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f move 3537 to security
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TheBlueMatt committed Jan 15, 2025
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13 changes: 7 additions & 6 deletions CHANGELOG.md
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## Bug Fixes
* Fixed a rare case where a BOLT 12 payment may be made duplicatively if the
node crashes while processing a BOLT 12 `invoice` message (#3313).
* Fixed a bug where a counterparty can cause funds of ours to be locked up
by broadcasting a revoked commitment transaction and following HTLC
transactions in specific formats when using an anchor channel. The funds can
be recovered by upgrading to 0.1 and replaying the counterparty's broadcasted
transactions (using `Confirm::transactions_confirmed`) (#3537).
* Fixed a bug where a malicious sender could cause a payment `Event` to be
generated with an `OfferId` using a payment with a lower amount than the
corresponding BOLT 12 offer would have required. The amount in the
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will have `balance_msat` equal to `next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat` (#3243).

## Security
0.1 fixes a funds-theft vulnerability when paying BOLT 12 offers.
0.1 fixes a funds-theft vulnerability when paying BOLT 12 offers as well as a
funds-lockup denial-of-service issue for anchor channels.
* When paying a BOLT 12 offer, if the recipient responds to our
`invoice_request` with an `invoice` which had an amount different from the
amount we intended to pay (either from the `offer` or the `amount_msats`
passed to `ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`), LDK would pay the amount from the
`invoice`. As a result, a malicious recipient could cause us to overpay the
amount we intended to pay (#3535).
* Fixed a bug where a counterparty can cause funds of ours to be locked up
by broadcasting a revoked commitment transaction and following HTLC
transactions in specific formats when using an anchor channel. The funds can
be recovered by upgrading to 0.1 and replaying the counterparty's broadcasted
transactions (using `Confirm::transactions_confirmed`) (#3537).
* Various denial-of-service issues in the formerly-alpha `lightning-liquidity`
crate have been addressed (#3436, #3493).

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