bibtex:@article{christiano2001knowledge, title={Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democracy}, author={Christiano, Thomas}, journal={Australasian journal of philosophy}, volume={79}, number={2}, pages={197--215}, year={2001}, publisher={Taylor & Francis} }
Democracy seems paradoxical.
On the one hand, a moral ideal of political equality implies that all adults have moral rights to participate as equals in political decision making. This appears to commit us either to the idea that differences in com- petence relevant to making good political decisions are not important or that there are no fundamental differences in the relevant competence among adults. On the other hand, we clearly do think that the competence relevant to good political decision making is an important qualification for holding a share in political decision making power. This is shown by the fact that we do not and ought not to allow children or insane adults to have a share in political decision making. -- p197
Christiano argues that "justice requires equality in say despite differences in competence as long as individuals meet a threshold of minimum competence." p197
The first aim of this paper is to show that one can derive a principle of equal respect for judgement from a principle of equal consideration of interests.
"In my view, that democracy is intrinsically fair is an intuitively powerful idea."
Estlund's argument against:
Estlund claims that for a ruler to claim moral legitimacy on the basis of his wisdom, ‘acceptable reasons are owed to the reasonable’. Since there is likely to be disagreement among reasonable people, he concludes that ‘no knower is so knowable as to be known by all reasonable people’, and therefore that no ruler can legitimate his power on the grounds of his superior wisdom. 198
The competence argument against equality:
A person possesses the moral right to exercise power over others only if that person has the competence to discern when an exercise of power is morally justified, or by virtue of having the others’ consent (when they are relevantly competent). -- p200
(See Richard Arneson, ‘Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels’, p. 122 for a version of this premise.)
In other words, in the absence of consent, moral competence is a necessary qualification for the possession of the right to exercise power over others. -- p201
The Proportionality Principle is at odds with equality:
If moral competence is a necessary qualification for a right to exercise power over others and moral competence comes in degrees, then the right to exercise power over others ought to be assigned in proportion to the degree to which the right holder has moral competence. -- p201
Tom's response:
The basic principle of justice from which my argument proceeds is the principle of equal consideration of interests. -- p202
First, it is a welfarist principle. It states that justice is concerned with the advancement of the interests of persons. -- p202
Justice is not concerned with the distribution of goods simpliciter nor is it concerned with the distribution of what people take to be good. Justice regulates the distribution of what is good for individuals.
Second, justice strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of individuals when they conflict. The appropriate balance between these conflicting interests is given by the idea of equal consideration of interests.
On the idea of justice & justification that underpins this:
No one’s good is more important than anyone else’s. No one’s interests matter more than anyone else’s. Each person has a life to live and the interests of each person are combined into a special unity within that life. Thus the principle of equal consideration of interests requires that the interests of individuals be equally advanced in terms of lifetime prospects. -- p202
Justice, by contrast, is a set of principles by which people make claims and can be satisfied or not in a way that can be publicly argued. -- p203
It must be possible for individuals and groups, given their limited cognitive capacities, to say which particular states of affairs satisfy the principles and which ones do not... It must be given an interpretation that satisfies weak publicity.
So weak publicity does not require that everyone agree that equal consider- ation of interests is the basic principle of justice. It demands that if it is, individuals can determine whether it has been served or not, given their cognitive limitations and under suitable conditions.
Equality "is a rock bottom principle." p204 The just society is one that gives equal consideration to all interests. This could mean:
One, it may compromise with the individual through negotiation or bargaining. Two, it may try to bring about agreement with the individual either by changing the individual’s mind or its own mind. Three, it may simply give the person the right to speak his mind and allow others to respond. Four, the society may simply tolerate the individ- ual’s actions. Five, the society may give that person a voice in the matter at hand by giving him or her a vote in a collective decision making process.
Tom's view is "society is properly responsive to the appeals of citizens when it enables them to see, given their ordinary cognitive limitations, that the institutions of their society embody equal consideration of the interests of all citizens." -- p204
This is a principle of respect for the judgement of each citizen. It treats each person as having something to say and of being worthy of being listened to and responded to. But it only requires responsiveness to those who satisfy a minimum of competence in moral reflection.
3 facts of judgement support this claim: (p205)
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The fallibility of moral judgement is pervasive, even when confined to the parameters set by a principle of equality.
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Facts connect individuals’ judgements to their interests.
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There are facts linking the right to appeal and the interests of each individual.
Justice demands that "society must publicly express the equal consideration of interests in a way that can be clear in principle to its members." --p208
Democratic decision making is a generally necessary condition for satisfying this principle in a public way. --p208
A possible argument against liberalism and anarchism:
Political societies are marked by deep disagreements about what is fair and just. These disagreements relate to the overall structure of society so that all are inter- dependently affected by the resolutions to these disagreements. Hence, they cannot be resolved merely by permitting each to go his or her way, or in other words, by means of liberal rights and toleration. --p208
The equal consideration of the interests can be clearly expressed to all citizens only by making collective decisions about the common social world in an egalitarian way.
But not everyone will be satisfied with democracy:
The point is that democracy is the only way that the principle of weak publicity can be satisfied at all. This is what makes democracy a uniquely just solution to political conflict and disagreement. --p209