In 2.7.1.) we have seen that a TEE can execute operations confidentially. In 2.7.2) we have shown how a third party can verify what kind of computations are run within a TEE. Here, we demonstrate how Integritee uses these features to make computations publicly verifiable.
A classical use case for remote attestation involves a service provider (SP) like a video streaming service which wants to be sure his viewer application runs on a genuine SGX hardware and respects the digital rights management (DRM). The SP therefore requests a quote from the application and sends that quote to Intel Attestation Services (IAS) who sign off the quote if it is genuine. The issue here is that IAS only talks to registered clients. You need to register in order to get a service provider ID (SPID), which needs to be supplied along with requests.
The above is practically infeasible, as every client needs to sign up with IAS, which is why Integritee has changed the protocol. The service provider’s application and the enclave run on the same hardware. The integrite-worker itself will request a remote attestation with its enclave, and write the response by IAS to the public registry on chain. With this scheme, only Integritee operators need to register with IAS, while the clients can be sure that the operator run the correct application, without harming confidentiality of the user data.
\*Integritee-worker: Overarching term for a hardware running any kind of business logic in a TEE.