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dissertation.out
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\BOOKMARK [0][-]{chapter*.3}{Introduction}{}% 1
\BOOKMARK [0][-]{chapter.1}{Government through patronage: the bargain for education in decentralized Brazil }{}% 2
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1.1}{Introduction}{chapter.1}% 3
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1.2}{Related literature}{chapter.1}% 4
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1.3}{Institutional context and data}{chapter.1}% 5
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.3.1}{Municipal education in Brazil}{section.1.3}% 6
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.3.2}{Bureaucratic turnover}{section.1.3}% 7
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.3.3}{Local governance and mayoral coalitions}{section.1.3}% 8
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.3.4}{Data}{section.1.3}% 9
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1.4}{Theory}{chapter.1}% 10
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1.5}{Empirical results}{chapter.1}% 11
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1.6}{Conclusion}{chapter.1}% 12
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.6.1}{Covariate balance}{section.1.6}% 13
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.6.2}{Accountability of mayors}{section.1.6}% 14
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.6.3}{Regression Discontinuity Design}{section.1.6}% 15
\BOOKMARK [0][-]{chapter.2}{How to reduce bureaucratic corruption? Unpacking Brazilian anti-corruption audits \040with Romain Ferrali }{}% 16
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.1}{Introduction}{chapter.2}% 17
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.2}{Context and Data}{chapter.2}% 18
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.2.1}{Municipal bureaucracies and management}{section.2.2}% 19
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.2.2}{Federal transfers and anti-corruption audits}{section.2.2}% 20
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.2.3}{Additional data}{section.2.2}% 21
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.3}{Reduced-form estimation}{chapter.2}% 22
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.3.1}{Approach}{section.2.3}% 23
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.3.2}{Results}{section.2.3}% 24
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.3.3}{Discussion}{section.2.3}% 25
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.4}{Theory}{chapter.2}% 26
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.4.1}{Setting}{section.2.4}% 27
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.4.2}{A baseline model}{section.2.4}% 28
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.4.3}{Introducing a wage penalty}{section.2.4}% 29
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.4.4}{Introducing a clean-up effect}{section.2.4}% 30
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.4.5}{Discussion}{section.2.4}% 31
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.5}{Structural estimation}{chapter.2}% 32
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.5.1}{Approach}{section.2.5}% 33
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.5.2}{Estimates, validation and counterfactual experiments}{section.2.5}% 34
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.6}{Conclusion}{chapter.2}% 35
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.6.1}{Proofs}{section.2.6}% 36
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.6.2}{Additional descriptive statistics}{section.2.6}% 37
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.6.3}{Measuring corruption}{section.2.6}% 38
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.6.4}{Management index}{section.2.6}% 39
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.6.5}{Additional descriptive statistics}{section.2.6}% 40
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.7}{Robustness checks}{chapter.2}% 41
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.1}{Other categories of bureaucrats}{section.2.7}% 42
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.2}{Subset of municipal secretaries}{section.2.7}% 43
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.3}{Subset by Tenure}{section.2.7}% 44
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.4}{Hiring Practices}{section.2.7}% 45
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.5}{Balance tests}{section.2.7}% 46
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.6}{Dependent variable as percentages}{section.2.7}% 47
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.7}{Findings on management}{section.2.7}% 48
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.8}{Subset of never audited municipalities}{section.2.7}% 49
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.9}{Individual-level analysis}{section.2.7}% 50
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.2.7.10}{Political models with other corruption metrics}{section.2.7}% 51
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2.8}{Estimation and validation of the DDC model}{chapter.2}% 52
\BOOKMARK [0][-]{chapter.3}{A partisan affair: Mapping patronage in municipal bureaucracies in Brazi}{}% 53
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.3.1}{Introduction}{chapter.3}% 54
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.3.2}{Context and Data}{chapter.3}% 55
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.2.1}{Brazilian municipal government}{section.3.2}% 56
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.2.2}{Municipal employment and patronage in Brazil}{section.3.2}% 57
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.2.3}{Partisan affiliation in Brazil}{section.3.2}% 58
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.3.3}{Data}{chapter.3}% 59
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.3.1}{Municipal and Private Sector Employment}{section.3.3}% 60
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.3.2}{Partisan affiliation}{section.3.3}% 61
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.3.3}{Joining Public Sector Employment to Partisanship Data}{section.3.3}% 62
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.3.4}{Who benefits from patronage?}{section.3.3}% 63
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.3.5}{Islands of Patronage}{section.3.3}% 64
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.3.4}{Campaign Finance and Wealthy Patrons}{chapter.3}% 65
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.3.5}{Conclusion}{chapter.3}% 66
\BOOKMARK [0][-]{chapter*.95}{Conclusion}{}% 67
\BOOKMARK [0][-]{chapter*.97}{Bibliography}{}% 68