lives of others without insulting your own dignity (p16)

As individuals, we owe others a measure of concern but not equal concern. The state however, owes all citizens equal concern (p95). Thus its ok to have greater concern for one’s own family but not for the state to (assuming equality under the law)

Dworkin conceptualises democracy along a majoritarian - partnership axis (p131). The majoritarian conception defines democracy in procedural terms: that the majority consensus is sufficient for legitimacy, is be unfair yet democratic but conflicts with the two principals. The partnership conception is congruent and requires fairness as a necessary condition of democracy.

Arguments claiming the majoritarian conception is fair fail to realise that it only has value as fair once certain prior conditions are met (p139)

Legitimacy

The legitimacy of the state stems not from consent (this is neither necessary nor sufficient) but rather from treat all those it governs with equal concern (p97).

But equal concern while necessary is not sufficient for legitimacy. “Though it would compromise my dignity to submit myself to the authority of others when I play no part in their decisions, my dignity is not compromised when I do take par, as an equal partner in those decisions.” (p145)

It is therefore equal political authority combined with equal concern from the state that legitimises democracy.

Suffrage

Dworkin’s clear implication is that universal suffrage it critical to democracy. “Equal concern…is best achieved with wide spread and roughly equal suffrage.” p(144) What he fails to consider is how universal suffrage leads to unequal concern by the state.

Other ideas raised: When does a decision become a collective one? What are the characteristics of a collective decision?

@book{dworkin2006democracy, title={Is democracy possible here?: principles for a new political debate}, author={Dworkin, Ronald}, year={2006}, publisher={Princeton University Press} }