🚨 [security] Update electron 16.0.9 → 26.1.0 (major)

[depfu]

---

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

---

Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ electron (16.0.9 → 26.1.0) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Electron vulnerable to out-of-package code execution when launched with arbitrary cwd

Impact

Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as myapp --help

Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met:

• Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory
• The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory

This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude Physically Local Attacks but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future.

Workarounds

There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 26.0.0-beta.13
• 25.5.0
• 24.7.1
• 23.3.13
• 22.3.19

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron's Content-Secrity-Policy disabling eval not applied consistently in renderers with sandbox disabled

Impact

A Content-Security-Policy that disables eval, specifically setting a script-src directive and not providing unsafe-eval in that directive, is not respected in renderers that have sandbox and contextIsolation disabled. i.e. sandbox: false and contextIsolation: false in the webPreferences object.

This resulted in incorrectly allowing usage of methods like eval() and new Function, which can result in an expanded attack surface.

Patches

This issue only ever affected the 22 and 23 major versions of Electron and has been fixed in the latest versions of those release lines. Specifically, these versions contain the fixes:

• 22.0.1
• 23.0.0-alpha.2

We recommend all apps upgrade to the latest stable version of Electron, especially if they use sandbox: false or contextIsolation: false.

Workarounds

If upgrading isn't possible, this issue can be addressed without upgrading by enabling at least one of sandbox: true or contextIsolation: true on all renderers.

const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
  webPreferences: {
    sandbox: true,
  }
});

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

Credit

Thanks to user @andreasdj for reporting this issue.

🚨 Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:

• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned.
• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.

The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.

Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 25.0.0-alpha.2
• 24.0.1
• 23.2.3
• 22.3.6

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:

• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned.
• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.

The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.

Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 25.0.0-alpha.2
• 24.0.1
• 23.2.3
• 22.3.6

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:

• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned.
• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.

The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.

Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 25.0.0-alpha.2
• 24.0.1
• 23.2.3
• 22.3.6

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:

• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned.
• If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.

The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.

Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 25.0.0-alpha.2
• 24.0.1
• 23.2.3
• 22.3.6

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron vulnerable to out-of-package code execution when launched with arbitrary cwd

Impact

Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as myapp --help

Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met:

• Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory
• The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory

This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude Physically Local Attacks but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future.

Workarounds

There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 26.0.0-beta.13
• 25.5.0
• 24.7.1
• 23.3.13
• 22.3.19

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron vulnerable to out-of-package code execution when launched with arbitrary cwd

Impact

Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as myapp --help

Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met:

• Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory
• The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory

This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude Physically Local Attacks but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future.

Workarounds

There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 26.0.0-beta.13
• 25.5.0
• 24.7.1
• 23.3.13
• 22.3.19

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron vulnerable to out-of-package code execution when launched with arbitrary cwd

Impact

Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as myapp --help

Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met:

• Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory
• The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory

This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude Physically Local Attacks but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future.

Workarounds

There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 26.0.0-beta.13
• 25.5.0
• 24.7.1
• 23.3.13
• 22.3.19

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Electron vulnerable to out-of-package code execution when launched with arbitrary cwd

Impact

Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as myapp --help

Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met:

• Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory
• The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory

This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude Physically Local Attacks but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future.

Workarounds

There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

• 26.0.0-beta.13
• 25.5.0
• 24.7.1
• 23.3.13
• 22.3.19

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

🚨 Heap buffer overflow in GPU

Heap buffer overflow in GPU in Google Chrome prior to 107.0.5304.121 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

🚨 Exfiltration of hashed SMB credentials on Windows via file:// redirect

Impact

When following a redirect, Electron delays a check for redirecting to file:// URLs from other schemes. The contents of the file is not available to the renderer following the redirect, but if the redirect target is a SMB URL such as file://some.website.com/, then in some cases, Windows will connect to that server and attempt NTLM authentication, which can include sending hashed credentials.

Patches

This issue has been fixed in all current stable versions of Electron. Specifically, these versions contain the fixes:

• 21.0.0-beta.1
• 20.0.1
• 19.0.11
• 18.3.7

We recommend all apps upgrade to the latest stable version of Electron.

Workarounds

If upgrading isn't possible, this issue can be addressed without upgrading by preventing redirects to file:// URLs in the WebContents.on('will-redirect') event, for all WebContents:

app.on('web-contents-created', (e, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('will-redirect', (e, url) => {
    if (/^file:/.test(url)) e.preventDefault()
  })
})

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

Credit

Thanks to user @coolcoolnoworries for reporting this issue.

