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chore: update book on memory argument #1958

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Jan 21, 2025
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chore: update book on memory argument #1958

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e0df42b
improve docs regarding new memory argument
rkm0959 Jan 21, 2025
5c8a50e
resolve comments
rkm0959 Jan 21, 2025
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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions book/docs/security/security-model.md
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Expand Up @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ SP1 assumes that the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curve over the d

An analysis based on Thomas Pornin's paper ["EcGFp5: a Specialized Elliptic Curve"](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/274.pdf), confirmed that the selected elliptic curve provides at least 100 bits of security against known attacks.

This assumption is used in our new memory argument. For more details, see [our notes](.../../../../static/SP1_Turbo_Memory_Argument.pdf) explaining how it works.

### Groth16, PLONK, and the Zero-Knowledgeness of SP1

SP1 utilizes [Gnark's](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark) implementation of Groth16 or PLONK over the BN254 curve to compress a STARK proof into a SNARK proof, which is then used for on-chain verification. SP1 assumes all cryptographic assumptions required for the security of Groth16 and PLONK. While our implementations of Groth16 and PLONK are zero-knowledge, individual STARK proofs in SP1 do not currently satisfy the zero-knowledge property.
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Binary file added book/static/SP1_Turbo_Memory_Argument.pdf
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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions book/versioned_docs/version-4.0.0/security/security-model.md
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Expand Up @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ SP1 assumes that the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curve over the d

An analysis based on Thomas Pornin's paper ["EcGFp5: a Specialized Elliptic Curve"](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/274.pdf), confirmed that the selected elliptic curve provides at least 100 bits of security against known attacks.

This assumption is used in our new memory argument. For more details, see [our notes](.../../../../../static/SP1_Turbo_Memory_Argument.pdf) explaining how it works.

### Groth16, PLONK, and the Zero-Knowledgeness of SP1

SP1 utilizes [Gnark's](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark) implementation of Groth16 or PLONK over the BN254 curve to compress a STARK proof into a SNARK proof, which is then used for on-chain verification. SP1 assumes all cryptographic assumptions required for the security of Groth16 and PLONK. While our implementations of Groth16 and PLONK are zero-knowledge, individual STARK proofs in SP1 do not currently satisfy the zero-knowledge property.
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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions crates/stark/src/septic_extension.rs
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Expand Up @@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ impl<F: AbstractField> Display for SepticExtension<F> {
}

impl<F: Field> SepticExtension<F> {
/// Returns the value of z^{index * p} in the [`SepticExtension`] field.
fn z_pow_p(index: u32) -> Self {
// The constants written below are specifically for the BabyBear field.
debug_assert_eq!(F::order(), BigUint::from(2013265921u32));
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -482,6 +483,7 @@ impl<F: Field> SepticExtension<F> {
unreachable!();
}

/// Returns the value of z^{index * p^2} in the [`SepticExtension`] field.
fn z_pow_p2(index: u32) -> Self {
// The constants written below are specifically for the BabyBear field.
debug_assert_eq!(F::order(), BigUint::from(2013265921u32));
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