improve security and fix a few minor issues #5
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`DirBuilder` ignores if the directory already exists. This is a bit of an isuse security-wise. An adversary could try to create the directory first, giving her full access to our temporary directory. Simply disabling the recursive mode appears to be the simplest and most secure solution. Another possibilities might be to use a more secury RNG (slower!) or implementing directory creation ourselves, failing if the directory already exists.
If creation of a file or directory fails, the destructor panics
because the file doesn't exist.
Example:
// Temp instance is created here
let temp = Temp {
path: create_path_in(directory.to_path_buf()),
_type: TempType::Dir,
_released: false,
};
// `Temp` is dropped here if creation the directory fails and the destructor
// will fail to remove the directory since its creation failed.
try!(temp.create_dir());
equalsraf
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In windows trying to remove a file/directory being used may cause an error - samgiles/rs-mktemp#5 will then cause us to panic. For now leak the tmpdir and release early.
equalsraf
added a commit
to equalsraf/ffcli
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Apr 26, 2017
In windows trying to remove a file/directory being used may cause an error - samgiles/rs-mktemp#5 will then cause us to panic. For now leak the tmpdir and release early.
equalsraf
added a commit
to equalsraf/ffcli
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 26, 2017
In windows trying to remove a file/directory being used may cause an error - samgiles/rs-mktemp#5 will then cause us to panic. For now leak the tmpdir and release early.
equalsraf
added a commit
to equalsraf/ffcli
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 26, 2017
In windows trying to remove a file/directory being used may cause an error - samgiles/rs-mktemp#5 will then cause us to panic. For now leak the tmpdir and release early.
|
Very nice work, thanks! Will set up a release this evening. 🙌 |
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Took a look at the default RNG used by the uuid crate and updated it while on it. I'm not a specialist for RNGs but a far as I can tell it should be strong enough that DoS are very unlikely to succeed. However, in the case of directories I decided to no longer recursively create the directory. When recursively creating it, "already exists" errors are ignored, potentially allowing an adversary to create the directory earlier than we do and thereby gaining full access to the directory. This would be far worse than DoS.
This is related to #3.