🚨 Exfiltration of hashed SMB credentials on Windows via file:// redirect

Impact

When following a redirect, Electron delays a check for redirecting to file:// URLs from other schemes. The contents of the file is not available to the renderer following the redirect, but if the redirect target is a SMB URL such as file://some.website.com/, then in some cases, Windows will connect to that server and attempt NTLM authentication, which can include sending hashed credentials.

Patches

This issue has been fixed in all current stable versions of Electron. Specifically, these versions contain the fixes:

• 21.0.0-beta.1
• 20.0.1
• 19.0.11
• 18.3.7

We recommend all apps upgrade to the latest stable version of Electron.

Workarounds

If upgrading isn't possible, this issue can be addressed without upgrading by preventing redirects to file:// URLs in the WebContents.on('will-redirect') event, for all WebContents:

app.on('web-contents-created', (e, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('will-redirect', (e, url) => {
    if (/^file:/.test(url)) e.preventDefault()
  })
})

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

Credit

Thanks to user @coolcoolnoworries for reporting this issue.

🚨 Exfiltration of hashed SMB credentials on Windows via file:// redirect

Impact

When following a redirect, Electron delays a check for redirecting to file:// URLs from other schemes. The contents of the file is not available to the renderer following the redirect, but if the redirect target is a SMB URL such as file://some.website.com/, then in some cases, Windows will connect to that server and attempt NTLM authentication, which can include sending hashed credentials.

Patches

This issue has been fixed in all current stable versions of Electron. Specifically, these versions contain the fixes:

• 21.0.0-beta.1
• 20.0.1
• 19.0.11
• 18.3.7

We recommend all apps upgrade to the latest stable version of Electron.

Workarounds

If upgrading isn't possible, this issue can be addressed without upgrading by preventing redirects to file:// URLs in the WebContents.on('will-redirect') event, for all WebContents:

app.on('web-contents-created', (e, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('will-redirect', (e, url) => {
    if (/^file:/.test(url)) e.preventDefault()
  })
})

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

Credit

Thanks to user @coolcoolnoworries for reporting this issue.

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron

Impact

This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 17.0.0-alpha.6
• 16.0.6
• 15.3.5
• 14.2.4
• 13.6.6

Workarounds

Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.

app.on('web-contents-created', (event, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device', (event, devices, callback) => {
    // Prevent default behavior
    event.preventDefault();
    // Cancel the request
    callback('');
  });
});

For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected].

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 17 commits:

• fix: instantiate tab video tracks from BrowserCaptureMediaStreamTrack (#39618)
• fix: `chrome.tabs` 'url' and 'title' are privileged information (#39607)
• fix: dangling raw_ptr in ElectronBrowserMainParts dtor (#39594)
• fix: `chrome://gpu` failing to load (#39584)
• fix: explorer restart does not recreated thumbnail toolbar buttons (#39587)
• fix: use tiled edges to calculate frame inset sizes in Linux (#39571)
• docs: note macOS bounds Tray offset (#39554)
• fix: destruction order of js env fields (#39548)
• chore: cherry-pick 11 changes from Release-1-M115 (#39516)
• docs: add missing webview `render-process-gone` event (#39545)
• chore: bump chromium to 116.0.5845.97 (26-x-y) (#39530)
• feat: support dns-result-order Node.js cli flag (#39501)
• fix: crash when calling `BrowserWindow.moveTop()` on modal children (#39527)
• docs: update timelines for E27 (#39508)
• refactor: clean up Node.js cli arg parsing (#39510)
• chore: bump chromium to 116.0.5845.96 (26-x-y) (#39502)
• refactor: update `WebContentsZoomController` (#39495)

---

Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with @depfu rebase.

All Depfu comment commands

@​depfu rebase

Rebases against your default branch and redoes this update

@​depfu recreate

Recreates this PR, overwriting any edits that you've made to it

@​depfu merge

Merges this PR once your tests are passing and conflicts are resolved

@​depfu cancel merge

Cancels automatic merging of this PR

@​depfu close

Closes this PR and deletes the branch

@​depfu reopen

Restores the branch and reopens this PR (if it's closed)

@​depfu pause

Ignores all future updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu pause [minor|major]

Ignores all future minor/major updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu resume

Future versions of this dependency will create PRs again (leaves this PR as is)

[depfu]

Closed in favor of #68.