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Patch for v1.2.12 #5

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Patch for v1.2.12 #5

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38 changes: 33 additions & 5 deletions src/tcp.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1158,9 +1158,35 @@ relpTcpGetCN(relpTcp_t *pThis, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, char *namebuf, int lenNam
return r;
}


/* helper to consistently add names to error message buffer */
static int
relpTcpAddToCertNamesBuffer(relpTcp_t *const pThis,
char *const buf,
const size_t buflen,
int *p_currIdx,
const char *const certName)
{
int r = 0;
assert(buf != NULL);
assert(p_currIdx != NULL);
const int currIdx = *p_currIdx;
const int n = snprintf(buf + currIdx, buflen - currIdx,
"DNSname: %s; ", certName);
if(n < 0 || n >= (int) (buflen - currIdx)) {
callOnAuthErr(pThis, "", "certificate validation failed, names "
"inside certifcate are way to long (> 32KiB)",
RELP_RET_AUTH_CERT_INVL);
r = GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
} else {
*p_currIdx += n;
}
return r;
}

/* Check the peer's ID in name auth mode. */
static int
relpTcpChkPeerName(relpTcp_t *pThis, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert)
relpTcpChkPeerName(relpTcp_t *const pThis, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert)
{
int r = 0;
int ret;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1199,8 +1225,9 @@ relpTcpChkPeerName(relpTcp_t *pThis, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert)
break;
else if(gnuRet == GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME) {
pThis->pEngine->dbgprint("librelp: subject alt dnsName: '%s'\n", szAltName);
iAllNames += snprintf(allNames+iAllNames, sizeof(allNames)-iAllNames,
"DNSname: %s; ", szAltName);
r = relpTcpAddToCertNamesBuffer(pThis, allNames, sizeof(allNames),
&iAllNames, szAltName);
if(r != 0) goto done;
relpTcpChkOnePeerName(pThis, szAltName, &bFoundPositiveMatch);
/* do NOT break, because there may be multiple dNSName's! */
}
Expand All @@ -1211,8 +1238,9 @@ relpTcpChkPeerName(relpTcp_t *pThis, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert)
/* if we did not succeed so far, we try the CN part of the DN... */
if(relpTcpGetCN(pThis, cert, cnBuf, sizeof(cnBuf)) == 0) {
pThis->pEngine->dbgprint("librelp: relpTcp now checking auth for CN '%s'\n", cnBuf);
iAllNames += snprintf(allNames+iAllNames, sizeof(allNames)-iAllNames,
"CN: %s; ", cnBuf);
r = relpTcpAddToCertNamesBuffer(pThis, allNames, sizeof(allNames),
&iAllNames, cnBuf);
if(r != 0) goto done;
relpTcpChkOnePeerName(pThis, cnBuf, &bFoundPositiveMatch);
}
}
Expand Down
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