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v2 security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks #8585

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kernel-patches-daemon-bpf[bot]
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Pull request for series with
subject: v2 security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=939085

Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.

Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.

Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <[email protected]>
@kernel-patches-daemon-bpf
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Upstream branch: 0b93631
series: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=939085
version: 1

@kernel-patches-daemon-bpf
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=939085 expired. Closing PR.

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