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tag update for 5.5.4 / 5.2.4
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Elar Lang committed Jan 10, 2025
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions 5.0/en/0x13-V5-Validation-Sanitization-Encoding.md
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Expand Up @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Where it is not possible to do this, other options include sanitization and sand
| **5.2.1** | [MODIFIED] Verify that all untrusted HTML input from WYSIWYG editors or similar is properly sanitized using a well-known and secure HTML sanitization library or framework feature. |||| 116 |
| **5.2.2** | [MODIFIED] Verify that data being passed to a potentially dangerous context is sanitized beforehand to enforce safety measures, such as only allowing characters which are safe for this context and trimming input which is too long. |||| 138 |
| **5.2.3** | Verify that the application sanitizes user input before passing to mail systems to protect against SMTP or IMAP injection. |||| 147 |
| **5.2.4** | [MODIFIED] Verify that the application avoids the use of eval() or other dynamic code execution features such as Spring Expression Language (SpEL). Where there is no alternative, any user input being included must be sanitized or sandboxed before being executed. |||| 95 |
| **5.2.4** | [MODIFIED, COVERS 5.5.4] Verify that the application avoids the use of eval() or other dynamic code execution features such as Spring Expression Language (SpEL). Where there is no alternative, any user input being included must be sanitized or sandboxed before being executed. |||| 95 |
| **5.2.5** | [MODIFIED] Verify that the application protects against template injection attacks by not allowing templates to be built based on untrusted input. Where there is no alternative, any untrusted input being included dynamically during template creation must be sanitized or strictly validated. |||| 94 |
| **5.2.6** | [MODIFIED] Verify that the application protects against Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks, by validating untrusted data against an allowlist of protocols, domains, paths and ports and sanitizing potentially dangerous characters before using the data to call another service. |||| 918 |
| **5.2.7** | Verify that the application sanitizes, disables, or sandboxes user-supplied Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) scriptable content, especially as they relate to XSS resulting from inline scripts, and foreignObject. |||| 159 |
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| **5.5.1** | [DELETED, INCORRECT] | | | | |
| **5.5.2** | Verify that the application correctly restricts XML parsers to only use the most restrictive configuration possible and to ensure that unsafe features such as resolving external entities are disabled to prevent XML eXternal Entity (XXE) attacks. |||| 611 |
| **5.5.3** | [MODIFIED, MERGED FROM 1.5.2] Verify that deserialization with untrusted clients enforces safe input handling, such as using an allowlist of object types or restricting client-defined object types, to prevent deserialization attacks. Deserialization mechanisms that are explicitly defined as insecure (such as BinaryFormatter) must not be used with untrusted input. |||| 502 |
| **5.5.4** | [DELETED, DUPLICATE OF 5.2.4] | | | | |
| **5.5.4** | [DELETED, COVERED BY 5.2.4] | | | | |
| **5.5.5** | [MODIFIED, MOVED FROM 13.1.1, LEVEL L1 > L2] Verify that different parsers used in the application for the same data type (e.g. JSON parsers, XML parsers, URL parsers), perform parsing in a consistent way and use the same character encoding mechanism to avoid issues such as JSON Interoperability vulnerabilities or different URI or file parsing behavior being exploited in Remote File Inclusion (RFI) or Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. | ||| 436 |

## V5.6 Validation and Sanitization Architecture
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