From 336caeb58fcbe1c889fa6083a43f0dbe71f08ed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TrellixVulnTeam Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 23:13:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Adding tarfile member sanitization to extractall() --- qnm/cached.py | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/qnm/cached.py b/qnm/cached.py index 85a3e8d..383b300 100644 --- a/qnm/cached.py +++ b/qnm/cached.py @@ -547,7 +547,26 @@ def _decompress_data(): print("Trying to decompress file {}".format(tarball)) with tarfile.open(str(tarball), "r:bz2") as tar: - tar.extractall(str(dest_dir)) + def is_within_directory(directory, target): + + abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory) + abs_target = os.path.abspath(target) + + prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target]) + + return prefix == abs_directory + + def safe_extract(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False): + + for member in tar.getmembers(): + member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name) + if not is_within_directory(path, member_path): + raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File") + + tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) + + + safe_extract(tar, str(dest_dir)) data_dir = dest_dir / 'data' pickle_files = data_dir.glob('*.pickle')